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Preface
The principal objectives of the AICPA’s September 20—21, 1982, Small 
Business Tax Equity Conference were to call attention to significant 
aspects of our federal tax system that adversely affect small business 
and to develop constructive alternatives. By doing this we hoped to 
stimulate changes that will create an economic environment in which 
small business can prosper.
Our major premise is not that legislators have consciously discrimi­
nated against small business. Instead it is, first, that there are some 
important business tax provisions—most of which were designed to 
provide justifiable incentives to certain courses of action—that, in 
effect, give large corporations an economic advantage over the small 
businessman; and second, that there are certain inherent characteristics 
of small businesses that make it impractical for them to take advantage 
of tax benefits that are more readily available to larger corporations, 
sometimes merely because of the cost and complexity of doing so.
Small businesses, many of which are unincorporated, are typically 
labor intensive, closely held, and owner-managed. Their access to 
outside sources of capital is limited. For most, the sophisticated strategies 
needed to take full advantage of potential tax savings are just not 
practicable, due in part to the inordinate complexity of many tax 
provisions.
The conference focused on three major areas: jobs tax incentives for 
small business, financing the enterprise, and retirement and fringe 
benefits equity. Papers on specific subjects within each of these broad 
areas were distributed to conference participants before the meeting. 
The authors summarized their papers briefly and discussed them with 
designated panelists and other conference registrants.
All the papers are included in these Proceedings, and each is 
summarized in the Introduction, which also includes a general com­
mentary.
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Both the conference and this publication were produced through the 
efforts of a large number of dedicated professionals, all of whom are 
identified on the following pages. It is appropriate, however, that this 
preface give special recognition to William T. Diss, who chaired the 
task force that planned and organized the conference; J. F. Kubik, who 
served as moderator; Donald H. Skadden, whose summary of the 
conference and introduction to these Proceedings added perspective for 
both registrants and readers; and William R. Stromsem, the conference 
administrator. In addition, we are grateful to Congressman Sam Gibbons 
and to David Glickman of the Treasury Department for their challenging 
and informative luncheon addresses, which are not reproduced in these 
Proceedings.
Ivan Bull, Chairman 
Committee on Small Business
William L. Raby, Chairman
Federal Taxation Executive
Committee
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Introduction
by Donald H. Skadden, CPA, Associate Dean, Graduate School of 
Business, University of Michigan
It has been widely recognized for many years that tax laws in the United 
States are becoming increasingly more complex. Recently it has been 
alleged that accounting standards and other pronouncements are also 
becoming overly complex. The complexity of both tax rules and 
accounting standards impose a special hardship on small business.*  
Some contend that financial statements and auditing standards for small 
business must satisfy a different set of investors and creditors than those 
of the widely held corporation, and therefore small business should not 
be subject to all the same accounting standards as large business. It 
has also been suggested that small business should not have to apply 
many of the more complex tax rules.
* In its Tax Recommendations to Aid Small Business, the AICPA Federal Taxation 
Division contended that there is no single definition of small business upon which 
everyone will agree. The division offered, however, a useful working definition, in 
which it suggested that all small businesses have two primary characteristics: (1) an 
entrepreneurial flavor (ownership and management of an operating business are 
substantially identical) and (2) an absence of access to capital markets. AICPA Federal 
Taxation Division, Tax Recommendations to Aid Small Business (New York: AICPA, 
1980), 4.
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants is concerned 
with the problems of small business. For many years the AICPA Federal 
Taxation Division had a Small Business Task Force reporting to the 
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Subcommittee on Special Entities and Industries. In 1978, this Task 
Force published a Proposal for Complete Revision of Subchapter S 
Corporation Provisions, which became the primary background for the 
sub S legislation that was adopted in 1982. In 1979, The Small Business 
Task Force was elevated to subcommittee status. In 1980, the AICPA 
Board of Directors created a new Small Business Committee, reporting 
directly to the board, with this objective:
To monitor all Institute activities that are directed toward assisting small 
business; recommend and, where appropriate, carry out programs to 
promote the success of small business; and generally represent the 
Institute in matters affecting small business.
Also, there is a Division for CPA Firms within the AICPA, and one 
of its two sections is the Private Companies Practice Section. Through 
this section, the thousands of AICPA members who are auditors and 
consultants for small business entities are gaining a more influential 
voice in the Institute’s activities.
The first major project of the Federal Taxation Division’s Small 
Business Taxation Subcommittee was the Tax Recommendations to Aid 
Small Business, which was published in 1980. In this publication, the 
division recommended that small businesses be aided in several ways. 
(1) To promote capital formation, the subcommittee suggested that 
section 1244 of the Internal Revenue Code be broadened to include 
stockholder direct loans and guarantee losses, that certain changes be 
made in the ERISA provisions regarding fund investment, and that 
small business participating debentures (SBPDs) be created. (2) Upon 
the sale of 80 percent control in a small business, the long-term capital 
gain should be deferred if the business continues as a small business 
firm or if the selling investor rolls over the proceeds into another 
qualifying small business. This provision would put small businesses 
on equal footing with the tax-free reorganization permitted for large, 
public corporations. (3) Continuity of ownership would be supported by 
eliminating liquidity problems faced by heirs when the business forms 
a large portion of the owner’s estate. The subcommittee suggested that 
estate tax be paid in installments and stock attribution rules be changed. 
(4) Finally, in order to gain greater neutrality (equity), it recommended 
simplifications of both LIFO inventory and depreciation. The 1981 
(Economic Recovery Tax Act) and 1982 (Tax Equity and Fiscal 
Responsibility Act) tax laws have responded, at least partially, to these 
last suggestions. These suggestions are reflected also in the papers 
presented at this conference.
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Other 1982 tax legislation resulted in significant reforms in the 
subchapter S provisions. The maximum number of shareholders has 
been increased to thirty-five, different voting rights of common stock 
will not disqualify a corporation under the one-class-of-stock rule, 
retirement plan contribution limits on shareholder-employees will be 
repealed as of 1984, the passive receipts rules have been modified, 
unused shareholders’ basis can now be carried over, and the earnings 
and profits rules will no longer be applicable during sub S years. This 
sub S legislation should be of significant benefit to small business and 
resulted directly from a cooperative effort of the AICPA Tax Division, 
the ABA Tax Section, and the staff of the congressional Joint Committee 
on Taxation.
This AICPA Small Business Tax Equity Conference addressed several 
inequitable aspects in the application of the tax law to small business. 
The papers highlight these inequities and propose solutions. The 
conference focused on several topics, which can be divided into the 
following three areas:
1. Jobs formation in the small business sector—incentives and 
reasons for failure
2. Financing the enterprise—the debt-equity problems, limitations 
on deductions of loan and guarantee losses and excess investment 
expense, and limitations on investment of ERISA funds
3. Equity issues in retirement and fringe benefits plan provisions 
The conference was sponsored jointly by the AICPA Small Business 
Committee and the AICPA Federal Taxation Division Small Business 
Taxation Subcommittee.
Jobs Formation Through Small Business 
Incentives
The jobs tax credit was the principal topic of three of the papers, and 
consequently was the focus of most of the discussion. The several 
attempts, past and present, to spur employment through general and 
targeted new jobs credits generated some interesting controversy among 
the speakers and in the group discussion.
Why Jobs Tax Credits Have Failed
In his paper, Marvin J. Dickman identifies several reasons for the 
ineffectiveness of the jobs tax credits. The confusion surrounding the 
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credits and their poor administration were largely to blame for their 
failure. Employers in small businesses were not informed of the provisions 
in a timely manner. The simultaneous existence of the Work Incentive 
(WIN) credit and the New Jobs Tax Credit was confusing, and the 
provisions themselves were complex. The most recent credit, the Targeted 
Jobs Tax Credit, failed in reaching the important goal of an employment 
tax credit—it did not generate enough tax savings to make it worthwhile 
for eligible businesses to alter their hiring practices. Furthermore, costs 
of compliance with the provisions were perceived by businesses as too 
high, and they feared the inherent increased contact with the government 
and possible tax audits. The complex administration of the Targeted 
Jobs Tax Credit and its inadequate marketing by the agencies also 
diminished its potential impact.
The inequity of the New Jobs Tax Credit to small business is evidenced 
by the fact that only 6.6 percent of the corporations with assets totalling 
less than $250,000 claimed the credit although such corporations 
constitute 69 percent of all corporate taxpayers. On the other hand, 
43.4 percent of the corporations with assets in excess of $250 million 
claimed the credit.
The Economics of an Effective Jobs Tax Credit
Economist Robert Eisner points out that an effective jobs tax credit, 
unlike investment credits and accelerated capital cost recovery systems, 
will tend to help small business, which is relatively labor intensive, 
more than large business, which tends to be capital intensive. The 
social benefit of increasing employment while lowering its cost—through 
the tax credit—may increase current productivity and build a base for 
future productivity. Eisner suggests that some type of employment credit 
is needed to balance the investment tax credit, which benefits capital- 
intensive firms.
However, Eisner recognizes that targeted subsidies are likely to be 
ineffective and possibly counterproductive. Small groups of workers are 
expensive to seek out and may be stigmatized. In addition, employment 
in the targeted group may be substituted for employment in other groups. 
The goal is to create jobs. Therefore, the credit should apply not only 
to small businesses but to all businesses, although small business, as 
labor intensive as it is, may benefit most.
Eisner proposes several specific provisions to make an employment 
subsidy more effective. In particular, he feels the tax credit should be 
available on payroll taxes rather than corporate or individual income 
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taxes. This would make the credit available to companies that have 
little or no income tax liability and to the many tax-exempt organizations. 
Both employ millions of workers and should be eligible for any incentive 
that is intended to create jobs.
A Small Business Jobs Tax Credit
Frank S. Swain and George Guttman, from the Small Business Admin­
istration, emphasize the role small business plays in training and 
providing early work experience for the entire labor force. The goal of 
a jobs credit must be to increase incremental employment instead of to 
subsidize base level employment. To give a business the incentives “to 
invest in human rather than capital assets,” the employer’s initial labor 
costs must be lowered. To encourage business to provide job training, 
the credit may have to serve as a temporary wage subsidy that will 
narrow the gap between an unskilled worker’s wage rate and his 
productivity level.
Swain and Guttman claim that the administration of such a credit 
will be simplified by tying the credit to the FUTA tax base. The credit 
could be used by an employer to offset FICA and FUTA tax liabilities. 
Any remaining credit would be refundable, so an employer is assured 
of receiving his full benefit. Limits on the credit and retention of 
employee rules would prevent abuse of the credit. Inasmuch as the 
credit is tied to the FUTA base and thus reduces labor costs proportionally 
more for the lower paid than for higher paid skilled workers, it is not 
necessary to target the credit toward any particular group. However, 
the employer must still track the specific new hires into the two 
subsequent years.
Financing the Small Business Enterprise
Debt-Equity Problems for Small Business
John Harrington examines the potential tax traps faced by small business 
because of the complexity of the proposed debt-equity regulations. 
These regulations may make it more difficult for small businesses to 
acquire equity capital and to obtain loans. Since legislative history 
indicates the purpose of section 385 of the Internal Revenue Code is 
to discourage the use of hybrid instruments in the acquisition of other 
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businesses, one wonders why that intent has been expanded through 
the proposed regulations to deal with “abuses” on the part of privately 
held corporations.
Harrington contends that mechanisms should be provided to remove 
the average small business from the impact of section 385 for the 
following reasons: (1) Complexity of the regulations is more than the 
small businessman should have to contend with. (2) Reclassification of 
debt and equity may have a severe effect on the small business. 
Uncertainty under section 385 may deter venture capitalists, who acquire 
a combination of debt and equity. (3) Section 303 redemptions may be 
impeded by section 385, and the use of this type of estate planning 
could be adversely affected. (4) In a small business, it is more difficult 
to differentiate between the key shareholder’s role as creditor, as 
employee, and as stockholder, making compliance with the section 385 
regulations difficult. (5) Industry requirements are not provided for 
under the proposed regulations.
Harrington suggests that section 385 rules should be elective if 
combined debt is $5 million or less. Correction periods to conform 
transactions to the regulations should be extended. Regulations should 
not apply to subchapter S loans for determining whether the corporation 
has more than one class of stock. Ratios should be computed on either 
the fair market value or the tax basis of the assets, at the taxpayer’s 
election. The Treasury needs to recognize and clarify how section 385 
relates to provisions of section 303, Employee Stock Ownership Plans 
(ESOPs), and the needs of specialized industries.
Limitations on Direct Loans and Guarantee Losses 
and on Investment Interest
The availability of debt to small businesses is affected not only by 
section 385 regulations but also through the deductions allowed or not 
allowed for bad debts. Loans and guarantee losses are treated as ordinary 
deductions by a widely held corporation when made for its wholly owned 
subsidiary but are considered a nonbusiness bad debt short-term capital 
loss when made for a privately held corporation by a sole individual 
shareholder. A payment by a father under his guaranty on a business 
loan to his son is treated as a “gift,” and a payment on a guaranty is 
not treated the same as a payment made for the release from a guaranty. 
Thomas E. Huntzinger believes that these inequities would be rectified 
if the section 1244 loss provisions were expanded to include losses from 
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direct loans or guaranties. This proposal was included in the AICPA 
1980 recommendations.
Investment interest is fully deductible by a corporation but limited 
for individuals borrowing to invest in an incorporated business. The tax 
benefits from net lease activity are also restricted. A safe harbor covering 
anyone lending to or investing in a qualified small business could 
alleviate these limitations on deductibility of investment interest and 
loan losses. Otherwise, it will be very difficult to get venture capital to 
many new, young businesses.
What Is an SBPD?
In this paper, Ronald B. Cohen illustrates how small business partici­
pating debentures (SBPDs) provide a means of attracting institutional 
and individual investors to the small business capital market. Low-risk 
investors can receive a stated rate of return and a contractual share of 
the profits. If a business is successful, the profits will exceed the stated 
interest rate, and the income in excess of the stated interest would be 
taxed as a long-term capital gain. The company would have an ordinary 
deduction for both the interest and the share of earnings; the investor 
would treat losses as ordinary losses. The security and yield potential 
of a note are combined with the appreciation, profit-sharing, and tax 
attributes of stock.
Cohen feels that serious consideration should be given to allowing 
the founding shareholders to buy the SBPDs as part of their investment 
in the company. Capital infusion should be encouraged from owners as 
well as from outside investors. The change in tax revenue may very 
well be positive if the additional capital provided small business generates 
jobs in new and expanding enterprises. H.R. 4015, which is included 
as Appendix A to this paper, currently proposes that SBPDs be recognized 
by the Internal Revenue Code and treated as recommended above. This 
was one of the proposals in the 1980 AICPA Tax Recommendations to 
Aid Small Business.
Limitation on Investment of ERISA Funds
Paul H. Jackson scrutinizes the investment restrictions contained in 
ERISA and concludes that Congress’s approach of imposing requirements 
on all who operate tax-qualified programs places an unreasonable burden 
on small business.
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He contends that the prudent man rule has confined funds to big 
banks, big insurance companies, and top-tier securities because in­
vestment in other areas would not be “prudent.” As a result, small 
business is losing funds that had previously been available from locally 
controlled pension funds. The prohibited transactions and other restric­
tions of ERISA are so numerous that the Department of Labor has 
issued exemptions generally freeing insurance companies and agents, 
qualifying banks, and security dealers from the regulations. The small 
businessman, however, is still subject to these rules.
Jackson feels that the repeal of a substantial number of these ERISA 
restrictions is necessary. Prohibiting every transaction and then ex­
empting most is intellectually dishonest.
Appendix A, submitted by Paul Antsen, is a reprint of a booklet 
published by the Department of Labor that describes the provisions of 
the prudence rule and discusses its relation to the investment of pension 
plan assets.
Appendix B, prepared by Mark Rollinson, is a guide for the conference 
discussion. The following modifications in the current tax treatment of 
retirement plans were suggested:
1. Defined benefit plans should be regulated as if they were insurance 
companies, since the employer acts as an insurer and the actuarial 
liability to fulfill obligations is the key concern.
2. ERISA regulations of defined contribution annuities are unnec­
essary.
3. Group defined contribution plans should continue to be governed 
by “prudence,” which mandates a “diversified risk” policy.
4. Regulations of individual defined contribution plans are also 
unnecessary, since the corpus is never large enough to permit 
diversification of investment.
Prudent investment requirements should be compatible with venture 
capital investment. Otherwise, resources will be allocated away from 
small enterprises to their large competitors. A 2 percent tax could be 
levied on the corpus of all plans, with a credit for 10 percent of corpus 
invested in small business and 10 percent invested in medium-size 
business. However, such investment should not be allowed to disrupt 
the effective operation of the business.
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Fringe and Retirement Benefits Equity
Retirement Benefits Equity
John S. Nolan reviews the changes in retirement benefits equity brought 
about by TEFRA. The discrimination found in the tax treatment of plans 
for self-employed persons has been alleviated significantly. The tax 
benefits of a retirement plan will now be evaluated by the benefits given 
to key employees—the top-heavy plan—rather than the form of the 
business organization the plan serves. Generally, loans from any qualified 
employer plan are now taxable distributions to the borrower. Advantages 
of incorporation will be reduced when TEFRA provisions go into effect, 
since H.R. 10 provisions have been equalized to more closely approx­
imate corporate plan provisions. Owner-employee restrictions have been 
generalized to corporate plans that favor key employees.
While the new top-heavy plan rules impose more onerous regulations 
on plans for both small and large businesses, they will have a heavier 
impact on small business. The implications for equity are not yet 
clarified, and there will be major costs of compliance. Plans for small 
employers may no longer be worthwhile. In correcting for discrimination 
against the self-employed and professional corporations (based on the 
type of business organization the plan serves), the distinctions will now 
be based predominantly on the size of the business, which seems equally 
inappropriate and unjustified.
Certain fringe benefits, social security taxes, and liability for mal­
practice affect the decision to incorporate. Professional corporations 
and partnerships of incorporated professionals still face several potential 
tax problems, such as reallocation of income, reasonableness of com­
pensation, treatment as a sham corporation, personal holding company 
status, and the accumulated earnings tax.
Fringe Benefits Equity
According to Thomas P. Brock, the discrimination against small 
businesses in the fringe benefit area is a direct result of the distinction 
made between incorporated and unincorporated businesses. He presents 
statistics on those small businesses affected and interprets their impor­
tance to the economy. Brock also reviews the specific differences in tax 
treatment of the major types of statutory benefits. His conclusion is that 
there is no fundamental justification for the differences. However, the 
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degree of control over the provision of the benefit to selected recipients 
may provoke suspicion of the motives of sole proprietors. In the case 
of a sole proprietorship, it is difficult to separate the owner from the 
business entity and therefore difficult to identify the income and expense 
related to each.
Brock proposes that percentage limitations be eliminated and any 
abuses curbed using the language precluding discrimination in favor of 
key persons. The provision of fringe benefit equity would provide a 
targeted reduction in income taxes that would significantly help the 
small business sector and promote the extension of benefits to small 
business employees not currently receiving them. These employees need 
such benefits more than most to compensate for the lower wage rates 
received by the marginal workers hired by this type of business.
Commentary
The theme for this entire conference was tax equity for small business. 
The proposition throughout has been that the tax law treats small 
businesses inequitably in comparison to large businesses. The jobs tax 
credit papers stress the fact that small business is generally labor 
intensive and therefore does not benefit proportionally from capital 
investment incentives such as the investment tax credit or rapid capital 
recovery schemes. Consequently, they conclude that some form of labor 
incentive is needed to offset the impact of the capital incentives. This 
seems to be indicative of a common assumption among many econo­
mists—and in Congress—that the answer to every problem is for the 
government to “do more. ” Society, especially the small business segment, 
may be saying that perhaps the government should “do less.” If the 
investment tax credit is inequitable, the answer is to provide a jobs tax 
credit to offset the inequity. This rationale ignores the fact that the 
inequity could be addressed by reducing or eliminating the investment 
tax credit. In the political arena it always seems easier to grant new 
benefits rather than discontinue old benefits. For many years, more and 
more of these new benefits have been provided through the tax law. 
This philosophy inevitably leads to more complicated tax laws and 
greater government interference in the marketplace.
Two of the groups targeted for assistance are teenagers and the 
unskilled. Some view the jobs tax credit primarily as a vehicle for 
employee training. Again, the government could provide incentives by 
“doing less.” There would be more jobs for youth, and consequently 
more training, if the government removed some of the present impedi­
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ments to employment. For example, instead of setting an artificial 
minimum wage and then allowing a credit to reduce the employer’s cost 
below that minimum, the minimum wage could be reduced or eliminated 
for teenagers. Also, social security contributions could be waived for 
employees below the age of twenty. Such changes would assist small 
business and would simplify rather than complicate the paperwork 
burden. This would also reduce the inflationary pressures from the 
artificial wage structure forced upon employers.
Professor Eisner suggests that the investment tax credit is inflationary 
because a $10 million credit motivates a company to pay $100 million 
for equipment that may be worth only $95 million. He does not explain 
why it is not also inflationary when a $2,000 credit motivates an 
employer to pay $10,000 for a worker who is worth only $9,000.
There is little doubt that training is important for the young worker, 
and, as Congressman Gibbons pointed out, on-the-job training is often 
one of the most effective ways to teach the new worker. Small business 
has long accepted its role in providing on-the-job training, but there 
are serious questions as to whether the jobs tax credit is an appropriate 
incentive. On-the-job training may be viable when the unskilled trainee 
is compensated according to the trainee’s value, but it can disrupt 
employee morale when senior workers see the new trainee being paid 
more than is justified in the market place. Also, there are different 
types of training needed. Training in the necessary job skills is quite 
different from the equally necessary education in good work habits. 
Small business may well be willing to provide training (and retraining) 
in the specific job skills needed in the particular firm. However, given 
that most new jobs are now provided by small businesses, it seems 
inequitable for society, through a targeted jobs tax credit, to impose on 
small business the responsibility for instilling in youth the ideas that 
workers are expected to show up every day, show up on time, and even 
work during the hunting or skiing season.
The three speakers on the jobs tax credit did not agree on some of 
the specific features of incentives, such as—
• Should the incentive be targeted or general?
• Should there be a maximum credit for each employer?
• Should it be refundable?
• Should the credit be taken against the income tax or the payroll 
tax?
Congress is also divided on these same issues. The underlying issue 
seems to be whether the purpose of the credit is simply to create jobs 
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or to assist particular groups of unemployed people. If the purpose is 
to create as many jobs as possible, the credit would be general, without 
a maximum, deducted from the payroll tax, and refundable. However, 
it was suggested from the audience that the small business community 
would really prefer simply abolishing the whole idea of a jobs tax credit. 
It is entirely possible that more jobs would be created if Congress 
removed some of the obstacles such as the minimum wage and 
employment taxes instead of providing complex, illogical assistance to 
overcome the obstacles.
The same sentiment was expressed in the discussion of the availability 
of capital to small businesses. Tax laws today create obstacles for small 
business and also for those doing business with small businesses. If 
venture capital is to be available to small business, some of those 
barriers discussed by Huntzinger and Harrington should be removed 
for both the lender (the investor) and the borrower (the entrepreneur). 
The time has come to try the SBPD, which would be an important aid 
to small businesses seeking access to venture capital. Hopefully, it can 
be structured in such a way as not to be overly complex. This was 
included in the 1980 AICPA recommendations and was introduced into 
Congress by Congressman Eckart on June 25, 1981, as H.R. 4015.
Tax equity, the central theme of the conference, was emphasized in 
the discussions of retirement and other fringe benefits. John Nolan 
pointed out that TEFRA will eliminate most of the inequities between 
corporate and noncorporate retirement plans, but many of the other 
benefits are still much more attractive in the corporate setting than in 
the proprietorship or partnership. It is clear that restoration of equity 
in the retirement area can be achieved primarily by restricting the 
benefits for big business rather than by increasing the benefits for small 
business. The small business community must realize that its desire for 
equity in other areas may also be met without gains for small business, 
but by losses for big business. However, small business and society 
may be better off in the long run if that is the result.
The enormous complexity of the tax laws was also emphasized in all 
three areas of discussion. While small business has been affected, many 
of the tax incentives that gave rise to these complexities have not been 
particularly helpful to small business. It has been suggested that the 
tax law should be used to benefit small business more than it has in 
the past. Many speakers and members of the audience stated that the 
present stage of complexity has had—or is likely to have—serious 
implications. Small businesses, and most other taxpayers, want both 
simplicity and equity. Tax theorists have long held that equity and 
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simplicity are not always compatible. It is true that some of the 
complexity in our tax law is intended to provide greater equity; however, 
much of the complexity today is a result of the many economic and 
social incentives and disincentives Congress has built into the tax 
structure, which many taxpayers do not view as equitable.
No matter how desirable the investment goal, if Congress elects to 
achieve that goal by providing a tax benefit as an incentive for investors, 
it is inevitable that wealthy taxpayers who have the most money to 
invest will be able to avail themselves of that benefit more than the 
middle- or low-income taxpayers. The general public, with substantial 
help from the media, is likely to view this as “inequitable.” Elimination 
of some of the incentives and disincentives could bring both simplicity 
and equity.
Furthermore, the extreme degree of complexity in itself breeds a 
feeling of inequity. When a taxpayer does not understand a tax law, it 
is easy to assume that others are getting unfair advantages. This can 
lead to a lack of confidence in and bitterness toward government and 
can motivate taxpayers, including many small entrepreneurs, to either 
ignore the law or move into the underground economy to evade the law. 
If excessive government involvement saps the vitality of the small 
business community or drives it underground, it could seriously impair 
our economic and political structures.
In addition to the tax law’s complexity, its continual change is another 
serious problem for the small business community. Given time, the 
economy, including small business, can adjust to almost any tax law— 
even bad law. What presents a greater hardship is the annual (or more 
frequent) revisions of the law. Stability in the tax law could be a 
worthwhile surrogate for simplification. Congress should realize that 
instability can do a great deal to negate the very incentives it is trying 
to provide. Many of the investments Congress is attempting to encourage 
require time to plan and implement. The incentive to undertake such 
an investment is diminished if it is not certain that the incentive will 
still be there when the investment is finalized.
While simplifying the tax law is a popular theme both in Congress 
and in the small business community, such a goal is not easily achieved. 
In almost every instance, there is a strong constituency behind each 
major tax provision. Many are eager to simplify the tax law by eliminating 
all provisions that do not pertain to them.
There are other, perhaps more formidable, obstacles to simplifying 
the tax law. The structure of Congress and the path that a tax bill must 
follow before it becomes law make it extremely difficult to get a simple 
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tax law. A fairly straightforward bill may be introduced, but by the time 
it is modified by the House Ways and Means Committee, the full House, 
the Senate Finance Committee, the full Senate, and the Conference 
Committee, it is no longer simple and sometimes not even recognizable 
as the same bill that started the process. In the case of TEFRA, entirely 
new ideas were still being added to the bill even at the Conference 
Committee level.
Conclusion
This conference on small business tax equity addressed three important 
areas: jobs, venture capital, and retirement and other benefits. Through­
out, there were comments on the need for equity between large and 
small businesses and between corporations and partnerships and pro­
prietorships. There were also several references to the administrative 
burden placed on small businesses and the need to exclude smaller 
entities from some of the more complex provisions that are relevant 
primarily to larger units. Many of the ideas expressed in these papers 
provide worthwhile suggestions to aid the AICPA Small Business 
Committee and the Federal Taxation Division in their future endeavors.
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KEYNOTE
Conference Address
by George D. Anderson, CPA, Anderson, ZurMuehlen & Co.
I would like to welcome all of you to this conference focusing on the 
particular tax problems of small businesses. On September 13, 1982, 
an article appeared in The Wall Street Journal entitled “Tax Changes 
Could Create Problems for Owners of Small Business/Small Concerns.” 
What disturbed me most as I read the article was that this situation is 
not a new one. As we have witnessed in the past, authors of tax bills 
have been unaware of the effects of tax laws on small business.
This conference is designed to examine possible changes that will 
make tax laws more equitable for small business, to explore some of 
the problem areas, and to consider alternative policies that might be 
implemented. Although interest in small business has increased over 
the last few years, in the past, small business as a national group has 
been somewhat disorganized. Individual businesses have never been 
able to unite and establish common goals, and, thus, have found it 
impossible to build a strong organization to represent their interests.
Just a few years ago, we finally realized that 97 percent of the 
enterprises in this country are small businesses. They produce 43 
percent of the gross national product, employ about 55 percent of the 
private work force, and are one of the major sources of new jobs in the 
U.S. economy. Small businesses are one of the primary sources of 
innovation and invention; huge conglomerates that fund so much research 
and development aren’t the only sources of social and technological 
advances.
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As these facts became more apparent, many of the small business 
associations became more important than they had been in the past. 
They acquired more members and more resources. In so doing, they 
obtained representation in Congress and in state legislatures, and their 
voices finally started to reach the ears of administrators. This culminated 
in President Carter’s White House Conference on Small Business, which 
brought to Washington representatives of small businesses from all over 
the United States. Once the small business people were gathered 
together, they realized that many of them shared the same problems 
and that if they set common goals and organized their efforts, they 
would have a better chance of being heard.
Most of the recommendations of that conference dealt with taxes. 
Over one hundred initial recommendations were pared down to fifteen 
particular proposals, twelve or thirteen of which pertained to taxes. 
While there were also recommendations to design other laws to encourage 
small business, the chief concerns were to reduce taxes and to simplify 
the tax laws for small business.
The AICPA had already begun to focus interest on small business 
before the White House conference. Our membership is made up of 
188,000 CPAs throughout the United States: one half in public practice, 
the other in industry—including government, education, and many 
small businesses. Among CPAs in public practice, small businesses 
constitute the bulk of clients. Also, of the 17,000 public practice units 
that the AICPA represents, perhaps only between fifty and seventy of 
the largest would not themselves be classified as small businesses. Thus, 
there is growing interest at the AICPA in helping members in their 
practices and in helping them advise their own small business clients.
The AICPA Federal Taxation Division has formed committees to work 
on these particular areas. One such group has cosponsored this Small 
Business Tax Equity Conference, the Small Business Taxation Subcom­
mittee, chaired by William Diss, with the AICPA Small Business 
Committee, chaired by Ivan Bull.
Much of the Federal Taxation Division’s committee work has concen­
trated on attempting to simplify the Internal Revenue Code. Some of 
this effort has come to fruition; recently Congress approved a bill to 
simplify the provisions that apply to subchapter S corporations. The 
Federal Taxation Division’s committees have done considerable work 
in the area of partnership taxation, and, in 1979, the division published 
Tax Recommendations to Aid Small Business.
The tax code has been used for two particular purposes: one is, of 
course, to raise revenue, the other is to remedy the economic and social 
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ills of the nation and sometimes, it seems, of the world. If we were to 
concentrate on revenue alone, it would probably be easy. A flat tax, a 
sales tax, or a value-added tax would all easily raise revenue. These 
particular taxes, however, do not lend themselves to solving social and 
economic problems.
When Congress and the administration use tax laws to address 
somewhat nebulous social and economic problems, the laws become 
very complicated. Complex mechanisms to hit these particular targets 
tend to be more theoretical than practical. In addition, many political 
considerations enter into the writing of tax legislation. When those who 
write laws start thinking about economics and sociology and compound 
their strategies with political concerns, they fail to recognize the practical 
problems that will occur when the law is applied to real business 
situations.
Although in many cases the law may offer advantages to business, 
generally it may be too complicated for small business to understand 
and comply with. Big businesses, on the other hand, have people on 
their staffs who work on nothing but complex areas of the tax law, and 
they are capable of taking advantage of the breaks that are written into 
the law. For the most part, small businesses must rely on outside 
consultants, and consultants are expensive. Furthermore, in less service­
intensive areas such as my own state of Montana, experts are sometimes 
unobtainable. As a result, the small businessman looks for part-time 
experts and utilizes part-time help to solve what is probably a full-time 
problem.
One overall solution as far as the small business person and the 
country are concerned would be to repeal all business taxes, tax only 
individuals and consumers, and permit businesses to retain earnings 
that they need for regular operations and expansion. However, I am not 
so naive as to think that this could come about politically. We will 
probably keep the present tax system because government has no more 
efficient tool to simultaneously raise revenue and deal with social and 
economic problems.
Through conferences such as this, I hope that we will stimulate small 
business to address some of these problems themselves as well as press 
for legislative assistance and simplication of tax laws.
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Jobs Formation 
Through
Small Business 
Incentives

WHY JOBS TAX 
CREDITS HAVE FAILED
by Marvin J. Dickman, CPA, Arthur Andersen & Co.
High unemployment rates have troubled Congress for years, and in its 
attempts to reduce unemployment, the federal government has often 
utilized the tax law. Several provisions in the Internal Revenue Code 
have provided for tax credits to employers who increase their work 
force. In 1971, the Work Incentive (WIN) credit was enacted to provide 
tax relief for employers who hired members of families receiving Aid 
for Dependent Children or persons in training under a WIN program. 
The New Jobs Tax Credit (NJTC), which came into existence in 1977, 
allowed a tax break for employers who hired any new employee. One 
year later, the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC) was enacted to provide 
a tax credit to employers who hired members of certain hard-to-employ 
groups.
To date, none of the three tax credits has been particularly successful 
for a variety of reasons. The WIN credit was not used by employers 
largely because they did not know of it, and those employers who had 
knowledge of the credit were confused by the simultaneous existence 
of the NJTC. The NJTC was unsuccessful because of a lack of awareness 
by employers as well as the complexity of the provisions. Even those 
employers who were aware of the credit made little or no conscious 
effort to change their employment policies. Finally, the TJTC, as it 
existed between 1978 and 1981, failed for three reasons. First, the tax 
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savings generated from the credit were not large enough to induce 
employers to alter their hiring practices. Second, employers perceived 
as too high the costs of screening applicants for the credit, training 
targeted-group members, and defending themselves against potential 
discrimination charges. Third, and most important, employers feared 
government contact. They feared potential tax audits and government 
“red tape” and generally felt reluctant to become involved with the 
government.
The discussion that follows explores the reasons for the failure of the 
NJTC and the TJTC. To be successful in reducing unemployment, a 
credit must be structured and administered in such a way as to directly 
affect the hiring patterns of employers. Neither credit accomplished this 
because neither successfully dealt with either the actual or perceived 
difficulties listed above.
Background and Purpose of Employment 
Tax Credits
Before the Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977 was enacted 
in May of that year, the Senate Select Committee on Small Business 
held public hearings. Various speakers outlined what they felt were 
changes necessary to help small businesses and to reduce unemployment. 
The Carter administration had proposed an increase in the investment 
tax credit or a rebate of 4 percent of an employer’s share of FICA taxes. 
Small business organizations thought that neither of these proposals 
would have a significant impact on unemployment nor help small 
businesses. Bruce Fielding of the National Federation of Independent 
Business noted that small companies accounted for over 95 percent of 
all businesses in the United States and that generally these small 
businesses were labor intensive. Accordingly, his organization preferred 
the creation of an employment tax credit that would provide a large 
enough incentive to encourage small employers to hire and that would 
ease the cash flow problems of small firms.1 Large firms, which were 
generally capital intensive, were deemed to be the primary beneficiaries 
of the investment tax credit. Additional investment tax credits would 
be of little benefit to small businesses. According to Mr. Fielding the 
investment tax credit would have to be graduated in order to have any 
effect on small businesses. In his opinion, such an alternative was less 
favorable than an employment tax credit.
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Milton Stewart, president of the National Small Business Association, 
generally concurred with Fielding. He advocated an experiment using 
an employment tax credit to create jobs directly, rather than indirectly 
by capital formation.2
Prior to the enactment of the NJTC, the only other tax provision 
designed specifically to stimulate increased employment had been the 
WIN credit. Because of lack of knowledge of the program, low availability 
of qualified workers among the target population, and strict “recapture” 
rules, very few employers had utilized the WIN credit.3 The NJTC was 
added by the Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977 to directly 
confront the problem of the high unemployment rate.
This credit amounted to 50 percent of the increase in each employer’s 
wage base (as determined by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act) above 
102 percent of the wage base in the previous year. No deduction was 
allowed for the portion of wages claimed as a credit. In addition to 
several adjustments to the definition of “wages” for purposes of the 
credit, there were five other limitations that might have applied before 
a taxpayer could determine the amount of the credit he could claim.
1. The maximum credit any taxpayer could claim in a calendar year 
was $100,000. For partners, subchapter S corporation sharehold­
ers, and beneficiaries of trusts or estates, the limitations applied 
twice, first to the entity and then to the taxpayer.4
2. The credit could not exceed the difference between the total 
current-year wages and 105 percent of the total wages paid during 
the preceding year.
3. All members of a controlled group were treated as a single 
employer.
4. The credit was limited to tax liability reduced by most other 
credits.
5. When the credit was “passed through” to a taxpayer, another 
limitation was imposed and another calculation was necessary.
Congress, believing that the unemployment rate had declined suffi­
ciently, decided that it was appropriate to focus employment incentives 
on those individuals who had high unemployment rates even when the 
national unemployment rate was low and on other employment groups 
with special employment needs. Congress therefore decided to allow 
the NJTC to expire as scheduled at the end of 1978 and to design a
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new provision as an incentive to private employers to hire individuals 
in seven target groups, which consisted of—
1. Vocational rehabilitation referrals—persons who had a physical 
or mental disability and were enrolled in rehabilitation programs.
2. Economically disadvantaged youths between eighteen and twenty- 
five years of age who were members of economically disadvantaged 
families.
3. Economically disadvantaged Vietnam veterans.
4. Individuals who received supplementary security benefits.
5. General assistance recipients.
6. Cooperative education students between sixteen and twenty years 
of age who had not graduated from high school and were members 
of economically disadvantaged families. (This incorporates a 
change made by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 [ERTA].)
7. Economically disadvantaged ex-convicts.
Because Congress believed that the TJTC had been sufficiently 
promising, ERTA extended the credit, which was due to expire at the 
end of 1981. In addition, ERTA added two new targeted groups: 
involuntarily terminated CETA employees and WIN employees. These 
groups were added because the CETA program had been terminated 
and the WIN credit had been eliminated.
Evaluation of the NJTC
The new NJTC and the TJTC had been designed to alleviate the 
unemployment problem. The NJTC was intended to promote employment 
of all groups, whereas the TJTC was intended to promote employment 
among specific groups.
As mentioned, there were several limitations on the amount that 
could be claimed under the NJTC. Taken separately, the limits seemed 
generally reasonable. For instance, the 8100,000 limit on the credit 
assured that large businesses with the ability and resources to train new 
employees did not benefit “excessively” from the credit. The limit of 
the increase of the current year’s wages over 105 percent of the prior 
year’s wages assured that employers would not convert year-round 
employees to seasonal workers. The apportionment of the credit between 
members of a controlled group prevented multiple corporations under 
common control from circumventing the other limitations. But the 
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limitations, when taken as a whole, resulted in a complicated set of 
rules that were difficult for employers to understand and administer.
The difficulties employers had with the rules were recognized by 
various commentators. One concluded, “Undoubtedly, Congress in­
tended the various restrictions on its use as a means of limiting its 
applicability as well as its abuse; what is unclear is the extent to which 
the limitations and restrictions on the availability of the credit defeat 
the use of the credit as an employment incentive.”5
In a written statement to the Senate Finance Committee, Emil Sunley, 
deputy assistant secretary of the Treasury for tax policy, mentioned the 
complexity of the law. “Each of the quantitative tests that are in the 
present credit has a defensible purpose . . . but taken together, the 
complexities of the present credit and the consequent uncertainties and 
compliance burdens have resulted in what appears to be a very ineffective 
jobs stimulus program.”6
Another problem that decreased the effectiveness of the NJTC was 
the fact that most employers did not know about the credit. Addressing 
the lack of employer awareness, Mr. Sunley went on to say that “most 
employers were not aware of the jobs credit even after its first full year 
had passed. Most who were aware of the credit and thought they were 
qualified, reported that they had made no conscious effort to change 
their employment policy because of the credit.”7 (emphasis added)
This contention was supported empirically in a study done by Jeffrey 
Perloff and Michael Wachter of the University of Pennsylvania.8 These 
researchers found that relatively few businesses knew about and 
responded to the NJTC. Only 27.3 percent of the companies with nine 
or less employees knew about the credit compared with 89.1 percent 
of the companies with over 500 employees. Furthermore, of those who 
knew about the credit, only 6.1 percent said they made a conscious 
effort to increase employment, and 5 percent said that the credit was 
“too troublesome to pursue.” The Treasury Department’s own statistics 
supported these opinions.
The following table indicates that small corporations (those with assets 
of less than $250,000) accounted for over 69 percent of corporate 
taxpayers, but only 6.6 percent of these businesses took advantage of 
the credit. However, 43.4 percent of corporations with assets over $250 
million claimed the credit.
In testimony presented on behalf of the AICPA, William T. Diss 
noted several problems resulting from the use of a tax credit mechanism.9 
Among these, the hiring incentive to a prospective employer was
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regressive: the higher the marginal tax bracket, the lower the benefit of 
the credit. Additionally, artificial state taxable income was created for 
employers in states where taxable income is defined by reference to the 
Internal Revenue Code.
Evaluation of the TJTC
The TJTC, enacted in 1978 and implemented in 1979, provided a 50 
percent reduction in after-tax costs of the first $6,000 of wages paid to 
target group employees in the first year of employment regardless of the 
employer’s tax bracket, so long as the employer had sufficient taxable 
income to use the credit. In the second year of employment the credit 
provided a 25 percent reduction in after-tax costs of the first $6,000 of 
qualified wages. Unused credits could be carried back three years and 
forward seven (now fifteen) years.
The groups eligible for the TJTC have changed over time. In 1981 
the targeted groups were expanded by adding recipients of Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), registrants under the WIN 
program, and CETA workers whose jobs had been terminated by recent 
budget cuts. ERTA also restricted the eligibility of cooperative education 
students to those who are economically disadvantaged. Until 1981, 
retroactive certification of existing employees was permitted. Retroactive 
certification was eliminated because it permitted employers to file for 
the credit long after hiring a particular employee.
The TJTC was intended to achieve a number of goals by providing a 
financial incentive for employers to hire individuals from groups that 
were at a competitive disadvantage on the labor market because of 
limited work experience, poverty backgrounds, physical handicaps, or 
other factors that tended to put them low among employer hiring 
preferences.10 Ideally, the tax credit should have enhanced the ability 
of employment agencies to place target group members in jobs, and it 
should have induced some employers to expand employment.11 Since 
little money was available for the program’s administration (Congress 
appropriated no funds and only $14 million in Title III discretionary 
funds were made available for the fiscal year 1980) the workload was 
spread across a number of government agencies.12 In addition to issuing 
all certifications, the Employment Service was to play a central 
coordinating role, encouraging other vouchering agencies to participate.13 
At the same time, the Employment Service and CETA Prime Sponsors 
were to increase their cooperative efforts in vouchering and marketing 
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to develop a unified marketing strategy.14 The process of implementing 
the TJTC required cooperation between a variety of local agencies that 
had worked together only occasionally and sometimes had faced each 
other with hostility and suspicion.15
Several studies have been undertaken to evaluate the effectiveness 
of the TJTC. The Mershon Center at Ohio State University issued a 
four-part report entitled The Implementation of the Targeted Jobs Tax 
Credit, which covered the period from July 1980 to July 1981. It found 
that the success of the TJTC was inhibited by employers’ attitudes and 
problems in the administration of the credit program.
Employers’ Attitudes
Two prevailing attitudes worked together to dissuade employers from 
availing themselves of the credit: the tax savings were not large enough 
to induce employers to alter their hiring practices, and employers 
perceived that the cost of hiring target group members was very high.16 
Objectively, the tax benefits received from the TJTC decreased as the 
taxpayer moved into higher tax brackets because the deductible wages 
had to be reduced by the amount of the credit. This fact, coupled with 
the employers’ perception of decreased rather than increased produc­
tivity, made the credit appear not worthwhile in terms of a cost-benefit 
analysis.
Another factor that prevented employers from using the credit was 
the lack of tax liability.17 If a firm had a small liability, it may not have 
wanted to bother with the TJTC program. Further, since the TJTC 
reduced tax liability after almost all other credits were applied, there 
may have been no tax liability and, thus, no tax savings. Although the 
credit was available for carryforward, employers with low profit or loss 
projections for the near future may have been hesitant to avail themselves 
of the credit.
According to the Mershon Center study, however, both employers 
and TJTC implementors agreed that the single most important reason 
why many employers refused to participate in the TJTC was “fear” of 
the government.18 This finding was further supported by the California 
Employment Development Department’s survey of its employer adviser 
groups. The fear of government was expressed in various ways: fear of 
“red tape,” fear of government intrusion into hiring decisions, fear of 
IRS audits, and fear of being treated like a federal contractor. This was 
a major barrier to generating employer participation in TJTC. These 
qualitative fears interacted with the quantitative facts of particular 
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situations, making employers believe that the costs of hiring the targeted 
groups far exceeded the potential tax savings.19 Even if an employer 
has little fear of the government, he may feel that the cost of inefficient 
contact with the government necessary to claim the credit exceeds the 
value of the credit.20
A third problem employers faced in implementing the TJTC was the 
difficulty of altering hiring practices.21 Employers reported to the Mershon 
Center researchers that, from their perspective, screening job applicants 
for TJTC eligibility may have been a violation of fair hiring practices 
and could have exposed them to lawsuits from disappointed applicants. 
Furthermore, screening applicants for eligibility required an understand­
ing of the TJTC and a commitment from personnel people.22
The problem of screening applicants and employees for TJTC eligibility 
has been turned over to separate firms who sell this service to employers. 
But, employers have some problems with this method. Many do not 
want their hiring practices influenced by a tax credit, and paying for 
the screening service added additional costs.23
Agency Attitudes
The administration of the TJTC has also deterred its effectiveness. The 
responsibility for successful operation of the credit was spread among 
various administering agencies, and one obstacle preventing effective 
operation has been confusion among these agencies.24
The administrative burden placed on agencies responsible for suc­
cessful implementation of the TJTC was extremely heavy. The agencies 
had to locate eligible persons and document their eligibility. Documen­
tation of the “economically disadvantaged” groups was particularly 
difficult for the agencies.25 The vouchering and certification process 
also took time. Most important, employers had to be made aware of the 
benefits of the credit through marketing efforts. The TJTC implementors 
have judged that mass marketing has not been very effective and have 
turned to time-consuming, face-to-face marketing efforts.26
Furthermore, the availability of the credit has not necessarily increased 
the productivity of the placement agencies. Most employers have wanted 
their current employees certified retroactively as permitted prior to 
ERTA.27 This was time-consuming and did not make the agency look 
more productive in helping applicants find work. Because of the various 
time costs associated with the TJTC, some agencies minimized their 
efforts in making it work.28
Other problems in the system established to implement the TJTC 
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included the number of agencies involved, the confusion of agency 
responsibility, and the variation in vouchering procedures among 
agencies.29 The Employment Service was given responsibility for coor­
dinating the marketing and implementation of the credit, but it was not 
given the authority necessary to carry out this responsibility.30 The 
administrative structure to implement the credit was poorly designed. 
Local Employment Service offices could try to coordinate the efforts of 
the other vouchering agencies in their area, but because the other 
agencies reported to offices above them in their own organizations and 
not to the Employment Service, the authority was reduced.31 Even when 
state Employment Service offices negotiated cooperative arrangements 
with the other vouchering agencies at the state level, the arrangements 
were usually too vague to have much meaning at the local level.32 All 
this resulted in confusion among the organizations.
The Mershon Center concluded that the uncoordinated nature of the 
TJTC delivery system had at least two consequences. First, there was 
not much sense of responsibility for the TJTC on the part of the various 
vouchering agencies because it was not clear who was in charge. Second, 
vouchering procedures varied across the designated agencies, and 
employers were faced with what they perceived to be a complicated 
array of forms. Employers were then forced to combine the forms and 
develop their own questionnaire for screening applicants.33
Failure to provide significant funding for implementation of the TJTC 
reflected an underestimation of the extent to which bureaucracies resist 
change.34 The Mershon Center found that TJTC managers in the 
vouchering agencies supported the credit and wanted to see it imple­
mented, expecting at least some increase in placements, but at the level 
where vouchering and job development were carried out, support for 
TJTC was almost totally absent. For the lower levels, the vouchering 
process was just additional work for which they received no reward.35 
Job developers were not motivated because most of the certifications 
were retroactive.
Several other findings regarding the TJTC should be noted.
The design for the administration of the credit provided that workers 
were to receive vouchers once an agency had determined a worker’s 
eligibility as a targeted-group member. When the vouchered worker 
sought work, he could show his voucher to the employer and, assumedly, 
enhance his chances of being hired. Once hired, the employer was to 
complete the voucher and send it to the state Employment Service 
Agency. The agency would send back a certification, which verified the 
employer’s right to claim the credit.
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What happened in practice (before the ERTA changes) was that a 
firm asked the Employment Service to determine the eligibility of the 
firm’s current work force and to provide the necessary certification. This 
resulted in what might be termed “windfalls” to employers who, without 
altering employment patterns, claimed the TJTC. Mershon found that 
approximately two-thirds of all certifications were retroactive.36 The 
later enactment of ERTA eliminated retroactive certification.
Second, most vouchering and certifying was concentrated in the two 
youth target groups: economically disadvantaged youths and students 
in cooperative education. Those groups accounted for approximately 
four-fifths of all certifications.37
A third finding was that marketing activity for the credit had been 
decreasing, mainly because the funds were not available. Also, the 
effectiveness of marketing efforts was questioned.38
Summary
None of the three employment tax credits has been particularly 
successful. Employers generally did not know about the existence of 
the WIN credit, and those who were aware of it were confused by the 
simultaneous existence of the NJTC. The complexity of the provisions 
of the NJTC made it difficult to work with, and again employers were 
generally unaware of its existence. Those employers who were aware of 
the credit did not change their employment policies. The TJTC has also 
failed because it did not achieve any of the three objectives of an 
employment credit. It did not provide adequate financial incentive to 
employers to alter their hiring patterns. It did not have the attribute of 
simple administration. Finally, it did not permit the employer to obtain 
its benefits without an increase, or a potential increase, in his contact 
with government agencies.
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THE ECONOMICS OF AN 
EFFECTIVE JOBS TAX 
CREDIT
by Robert Eisner, Ph.D., William R. Kenan Professor of Economics, 
Northwestern University
My interests in employment tax credits, I confess, stem from my 
jaundiced view of tax subsidies to business investments, which are 
difficult to support on grounds of economic efficiency or equity. They 
distort the allocation of resources, inducing business investment for tax 
benefits where it would not be justified by real economic advantage. 
And tax subsidies to business investments offer their major, overwhelm­
ing advantage to capital-intensive, big business.
Subsidies to employment should offer quite a different picture to the 
objective analyst. There may be no good reason to give a business a 
$10 million tax credit to induce it to spend $100 million on new 
equipment that would be worth only $95 million without the tax 
advantage. However, there may be good reason for the government to 
encourage businesses to hire more workers. The difference between 
employment incentives and investment incentives pertains to the essen­
tial nature of labor markets, which are far from perfect. Until recently, 
most economists have paid too little attention to those imperfections.
One must focus on our currently high unemployment rate, now at 
peaks unmatched since the Great Depression of the 1930s. I trust that 
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by now those who would view unemployment as somehow the “natural” 
outcome of free choice in a situation of general equilibrium have 
abandoned their position or have been thoroughly discredited. A great 
deal of the current unemployment is clearly the result of a general 
deficiency of aggregate demand, the Keynesian unemployment that so 
many had wished to call dead along with its namesake.
This Keynesian unemployment should hardly come as a surprise. It 
is the direct result of government policies—unwise in my opinion—that 
have been directed at reducing inflation by creating slack in the 
economy. Rigid restriction of growth rates of monetary reserves has 
brought on extremely high real rates of interest. Fiscal policy, as 
appropriately measured in terms of an adjusted high employment budget, 
has actually been tighter than realized, despite large and growing current 
budget deficits. These factors and the recession they have generated 
have greatly depressed both investment and employment.
Measured unemployment, now almost 10 percent of the labor force, 
understates substantially the economically relevant nonemployment in 
our economy. Nonemployment must include much of another 5 percent 
part-time for economic reasons, those who have dropped out of the labor 
force as “discouraged workers,” and those who have not entered the 
labor force because the prospects of satisfactory jobs appear too slim.
Increasing aggregate effective demand for goods and services would 
bring about a major reduction in current rates of unemployment. But 
long before such increases eliminated unemployment, they would 
generate increasing rates of inflation, which would widely be viewed as 
unacceptable. Economists have searched for a “non-accelerating inflation 
rate of unemployment” (NAIRU), in the notion that reduction of 
unemployment below such a rate would generate increasing inflation. 
Getting unemployment below this rate, which many economists put as 
high as 6 and even 7 percent, would require measures that go beyond 
general, expansionary fiscal and monetary policy, such as employment 
tax credits and subsidies.
General Principles and Rationale of an 
Employment Credit
If labor markets were all perfect and labor were homogeneous, we could 
imagine one supply curve for all of labor in which the supply of workers 
was a function of the real wage and the demand for workers a function 
of the marginal productivity of labor. There would be no involuntarily 
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unemployed in the sense that those not working would consist exclusively 
of individuals who had decided that they preferred not to work, in view 
of their own personal preferences and the general productivity of labor, 
which determines the real wage.
In the real world, labor is quite heterogeneous. Individuals of different 
ages, sexes, races, education, training, and experience, as well as 
different location and selling power, appear to employers to have 
different potential values and find quite different and frequently variable 
prospects for employment. Many individuals, indeed millions, do not 
appear to potential employers to be of sufficient value to warrant payment 
of wages as high as customary rates of pay, minimum wage rates, 
alternatives available on “welfare” or unemployment benefits, or what 
would be necessary to induce potential workers to give up their 
alternatives to employment.
At any moment of time there are millions not employed because they 
literally cannot “find” a job where employers consider them worth 
hiring. Likewise, employers who might consider them worth hiring 
cannot find them. Much of the problem relates to uncertainty caused 
by a lack of information. A prospective employee might turn out to be 
worth hiring, but the potential employer does not know or cannot be 
sure. Furthermore, if the youngster with no significant previous expe­
rience turns out, once he is trained, to be worthwhile, there is nothing 
to stop him from taking his new experience and ability to another 
employer. The first employer meets the break-in costs but does not 
secure the benefits even when the gamble pays off.
Thus, we have a clear divergence between the individual self-interest, 
which must guide a competitive firm, and the interests of all firms in 
general or of society, which is to see people in productive labor of their 
choice rather than idle or on “welfare.”
An employment tax credit or subsidy can bridge the gap between 
what the potential labor of the unemployed is worth to society and what 
it is worth to individual employers. That gap is made all the more 
substantial by our welfare programs. It is worthwhile for society to pay 
$6,000 in subsidies or tax credits to induce gainful employment rather 
than pay the same amount in welfare aid or unemployment benefits.
The beauty of employment subsidies is that they offer the promise of 
increasing employment while lowering costs and stemming inflation. 
Raising employment by increasing Pentagon purchases of goods and 
services or by cutting income taxes to increase private purchases will, 
under certain circumstances, raise prices and inflation. But inducing 
increases in employment by lowering labor costs will reduce upward 
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pressure on prices. Relative effects upon employment, output, wages, 
and prices will indeed depend upon shapes of supply and demand 
functions and the productivity of labor, but, with plausible assumptions, 
employment subsidies offer the opportunity to increase employment 
while reducing inflation.
Just how much may be accomplished will depend on both these 
relevant supply and demand functions and the particular forms taken 
by the employment subsidies. It is important that programs be devised 
and policies be adopted that will do more than chum unemployment. 
It is hardly optimal to give jobs to some at the expense of others. Nor 
do we wish to increase employment in one period at the expense of 
more unemployment in another. We wish to expand employment and 
output. No programs and policies are foolproof, and measures to increase 
employment will prove to be no exception. But there are policies that 
can and will work, which, indeed, in some instances have worked. It 
is to their consideration and analysis we shall now turn.
It is easy to see the gains from an effective jobs tax credit in terms 
of tax savings to firms and income to new workers. From society’s point 
of view, the net social benefit is the added market output resulting from 
higher employment minus the value of whatever leisure or nonmarket 
production is lost as a consequence of additional time spent working. 
This, however, is only one dimension. An added dimension is the future 
output that may be produced out of the human capital achieved by job 
experience and the opening of future opportunities. Of course, if 
alternatives to work involve crime, illness, or other consequences costly 
to society, the benefits of additional employment are greater still.
Effective job tax credits, unlike investment credits and accelerated 
capital cost recovery systems, will tend to help small business, which 
is generally relatively labor intensive, more than large business, which 
tends to be capital intensive. The social cost of unemployment is such, 
however, that our dominant purpose in devising a jobs tax credit should 
be to increase employment, not to help any particular set of firms or 
groups within the economy other than the unemployed themselves. Jobs 
tax credits, therefore, should in no way be restricted to small business, 
although small business would inevitably be a major beneficiary of 
effective credits.
Similarly, unemployment is proportionately greater among the poor, 
the young, blacks, and women. Effective measures to increase employ­
ment will inevitably favor these groups, but I would not restrict 
employment-increasing measures to those groups that have been hardest 
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hit in the past. Again, I would increase employment and reduce 
unemployment wherever possible.
Given fiscal limitations as well as the public’s sense of equity, jobs 
tax credits should be devised to have maximum “bang for the buck,” 
to focus on incentive effects rather than reductions in total tax payments.
With these considerations in mind, there is much to be said for a 
marginal tax credit such as that in the New Jobs Tax Credit (NJTC) in 
effect in 1977 and 1978. The restriction to a base as high as 102 
percent of previous employment is, however, too high. It makes immune 
to the incentives very many businesses, particularly in a recession 
period, that can have no reasonable hope of reaching the threshold at 
which the credit would become effective. A high threshold tied to 
previous employment offers the further danger of encouraging variation 
in employment rather than long-term increases; employers might be 
encouraged merely to reduce employment every other year in order to 
increase it each following year.
Narrow targeting of jobs tax credits may be ineffective if not 
counterproductive over a considerable period of time. If those in targeted 
groups, collectively and individually, form only small portions of the 
labor force, actual or potential, it is likely to prove inordinately costly 
for employers to seek them out. To the extent such groups are stigmatized, 
potential employers may be even less willing to hire individuals who 
belong to them.
Previous Attempts to Subsidize 
Employment
There have been many scattered and sometimes abortive efforts in the 
United States to subsidize employment; their record confirms these 
analytical considerations and shows us how best to proceed.
First, a number of studies suggested that the NJTC, despite its 
limitations, did significantly increase employment. A major problem 
during its short life was the lack of information about its existence. 
Perhaps out of the Carter administration’s hostility—it was pushed 
through Congress over the administration’s opposition—or perhaps due 
to the improbability of expecting the Treasury to push a campaign to 
show business how to use a provision of the tax code to reduce taxes, 
many businesses never learned of the credit or learned of it only after 
the period of employment it was intended to stimulate. Since studies 
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suggest a significant impact among those businesses that knew of the 
credit in time, one may conjecture that the stimulus would have been 
all the greater with properly devised, permanent legislation, of which 
employers would have become informed.
The Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC) had funds for providing publicity 
to employers, but the nine groups targeted until 1982, with one 
conspicuous exception, were too narrow, too unappealing, or too difficult 
to reach to generate much employer recruitment. That major exception 
was economically disadvantaged youth between the ages of sixteen and 
nineteen participating in cooperative education programs. The active 
participation of schools and the joint undertaking of responsibility in 
the recruitment of student-worker participants has apparently proved 
effective and successful. The TJTC will probably also prove to be 
effective for the new target group of “summer youth”—that is, those 
economically disadvantaged who are sixteen or seventeen years of age 
working during any ninety-day period between May 1 and September 
15. This credit would appear indeed to be surprisingly generous—85 
percent of up to $3,000 of wages paid for services during this period.
To the extent that narrow targeting can be effective in stimulating 
employment within the targeted groups, it runs a particular risk of 
substituting employment in the targeted groups for employment of others. 
Where a major criterion of group membership is, as under the targeted 
employment tax credit, household income “less than 70 percent of the 
applicable regional lower income standard,” there is further danger that 
the credit will contribute to a lowering of household income. Existing 
income earners may be encouraged to leave the household or to quit 
their jobs to make others in the household subject to the credit.
An Illustrative Employment Subsidy 
Program
Strong economic arguments can be made for a jobs tax credit more 
broadly targeted at all of those who want jobs. This might have some 
special focus on youth, where unemployment is most widespread, and 
on others where special assistance seems warranted. The following 
package illustrates some underlying principles for a new employment 
subsidy program.
1. For net additions to employment beyond 95 percent of employment 
in 1981, offer a 50 percent tax credit of up to the amount of 
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average unemployment insurance benefits (currently $116 per 
week) for—
• Those unemployed five weeks or more.
• Those under the age of twenty without jobs and less than one 
year of prior employment.
• Those seeking employment after being out of the labor market 
due to child-rearing.
• Those seeking civilian employment after being out of the 
civilian labor force due to military service.
2. For all others, offer a similar credit, modelled after the NJTC, 
for increases in employment over that in 1981. (Unlike with the 
NJTC, there would be no limitation of $100,000 or any other 
amount for the credit to be received by each individual employer.)
3. Have the Treasury pay payroll taxes out of general revenues for 
those under the age of twenty.
4. Relate the tax credit to the payroll tax rather than corporate or 
individual income taxes. Have the Treasury make contributions 
to the social security funds corresponding to the credits.
The threshold of 95 percent of 1981 employment for employer 
eligibility for the credit for workers in special categories would focus 
on these targeted groups. The general eligibility pertaining to employment 
beyond 100 percent of 1981 figures would mitigate the danger of 
increasing employment within the special groups at the expense of 
others.
The targeting of those unemployed for five weeks or more has some 
special appeal as well as some obvious dangers. By focusing directly 
on those suffering significantly more than frictional unemployment, it 
offers the promise of a direct cure, similar to heat-seeking missiles or 
drugs designed to find and destroy cancer cells while leaving the rest 
of the body undamaged.
However, one must recognize the danger of “moral hazard,” partic­
ularly the possibility that workers will find it appealing to enjoy brief 
periods of unemployment that will in turn make them more attractive 
to employers. Similarly, under my proposal employers may contribute 
to short-term unemployment by spuming those unemployed less than 
five weeks. I am not convinced that these difficulties are overwhelming. 
For most workers, unemployment benefits would not be a preferred 
substitute to available employment. Most employers would prefer the 
efficiency of having long-term employees as opposed to regularly 
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substituting them with the short-term unemployed. And various admin­
istrative safeguards might well be introduced to reduce cheating and 
undesirable fallout from this provision.
Elimination of social security payroll taxes for teenagers may well be 
justified on grounds of equity as well as encouraging the employment 
of youth. Under our current social security laws, contributions by the 
young most certainly entail a singularly poor benefit-contribution ratio. 
Even with greater longevity, disproportionately fewer numbers of those 
who will begin work at an early age live long enough to receive major 
portions of their benefits. And the present value of expected future 
benefits for a teenager must in any event be very low.
Tying the tax credit to the payroll tax would make it effective for the 
very large numbers of small companies that do not have business income 
tax liabilities. It would also make it effective for nonprofit institutions 
and ideally, as well, state and local government bodies and school 
districts that participate in the social security system. Our purpose, we 
must recall, is to increase employment, not to help any particular group 
of employers. Nonprofit institutions such as schools, colleges, univer­
sities, and hospitals as well as governmental units can prove to be 
particularly flexible employers, less pressed by cyclical profit concerns.
Generally, tying the tax credit to payroll taxes rather than to business 
income taxes will offer a better opportunity for the direct reduction of 
labor costs, which can make jobs tax credits an ideal tool for combating 
both unemployment and inflation.
Qualifications
A number of side effects must be recognized in any sober consideration 
of jobs tax credits. First, they can be expected to have some effects 
upon wages. Specifically, wage rates of target groups should rise. This 
in itself is probably a desired boon to the predominantly lower-income 
individuals where the incidence of unemployment is greatest. Where 
the minimum wage proves a barrier to employment, employment subsidies 
can neatly finesse the issue by keeping marginal labor costs to the 
employer below the minimum wage while raising the return to the worker 
above it.
For those outside of a target group eligible for the credit, however, 
wages may fall. The demand for the services of nontargeted workers 
may be reduced as employers direct themselves to workers for whom 
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they can receive the subsidies. The consequences may well include 
reduced employment among the nontarget groups.
It is therefore important that any system of jobs tax credits be 
accompanied by a general policy of maintaining employment. Significant 
credits focussed on target groups should be complemented with some 
incentives to prevent nontarget groups from falling back. Also, it would 
be dangerous for jobs tax credits to be accompanied by higher taxes 
elsewhere or by tight money policies that will reduce overall demand 
and contribute to general unemployment, or both.
A second side effect of an effective jobs tax credit may be increased 
employment through increases in the labor force rather than reductions 
in unemployment. The employment subsidies may induce some youth 
to quit school in order to take jobs now available. They may induce 
some women to leave home and nonmarket activity to work in the 
marketplace. Since neither youth in school nor women working at home 
are counted as unemployed, the job subsidies may increase employment 
more than they decrease unemployment, and the increases in employment 
may be accompanied by reductions in other useful activities as well as 
leisure.
Third, increases in employment generated by jobs subsidies will 
increase aggregate demand, output, saving and investment, tax revenues, 
and other employment. New workers will spend much of their additional 
income, thus contributing to purchasing power for other output as well 
as their own. This will stimulate employment generally and tend to 
reduce the adverse side effects on other employment and wages suggested 
above.
Fourth, effective jobs subsidies may increase employment and output 
but raise output less than employment, thereby reducing labor produc­
tivity, particularly at the margin. There is, after all, some presumption 
that workers hired because of a subsidy are less productive; otherwise 
they would have been hired without the subsidy. With higher long-run 
employment and a higher labor-to-capital ratio, we may expect produc­
tivity per worker to be lower. The bottom line, however, should be 
recognized as output per capita and not output per worker. In that 
sense, despite any decline in measured productivity, we will all generally 
be better off.
Fifth, there are a number of long-run consequences of employment 
subsidies. If they are limited in time, as in the TJTC, or related to 
increases in employment, as in the NJTC, a number of questions arise. 
What do we do for an encore? What happens to workers after their 
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eligibility expires? What happens when a firm reaches the limit of its 
expansion capabilities? The answer must lie in the not unrealistic 
expectation that workers initially hired on the basis of tax credits will 
in a reasonable period of time acquire the job experience, skills, 
motivation, and human capital that make them desirable employees at 
prevailing wages without the subsidies. There can be no guarantee that 
this will always be true, but if it is true for a significant portion of those 
affected, the benefits of well-devised employment subsidies will be long 
term indeed.
Sixth, any system of jobs tax credits, however well devised, must 
inevitably involve significant amounts of leakage and waste. Employers 
will take advantage of the credit to hire workers that they would have 
hired anyway. Workers will find themselves in greater demand and with 
higher wages, as the result of the credit, for jobs that they would have 
been offered and would have accepted at lower wages without the credit. 
It is important that the public accept these consequences, whether they 
find them desirable or not, and recognize the net benefit of the increased 
employment and output, now and in the future, which results.
Conclusion
While the possibility of devising and implementing effective employment 
subsidies is enormously appealing, it would be foolish to oversell them. 
They are no panacea. They present a number of difficulties in imple­
mentation and administration. Much of hard core unemployment and 
nonparticipation of the labor force, will require more far-reaching 
intervention. There are many who lack the skills, ability, education and 
training, ambition, and motivation that would make them employable 
even at credits of 100 percent and more. Employers will essentially not 
want them at any price.
Solutions here must be found in terms of comprehensive training, 
counselling, family support, and provision of new living arrangements 
where households have ceased to function in any acceptable fashion. If 
the armed forces can recruit two million youth, cannot the government 
institute a complementary nonmilitary program that would combine 
training and preparation for private and public employment?
Reducing the scourge of unemployment must be a joint undertaking 
of government and of the private sector, where the great bulk of 
employment in our economy is to be found. In that undertaking, a well- 
conceived, far-reaching, and ambitious program of employment subsidies 
can play a major role.
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A SMALL BUSINESS 
JOBS TAX CREDIT
by Frank S. Swain, Esq., Chief Counsel for Advocacy, Small Business 
Administration, and
George Guttman, Esq., Formerly Counsel for Tax Analysis, Office of 
Advocacy of the Small Business Administration
When one looks at the small business sector, a characteristic that is 
immediately apparent is the degree to which it is labor intensive. Small 
business uses in abundance our nation’s most precious resource, our 
people—their ideas and skills.1 Studies have indicated that small 
businesses account for a significant amount of training for the unskilled 
and those newly entering the job force.
In his study, “Human Capital Transfer From Small to Large Business,” 
Bradley R. Schiller explores the extent to which small businesses 
provide early work experience and training opportunities—67 percent 
of all male workers get their first steady job in companies with fewer 
than 100 employees. While small companies pay lower initial wages, 
they offer faster wage growth, which helps to reduce the pay gap over 
time. When workers move from small companies to larger ones they get 
substantial first-year pay increases (an average of 23 percent). These 
pay premiums partially reflect the skills development provided by the 
initial small employer.2
The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views of the Reagan 
administration or those of the Small Business Administration.
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Alternatively, when one looks closely at the Internal Revenue Code, 
one sees that it strongly emphasizes providing incentives for capital 
investments. Legislation in past years has continued this bias by 
strengthening existing provisions and creating new ones that provide 
additional incentives for capital investments, such as the safe-harbor 
leasing provision enacted by section 201 of the Economic Recovery Tax 
Act of 1981 (ERTA).3 To the extent that small businesses engage in 
capital investments, they also receive regular and special benefits, such 
as immediate expensing of some capital expenditures. However, ex­
penditures for labor inputs are a significantly greater factor for small 
businesses than are capital investments.
In 1976, as part of the planning for an economic stimulus package, 
a tax credit to encourage employers to hire additional workers was being 
actively considered by the Treasury Department. At the time, some 
administrative economic policymakers felt that prior stimulative efforts 
to recover from the 1974 recession were not working adequately, and 
high unemployment, with its serious social and economic consequences, 
was a pressing concern. Additional incentives for capital investments 
were rejected as providing uncertain relief in general and too little real 
relief for small businesses and labor-intensive industries. Passage of a 
jobs tax credit, on the other hand, would have the dual advantage of 
being anti-inflationary and a direct stimulus to increased employment. 
A jobs credit would immediately reduce labor costs over a significant 
range of inputs. Also, a jobs credit, while reducing labor costs to 
businesses, does not reduce labor income to employees, an added plus. 
The only prior experience the United States has had with jobs tax credits 
was the Work Incentive (WIN) credit enacted in 1971. It was not used 
by many employers because of the low availability of qualified workers 
among its target population and the strict recapture rules on its use.4
The new proposed credit was enacted as the New Jobs Tax Credit 
(NJTC) by section 202 of the Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 
1977,5 with numerous technical restrictions6 to reduce its overall cost, 
to curb real and imagined abuses, and to better target the credit.
The effectiveness of a tax provision of this nature can only be measured 
by reference to its margin of elasticity. There are some companies that 
will receive a windfall by claiming the credit for workers they would 
have hired whether or not the credit was in effect. Some employers will 
not hire new workers even with the benefits of the credit. The cost­
effectiveness of the credit is determined by how many employees are 
hired by employers who did so because of the added tax incentives to 
do so. Thus, this credit aims to maximize this margin.
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However, the credit was seen as a temporary measure with only a 
two-year life, and it was only one provision within a tax package that 
had numerous other, more newsworthy components, such as a refundable 
fifty dollar tax credit for most taxpayers. As a result, by the time a 
significant number of small businesses became aware of the NJTC, it 
was due to expire.
A type of jobs tax credit was reenacted and extended for another two 
years by section 321 of the Revenue Act of 1978.7 However, the 1978 
credit was enacted in a form substantially different from the 1977 NJTC. 
The Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC) was a narrow-based credit whose 
scope, emphasis, and administration was different than the prior NJTC. 
The targeted credit provided tax benefits to employers who hired 
individuals from any of seven hard-to-employ groups of people, including 
the handicapped, ex-convicts, and welfare recipients, among others.
In 1981, the TJTC was reenacted for one year with modifications 
further limiting its applicability.8 It was recently reenacted with minor 
changes until the end of 1984 by section 233 of the Tax Equity and 
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA).9
Data indicates that a good part of the lack of success of the two-year 
NJTC can be attributed to the limited awareness of the credit by 
potential users. Knowledge of the NJTC diffused slowly among small 
businesses because they did not have extensive information networks 
to provide in-depth details of the complex legislation and its implementing 
regulations. However, studies have shown that where knowledge of the 
credit was available, the desired purpose was effectively served.
In one such study, Jeffrey Perloff and Michael Wachter found that 
while many employers did not know of the credit, those who did were 
able to increase employment 3.1 percent faster than those who did 
not.10 Perloff and Wachter reexamined their study six months later for 
the Department of Labor using another methodology and found the 
correct percentage to be 3.4.11
With this opportunity to write on a clean slate, we will provide you 
with our thoughts on how a jobs tax credit might look if the small 
business community were charged with designing one.
Purpose of the Credit
In our view, a jobs tax credit should have three goals.
First, in a general sense, the credit should increase the incentives 
for a business to invest in human rather than capital assets. Thus, to 
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some extent the credit would offset some of the current bias in our tax 
code towards capital investments by providing an additional incentive 
for labor investments.
Second, the credit should specifically provide incentives for an 
employer to hire individuals above traditional staffing and utilization 
levels. The structure of the credit implicitly recognizes that product 
demand and not wage level is the ultimate factor an employer uses in 
determining if and when to hire additional employees. While it is well 
and good that a business routinely hires new workers on a seasonal or 
regular basis, this credit aims to increase the margin.12 Specifically, 
the jobs credit should be designed to increase both the scope and 
utilization level of human capital in a business. Thus, the credit should 
encourage a company to consider hiring individuals to do functions that 
a machine could do for about the same cost. The credit should act as 
an incentive to new incremental employment rather than a subsidy to 
base level employment.
Third, the credit should serve as an incentive to provide job training 
to unskilled or semiskilled individuals and to give new entrants in the 
job force real-world experience so they will be able to compete in the 
job market in the future.13 The jobs tax credit in this instance would 
be acting in the nature of a temporary wage subsidy to create jobs by 
lessening or closing the gap between the nominal wage rate and the 
productivity of the incremental labor. However, in no sense should the 
jobs tax credit be looked on as a private sector type of CETA program 
to create temporary make-work positions. It is hoped that the credit will 
lead to a significant amount of hiring by employers who will provide 
training and experience in jobs that meet future technology needs. 
When, as mandated by our proposal, the Treasury Department reviews 
the effectiveness of the credit after five years, we expect that this 
question will be examined in detail.
Structure of the Credit
The proposed jobs tax credit is structured to be flexible, but stresses 
private initiatives and relies on market forces rather than government 
directives to make the program work. All three goals set forth above 
can be achieved by lowering the initial cost of labor to an employer.
One aspect of a successful credit is its ease of use. This is especially 
important for small businesses that have a limited ability to deal with 
complex provisions, extensive record-keeping, certification problems, 
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and the like. Thus, we propose to calculate the credit based on the 
current FUTA (Federal Unemployment Tax Act)14 tax base of an 
employer. For ease of calculation purposes and simplicity, let us assume 
that each employee will earn at least $7,000 per year or $140 per week. 
It is not realistic to use the salary or the FICA (Federal Insurance 
Contributions Act)15 base because inflation and normal wage increases 
would distort calculations to determine the actual jobs tax credit.
Under FUTA rules, an employer must pay a tax of 3.4 percent on 
the first $6,000 of wages of each employee. In light of the changes of 
the recently enacted tax bill,16 the FUTA base will rise to 3.5 percent 
of the first $7,000 of wages of each employee in 1983. For purposes of 
this jobs tax credit proposal, we will use the 1983 figures in our 
calculations and illustration.
The amount of jobs tax credits that an employer can earn in a given 
year would be 30 percent of the amount of the employer’s FUTA base 
that exceeds 105 percent of the prior year’s FUTA tax liability.17 Thus, 
if the employer’s FUTA base was $100,000 in 1982, and the credit 
takes effect January 1983, 30 percent of 1983 FUTA tax liability over 
$105,000 could be earned as a jobs tax credit by the employer. This 
amount shall be known as the “FUTA sum.” If the 1983 FUTA base of 
the employer is $128,000, the employer’s maximum jobs tax credit for 
1983 could be $6,900 (30 percent of $23,000). If the 1983 FUTA base 
is $104,000, no new credits would be earned in that year.
The amount of the FUTA sum (here $23,000) would then be tagged 
to the eligible employees hired in 1983 that earned them. For future 
years (in this example after 1983) these tagged employees would be 
eligible to earn jobs tax credits within the next twenty-four months 
regardless of future changes in the FUTA sum. The maximum amount 
of jobs tax credits that an employer will be able to use to offset tax 
liability, and subject to refundability, would be $42,000.
During each of the first twelve months that the tagged employee works 
for the employer, 30 percent of his or her actual monthly wages, here 
up to $584 of wages ($7,000 ÷ 12 = $583.33), would be eligible for 
a 30 percent jobs tax credit. This is necessary, for second-year credit 
and third-year employment purposes, to identify the workers whose 
wages are earning jobs tax credits. During the second twelve months, 
the credit would be 15 percent of his or her actual monthly wages. The 
higher the jobs tax credit, the greater the incentive of an employer to 
substitute labor for capital investments. However, too high a credit 
would be both expensive and lead to a perception that the credit is in 
reality direct funding for jobs, a result we wish to avoid.
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Each year the designation process would begin again without regard 
to how many employees were eligible for, or actually earned, jobs tax 
credits in past years.
This formula is being used because the credit, while flowing to the 
employer, will be based on the actual work cycle and earnings of 
individuals. Also, employers will have specific obligations to the 
employees hired who earn jobs tax credits. Thus, the credit covers a 
twenty-four-month wage cycle for each designated employee, at 30 
percent for the first twelve months up to a $584 base per month and 
15 percent for the next twelve months.
This tagging is necessary because even if the FUTA base does not 
rise to 105 percent of the prior-year FUTA base in later years, or the 
FUTA base shrinks, the designated employees would still be eligible 
for credits for the full twenty-four-month cycle. The incentive to hire 
and use the human capital assets would not be lost once he or she is 
tagged as eligible. This would prevent the last-hired-first-fired rule from 
negating the effects of the jobs tax credit. Accordingly, the next year 
the employer would begin the same designation process again if there 
were any FUTA sums available.
Unlike the NJTC, the amount of the credit taken would not have to 
be used to reduce deductible wage expenses. The jobs credit would be 
permanent and not have an expiration date. Thus, employers could plan 
for the long term and begin to impute jobs tax credit considerations in 
hiring practices. However, as indicated above, the proposal mandates 
that the Treasury Department review the effectiveness of the credit after 
five years.
Administration of the Credit
As almost all businesses file yearly tax returns and submit information 
or withholding reports to the federal government on a regular basis 
(usually quarterly), it would be cost-effective to piggyback the proposed 
credit to the existing tax system, and this proposal adopts this approach. 
It will minimize paperwork costs for the employer and administrative 
costs for the government. Consistent with this approach, administration 
of the credit will consist of a few additional lines on the employer’s 
yearly tax return. Depending on the type of business, changes will be 
made to either Form 1040 for sole proprietors, Form 1120 for corpo­
rations, or Form 1120S for subchapter S corporations. This is preferable 
to creating a new bureaucracy to deal with jobs creation.
All benefits of a jobs tax credit program should go to jobs credit 
payouts rather than overhead and administrative expenses. For this 
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reason, a tax credit is preferred over a deduction from income as a 
means for providing jobs incentives because the value of a tax deduction 
is dependent on the business’s effective rate of taxation and makes no 
sense unless there is actual income to offset. Otherwise, one cannot 
translate the value of a deduction into actual cash benefits. With a tax 
credit the employer immediately knows the value of the subsidy, and 
with refundability he is sure of actually receiving that amount. In 
contrast with the TJTC, this program would not require prior certifications 
or vouchers to be issued by the state employment service for each 
eligible employer.
Publicity
Experience with the NJTC shows that knowledge of the credit was slow 
to diffuse among small businesses. To avoid this problem, a brochure 
would be sent to all FUTA tax payers by the Internal Revenue 
Service. The brochure would contain a simplified explanation of the 
credit, provide numerous examples, and give a telephone number where 
an employer can receive additional information and answers to specific 
questions.
Limits on the Credit
The maximum credit an employer could earn in a given year would be 
$42,000. This limit is imposed because the credit aims to work as an 
incentive to hire workers above traditional levels, but not above levels 
that would provide an excessive windfall for planned expansions. With 
a $42,000 limit, up to twenty full-time or full-time-equivalent workers 
could earn credits in the first year of the credit, and thirty in the second 
year of the credit.
No family member or relative of the employer would be eligible for 
the jobs tax credit. Temporary help agencies who hire out employees 
for short periods would not be eligible for the credit.
The employer would be required to keep the employee for at least 
one year after the twenty-four-month credit period if he desires to stay. 
If the business is sold, the new owner will inherit the FUTA base. A 
given employee could only be eligible once for the two-year credit. If 
an employee who is receiving a credit is fired or quits after twelve 
months, his replacement is not eligible for jobs tax credits. However, 
no recapture of credits would occur if the dismissal or resignation occurs 
in the first twelve months.
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The credit would be available on a per-tax-return rather than a per­
plant basis. Credits granted that are forfeited are subject to recapture 
after the end of the tax year in which a disqualifying act occurs, such 
as dismissing an employee after the second year. Recapture means that 
the dollar amounts of credits taken would have to be repaid to the 
government in the form of an added tax liability.
Retention rules will be as follows:
1. If the employer takes two years of credits on an employee, he is 
bound to offer the employee a third year of employment.
2. If the employee quits or is fired within the first year, there would 
be no recapture of credits unless the employee was fired so another 
employee could be hired in his place.
These issues would not be addressed except as part of a regular IRS 
audit of an employee’s tax return.
Refundability
Under this proposal, the jobs tax credit would be refundable. Under 
present rules, jobs tax credits earned can only be used to offset the 
income tax liability of the employer. This offset is allowed only after 
all the nonrefundable tax credits are first used to offset up to 90 percent 
of current tax liability. Under TEFRA, tax credits can only be used to 
offset up to 85 percent of current tax liability after 1982. Any currently 
unusable credits can be carried back three years and forward fifteen 
years.
As the credit is based on a percentage of the wages of a worker up 
to $7,000, the credit reduces the labor costs for lower paid, probably 
unskilled, workers more than for higher paid, skilled workers, since 
the per-worker credit represents a higher proportion of the wages of 
low-paid workers. This stimulates employment of the young, women, 
minorities, and others who compose a major portion of marginally skilled 
workers and a disproportionate share of the unemployed in periods of 
declining business activity. Thus, there is no real need for the jobs tax 
credit to have a targeting feature; coupled with market demand, it will 
help groups that are now deemed to need a targeted-type credit.
Since many small businesses have little or no federal income tax 
liability in a given year, the credit is of limited current use. For each 
employee hired in 1983, the employer has FICA or social security tax 
liability of 6.7 percent of each dollar of wages, up to $32,400, and 
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additional tax liability of 3.5 percent against the first $7,000 of wages 
for FUTA or unemployment tax purposes. Thus, for the jobs tax credit 
to be useful for small businesses, the credit can be used to offset FICA 
and FUTA tax liabilities. Any remaining credit would be refundable. 
This is especially important for small businesses because many have 
cash flow problems, and refundability would be a capital-retentive 
benefit. The employer who has income tax liability will be able to offset 
it with jobs tax credits and receive credit benefits immediately by having 
to pay less estimated tax payments to the government. If there is no 
expected tax liability for a given year, refundability of credit benefits 
would be available within approximately six weeks of filing the yearly 
business tax return.
Possible abuse of this refundability feature would be limited by 
restrictions on the amount of the jobs tax credits that an employer would 
be eligible to obtain in a given year. Also, refundability would be 
limited to small businesses, for example, companies with assets under 
$10 million. Thus, the restriction would help assure the jobs tax credit 
program’s usefulness, since big businesses that are already planning to 
hire employees as part of an expansionary move would receive only 
limited windfall benefits. Refundability would make tax credit ordering, 
limits on tax credit offset, and carryover considerations irrelevant for 
small businesses. These rules limit complexity and administrative 
burdens and assure that benefits flow to the intended recipients.
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14. I.R.C. §§ 3301 through 3311.
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the Smail Business 
Enterprise

DEBT-EQUITY 
PROBLEMS FOR SMALL 
BUSINESS
by John H. Harrington, CPA, Price Waterhouse
Ever since the corporate income tax was instituted, there has been much 
uncertainty whether capital provided by outsiders is debt or equity. 
Payments for the use of capital treated as debt are interest on 
indebtedness, while distributions to owners are dividends. The impli­
cations of this characterization are far reaching. The most obvious is 
that the corporation receives a deduction for interest payments but 
generally does not receive a deduction for dividends, thereby directly 
affecting the taxable income of the corporation. Of course, the recipient 
is normally subject to tax in either case. Repayments of debt principal 
do not result in income to the holder, whereas any distribution of capital 
will generally result in taxable income to the “shareholder” provided 
the corporation has current or accumulated taxable earnings and profits. 
This affects taxable and nontaxable reorganizations, liquidations, stock 
redemptions, and a long list of other areas.
The issue is not confined to corporations; the characterization as 
debt or equity for a partnership or other entity can have a number of 
implications. For example, while a partnership is not subject to income 
tax, the characterization of capital provided by outsiders can affect the 
tax basis of the interests of the partners and timing of deductions for 
expenses and receipt of income.
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Commonly, small businesses have been started by the capital being 
provided by owners who are active in the business. Frequently, additional 
investments are made by other friends or acquaintances or, if things go 
well, a venture capital firm. Sometimes a business is so successful that 
it is able to go directly from the original owners to the public market. 
Many firms never go public because either they do not wish to be 
burdened with the expense and inconvenience associated with being 
public or they fail to achieve the necessary success. However, irre­
spective of the sequence of events, the providers of capital frequently 
wish to make their investments in the form of both loans and stock, 
with debt instruments often playing an important role. This is because 
(1) debt instruments may have greater rights in liquidation in the event 
the business is unsuccessful, (2) the corporation can obtain a tax 
deduction for payments of interest, and (3) debt instruments enable the 
owners to get their capital back without paying income tax on the 
“principal” portion. It is very important in the evolution of a business 
for it to be able to design its capital structure in such a way as to 
maximize the opportunity for investors who must be induced to provide 
capital for expansion of the business.
Since the debt-equity question has many tax implications for small 
business, I will not touch on all aspects of the issue. This paper will 
be primarily concerned with the future characterization of the capital 
provided by outsiders to a corporation in light of the Treasury’s intent 
to finalize regulations under section 385 of the Internal Revenue Code, 
which was enacted in 1969. The section and the related regulations are 
designed to provide specific criteria for determining whether capital is 
to be characterized as debt or as equity. Clearly, the Treasury is 
empowered to issue regulations to apply section 385. These were 
originally proposed in 1980 and have been modified several times since. 
Presently they are scheduled to become effective ninety days after the 
final revisions are published in the Federal Register but in no event 
earlier than April 1, 1983.
These proposed regulations have caused considerable controversy, 
and many groups, including the AICPA, have objected to numerous 
aspects. Principally the objections concern the potential negative impact 
on the ability of small business to raise equity capital and borrow 
money, the complexity of the proposed regulations, and the many 
potential tax traps for the small businessman who is unfamiliar with 
their application.
After many years of experience in working with privately held 
businesses, it is my view that tax rules that are too complex or too 
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difficult to understand tend to be ignored by taxpayers. Such provisions 
encourage noncompliance by taxpayers in other areas of the tax law 
because they develop a disdain for the entire law. Furthermore, IRS 
agents may not be qualified or have the time to properly enforce unduly 
complex provisions, thereby discouraging self assessment, which is 
fundamental to our tax system.
History of the Debt-Equity Tax Area
The question of characterization of capital as debt or equity has resulted 
in frequent litigation between taxpayers and taxing authorities over the 
years. The determination generally has been based upon the facts and 
circumstances of each case, although certain general principles have 
evolved. Taxpayers were in a far stronger position to have an investment 
treated as debt if it was evidenced in writing, it carried a reasonable 
rate of interest, regular payments were made, it had a definite due date, 
and the debtor could demonstrate an intent to ultimately pay off the 
entire principal. In addition, the ratio of a corporation’s debt to equity 
is a factor in deciding some of these cases, although a fairly wide variety 
of debt-to-equity ratios has been allowed. In Revenue Ruling 68-54, 
the IRS approved a debt-to-equity ratio of 20 to 1 as long as capital is 
sufficient for normal business operations.
In fact I can only recall one instance in my entire experience when 
an actual assessment of tax was paid because of a recharacterization of 
debt to equity. This is not to say that the issue is unimportant but 
reflects my view that taxpayers who have taken reasonable steps to 
comply with the guidelines outlined above have been successful in 
having the debt treated as they had intended.
In the late 1960s the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. 
government became very concerned over the merger wave that was 
underway at that time. It was felt that large corporations (commonly 
called conglomerates) were acquiring too many of the businesses in 
America, resulting in an undue concentration of financial power and 
business interests. In addition, it was felt that certain provisions of the 
tax laws encouraged these kinds of acquisitions and that some revisions 
were needed. This resulted in a series of legislative proposals, some of 
which were ultimately enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1969.
These changes disallowed a deduction for interest on certain acqui­
sition indebtedness in excess of $5 million (section 279), strengthened 
the original issue discount rules under section 1232, prohibited install­
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ment reporting of income when the consideration was readily marketable 
(section 453), and added section 385. In reviewing the legislative history 
of section 385, it is clear that the genesis of this section arose from the 
concern over the conglomerate wave. Both Treasury testimony and the 
legislative history indicated that the purpose in enacting this section 
was to give the Treasury the power to determine what is debt and what 
is equity in order to discourage the use of hybrid instruments to acquire 
other businesses. Such hybrid instruments might contain elements of 
both equity and debt, such as convertible debentures, debentures with 
warrants attached, and debentures with equity kickers. There was 
virtually no suggestion that this section was enacted to deal with 
“abuses” or problems that existed with respect to privately held 
businesses.
Needless to say, because section 385 gives the Treasury authority to 
determine what is debt and equity in the case of any corporation, it 
may have a broad range of influence. This section does not apply to 
noncorporate entities such as partnerships, individuals, and trusts. 
Moreover, it does not apply to money loaned by the corporation to 
shareholders, employees, or others, but rather only to money loaned or 
invested in the corporation, that is, money coming from the providers 
of capital.
The congressional intent of the section has been expanded through 
the proposed regulations. By way of background, the Treasury originally 
issued proposed regulations under section 385 in March 1980, over ten 
years after the enactment of the section. These proposals have been 
modified and delayed several times.
The Treasury has substantially altered the original intent of section 
385 by failing to provide mechanisms whereby the average small 
business will not be adversely affected by the section. If the congressional 
intent was to have section 385 discourage corporate takeovers by 
conglomerates, then the rules should be structured in a manner that is 
directed towards these kinds of transactions with minimal effect on 
entities such as small businesses that apparently were not the subject 
of congressional concern.
The Treasury has had considerable difficulty with the question of 
debt vs. equity over the years, and it welcomes the opportunity to 
acquire the authority to apply specific rules so it can make this 
determination. Clearly it is using section 385 to accomplish this. 
Moreover, from a taxpayer’s point of view, there probably are benefits 
from having a more specific set of rules to operate under, provided they 
58
are not unduly complex. However, the proposed regulations do contain 
a number of problems, and they should be substantially modified.
A number of business groups and individuals, including the AICPA, 
have invested a substantial amount of time in analyzing the proposed 
regulations and providing very valuable input to the Treasury, which 
has adopted a number of the suggested changes. These comments are 
still being developed. While many significant improvements have 
resulted, additional revision is necessary. Therefore, the following 
discussion outlines some suggestions concerning further modification of 
the proposed regulations that would provide a more workable environment 
for small business. However, it will not cover the international aspects 
of section 385.
General Structure of Proposed 
Regulations Under Section 385
The proposed regulations under section 385 attempt to treat insiders 
and outsiders differently, which is logical. In general, insiders are those 
that hold a significant equity interest in the corporation, while outsiders 
are those that hold minor amounts or no equity in the corporation. This 
leads to the so-called proportionality issue, in which debt that is roughly 
proportional to stockholdings is subject to stricter standards.
There are five general categories of transactions that the Treasury is 
concerned with and has attempted to deal with, which include—
1. Hybrid instruments, which contain elements of both debt and 
equity. Perhaps the most common example is a convertible 
debenture in which interest is regularly paid at a specified rate 
and principal is ultimately due, but that can be converted into a 
certain number of shares of stock at the option of the holder. If 
over one-half of the value is attributable to the equity feature, a 
hybrid instrument is automatically deemed to be stock.
2. Debt not evidenced by a formal negotiable instrument or other 
written instrument.
3. Debt that does not bear interest at a reasonable rate, including 
demand and term loans.
4. Excessive debt. In general this is debt where the debt-to-equity 
ratio of the corporation exceeds a certain amount. The proposed 
regulations operate under the presumption that if certain specified 
59
ratios are not met, the corporation is undercapitalized unless a 
lender could qualify as an independent creditor. The ratios are 3 
to 1 for insiders and 10 to 1 for outsiders. These are calculated 
on a tax basis (not book or fair market value).
5. Failure to pay interest or principal on a timely basis as specified 
by the instrument.
If under any of these rules the instrument is treated as equity rather 
than debt, it is deemed to be equity forever. Thus, where an IRS agent 
examining a tax return that was filed three years ago successfully asserts 
that a debt instrument is equity, it will result in a disallowance of tax 
deductions for all intervening years without the taxpayer being able to 
take any corrective or offsetting action for the intervening years. While 
limited time periods are allowed after the end of the year to take 
corrective action, these are, generally, 120 days in the case of unwritten 
advances and 90 days for the payment of interest.
Interest rates that are deemed to be reasonable can be based upon 
several standards including section 482 rates, the interest rate on federal 
tax assessments, rates paid by unrelated debtors, and the prime rate at 
a local commercial bank. But, in no event can the rate be less than the 
rate on U.S. obligations of comparable maturity.
Because of the difference in 10 to 1 and 3 to 1 debt-to-equity ratios 
for outsiders and insiders, it is important to be able to determine whether 
debt is proportional to stock holdings. In general, where there is a 50 
percent overlap between stock holdings and debt holdings, the debt is 
deemed to be proportional.
For example, in the following case the overlap factor is 40 percent, 
and instruments are deemed to be held non-pro-rata to stock. Constructive 
ownership rules apply for determining holdings.
understand. Even with my background as a tax partner with Price 
Waterhouse, I have found that it required considerable effort to interpret 
and understand them. I probably still do not have a full understanding 
of their provisions and impact. Rules such as these, which could apply 
to thousands or millions of businesses, should be structured in a manner
A B C D
Stock 40% 10% 50% 0%
Instruments 20% 60% 10% 10%
(Overlap = 20% + 10% + 10% + 0%)
The proposed regulations are extremely complex and difficult to
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that is understandable and subject to easy interpretation with reasonable 
effort. The proposed regulations do not meet this standard.
Many of these provisions will have an impact that taxpayers may be 
totally unaware of and may have very adverse tax consequences even 
though the taxpayer was not engaging in a transaction that was intended 
to result in any tax reduction or tax avoidance. Given the extensive tax 
rules and regulatory rules that the average small business and its 
advisers must cope with, it seems to be an unreasonable request to 
have small business interpret the proposed regulations as presently 
structured.
In addition, because many other sections of the tax law are dependent 
upon whether capital is treated as loans or equity, other transactions in 
other sections of the Internal Revenue Code are affected. The proposed 
regulations fail to provide adequate guidance as to their effect on other 
sections.
One of the more thorny areas that has been reserved presently, but 
ultimately needs clarification, is the question of whether section 385 
will determine if a loan to a subchapter S corporation (a corporation 
where the income is generally taxed to the shareholders without corporate 
tax) will be characterized under the section 385 rules for determining 
whether the corporation has two classes of stock, which is prohibited 
under the subchapter S rules. In the past, the Treasury has been 
successful in treating certain loans as a second class of stock. Therefore, 
application of the proposed rules could substantially increase the risk 
of a termination of subchapter S status.
There are several provisions in the proposed regulations that provide 
for corrections within 90 to 120 days after the end of the year. It is my 
belief that this is too short a period of time. Frequently the analysis of 
transactions necessary to determine what corrective action may be 
required is not completed until very close to the time the tax return is 
due, thus allowing the business virtually no time to raise money to 
repay loans or take other corrective action that may be required.
Finally, the IRS will have difficulty examining and enforcing this 
section because of the need to educate its own agents concerning the 
complexity of the application. The tax law should be structured so it 
can be enforced in an equitable and efficient manner. We all recognize 
that many provisions of the tax law are complex, but many of the most 
complex rules apply to a relatively small number of taxpayers who can 
afford professional advice necessary to interpret them. The section 385 
provisions have such wide application that they should be less complex.
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Inequities and Negative Effects of the 
Proposed Regulations
The proposed regulations cause a variety of negative effects and result 
in a number of inequities, which are discussed below.
Section 385 applies to investments in a corporation but not other 
forms of businesses. This causes an inequitable result inasmuch as the 
whole section could be avoided by operating in partnership form, 
although admittedly this may not be desirable for other reasons.
The amount of record-keeping and paperwork that will be required 
is substantial. Although the preamble to the proposed regulations 
specifies that no additional record-keeping is required, I simply cannot 
agree with this statement given some of the tests that must be met in 
order to come within the provisions of the regulations. The calculation 
of debt-to-equity ratios is perhaps the best example of the requirement 
for additional record-keeping. Normally, a corporation’s books and 
records are not kept on a tax basis, so almost every corporation would 
have to make numerous adjustments to determine the tax basis of its 
assets.
The complexities set traps for many. It is true that every new tax 
legislation takes years in order to have the tax practitioners, taxpayers, 
and Treasury officials digest the provision. However, this area will take 
longer than most.
Today many real estate financing transactions involve some kind of 
equity participation. This enables a lender to participate in the gross 
or net income of the project, gain on sale, and so on. These transactions 
may be adversely affected by these regulations as they will probably 
constitute hybrid instruments.
It is not unusual nowadays to have what is called a leveraged buy­
out, particularly by employee groups including the use of Employee 
Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs). There have been a number of instances 
whereby corporations in financial trouble have been bought by the 
employees on a highly leveraged basis, since employees normally do 
not possess a substantial amount of capital to invest. The proposed 
regulations could adversely affect this kind of transaction. Presumably 
such a transaction is in the best interests of the country if it enables a 
business to survive and keep the people employed.
Under supply side economics a number of measures (both tax and 
otherwise) have been undertaken in order to encourage business 
investments. These proposed regulations discourage venture capital 
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from making certain investments in businesses. Venture capital com­
panies generally hope to achieve a rate of return of 25 to 40 percent in 
today’s environment for making venture capital investments. It is virtually 
impossible to achieve this by straight debt, so the venture capitalist 
will usually acquire a combination of debt and equity. The venture 
capitalists are usually looking for some current income and want some 
preference in liquidation, thus, they are often not satisfied to accept 
only stock for their investment. Furthermore, the venture capitalist does 
not like uncertainty or complication, so these rules may prove to be a 
psychological barrier. Since over $1 billion was invested by venture 
capitalists in 1981, it is obvious that it is important to encourage this 
kind of investment.
Under section 303 of the code, a corporation can redeem its stock to 
enable the deceased shareholder’s estate to pay estate taxes and 
administration expenses. Compliance with section 303 permits this 
without dividend income to the estate. The obligations incurred in these 
situations would be subject to section 385. Since these obligations can 
go as long as a period of fifteen years in order to enable an estate to 
take advantage of the ability to defer the payment of estate tax over a 
period of fifteen years permitted under section 6166, section 385 could 
very adversely affect the ability to use section 303 as Congress had 
intended. This would occur because an estate may be an “insider” and 
the debt may exceed the 3 to 1 ratio test and be considered “excessive 
debt.” It is very likely that such debt could not meet the independent­
creditor tests. Perhaps this is unintended, but it is an example of what 
results from pervasive rules such as these.
Today many lenders require key shareholders to guarantee debt of 
the corporation. The application of section 385 to guaranteed debt or 
situations where shareholders pledge other assets remains unclear. 
Initially the Treasury wanted to effectively treat such debt as debt or 
stock of the shareholders.
In general, the proposed regulations fail to make provisions for 
industries that have significantly different financial structures. For 
example, the leasing industry and the real estate industry typically are 
very highly leveraged. When debt-equity was determined under court 
authority or administrative decisions, financing arrangements that were 
common or normal for any particular industry were acceptable. These 
rigid rules eliminate this flexibility.
A corporation with very little net worth on a tax basis could incur 
virtually no debt except from independent creditors because the 10 to 
1 and 3 to 1 ratios would be very low. For example, the corporation 
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might possess valuable assets such as intangibles or appreciated property 
with a low tax basis, which would justify obtaining loans. If the ratios 
could be calculated on the fair market value, the true economics could 
be recognized.
Under the proposed regulations a creditor-shareholder must enforce 
its rights as an independent party would. This occurs when the debtor 
corporation is unable to make scheduled payments. This is an unrea­
sonable standard because a shareholder (at least an insider) often stands 
to benefit economically as an employee, director, and/or lessor as well 
as a creditor. Thus, the creditor may forego collection proceeds on a 
loan because of the need for employment. It is going to be very difficult 
to separate these roles in order to prove that as required, the creditor 
“exercised the ordinary diligence of an independent creditor.”
Proposed Solutions
Some of my proposed changes may seem radical in light of the enormous 
effort that has been put into attempting to modify these rules, but I will 
still put them forth. Also, there are a number of suggestions that I have 
not included, as I have confined my remarks to the major issues. On 
August 5, 1982, the Chamber of Commerce together with other interested 
organizations issued a letter to the Treasury that incorporates a number 
of very constructive suggestions, such as—
• The inclusion of a $1 million (inside) exemption.
• A provision for a five-year hiatus for new businesses.
• A provision for a 5 to 1 inside debt-to-equity ratio.
• A provision for using fair market value as a means for determining 
net assets and the ratio of debt to equity.
• A provision for a separate rule for venture capital transactions 
because of their unique situation.
I support these but suggest they be modified as follows.
First of all, the only way to equitably apply section 385 is to raise 
the exemption for small business to a very large dollar amount. Perhaps 
it should apply only to corporations with total borrowings (exclusive of 
trade payables, etc.) in excess of $5 million as was incorporated in 
section 279 having to do with the disallowance of interest on corporate 
acquisition indebtedness. These sections were enacted in tandem in 
1969.
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Furthermore, the Treasury should allow any corporation to utilize the 
section 385 guidelines by electing to have them apply. Presumably this 
could be done so the election would be on a semi-permanent basis and 
not a year-by-year decision. However, for any corporation (or affiliated 
group) with a combined debt in excess of $5 million, the rules could 
be applied at the Treasury’s election. Under this approach, those 
businesses wishing to take advantage of the rules in order to have 
precise guidance concerning their debt instruments could elect to apply 
the rules. On the other hand, small businesses not being aware of the 
rules or those lacking sophisticated advice necessary to apply them 
would not be caught in the trap of having the Treasury apply the rules 
on examination. I recognize that as businesses get larger it is reasonable 
to expect that they become subject to stricter rules. Therefore, at some 
point (my suggestion being $5 million) it would be reasonable to expect 
them to be subject to mandatory application of the rules. This would 
exempt many small businesses, although many small businesses would 
still be subject to section 385.
In addition, I have the following other suggestions:
1. The correction period for the repayment of undocumented advances 
or the documenting of advances, and payment of satisfactory 
amounts of interest should be extended to thirty days after the 
tax return is due in order to enable taxpayers to have time to 
accomplish the transactions necessary to comply with the regu­
lations. To assist with compliance the required actions could be 
subject to return disclosure.
2. The regulations should not apply to loans to subchapter S 
corporations for purposes of determining whether the subchapter 
S has one or more classes of stock.
3. For calculating ratios for insiders and outsiders (the 10 to 1 and 
3 to 1 ratios) the taxpayer should have the option of using either 
the fair market value of the assets or the tax basis of the assets.
4. The regulations should exempt redemptions to pay estate taxes 
that comply with the provisions of section 303.
5. Special rules for selected industries such as real estate and leasing 
should be developed.
6. Transactions involving ESOPs and employee acquisitions should 
be exempted or have special rules.
7. The application to other provisions of the Internal Revenue Code 
should be clarified. Since this is a highly technical area, the best 
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result would be to make section 385 only applicable to those 
provisions necessary to carry out congressional intent.
8. The regulations should be changed to reflect changes of a technical 
or practical nature to deal with concerns not covered by the 
preceding.
If these or other changes necessary to accomplish our goals of making 
section 385 workable are unacceptable to the Treasury, legislation may 
have to be pursued in order to accomplish our goals. Hopefully, the 
Treasury will take an approach that will substantially modify these rules 
in order to avoid the problems outlined herein. However, if the results 
are unsatisfactory, I think that this area should be added to the legislative 
list. There has been an increasing trend in recent years to have 
legislation override the Treasury in areas that are considered especially 
troublesome to a wide variety of taxpayers and involve substantial 
changes in existing practice. I believe the debt-equity area qualifies on 
both points.
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LIMITATIONS
ON DIRECT LOANS
AND GUARANTEE LOSSES
AND ON INVESTMENT 
INTEREST
by Thomas E. Huntzinger, CPA, Huntzinger, Miller & Associates
Aside from interest rates, the availability of and access to capital rank 
as premium problems for the small business community. These problems 
are complex and are not the direct subjects of this paper. However, the 
discussions that follow will highlight the fact that the Internal Revenue 
Code creates obstacles for small businesses and those entering into 
transactions with small businesses when it comes to the creation of 
debt, its continuance, or the deductibility of the related interest expense. 
It is significant to note that large corporations do not face the same 
problems with the code. Therein lies a great inequity.
The intent of this paper is to illustrate inequities that small businesses 
face and discuss how to correct the situation. Some general solutions 
are presented for your review. However, the real purpose here is to 
generate an awareness that problems do exist, inequities do exist, and 
that Congress and the Treasury have done little or nothing to correct 
the problems.
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Deductions for Direct Loans and
Guarantee Losses
John Q. Public, Jr. is interested in buying a small business. He goes 
to his bank, and the loan officer is convinced that the deal looks good 
and informs John that the bank will approve the loan if John Q. Public, 
Sr. guarantees it. After all, young John is only starting out in life, and 
John Sr. has a nice comfortable farm with no record of debt.
Everything goes along fine until the recession of 1980—82 comes 
along and John cannot meet his debt requirements. The bank calls John 
Sr. and asks for and receives payment in full, but only after John Sr. 
takes out a mortgage on the homestead. The following April, John Sr. 
tells his CPA that he had to pay $50,000 to make good on his guarantee 
at the bank. The CPA tells him what a nice “gift” he gave his son and 
it’s a shame that he can’t take a tax deduction for the “gift.”
In 1980, Conglomerate Corporation guaranteed the loans of one of 
its wholly owned subsidiaries, which in turn went under in 1982. 
Conglomerate Corporation took an ordinary deduction for the amount 
paid to the bank.
In 1980, Mary Peoples, the sole shareholder of Small People 
Corporation, arranged a working capital loan for her company at a local 
bank. Again, along comes the recession, she can’t clear out the loan, 
and the bank informs her that it wants her to pay the loan. She sells 
her few shares of bank stock, cashes in her IRA, and pays off the loan. 
She has just made a contribution to the capital of the corporation. 
(Remember, Conglomerate Corporation took an ordinary loss deduction.)
George Nice has had some successful business ventures during his 
career and now he’s semi-retired. He’s very impressed with two local 
young businessmen, both of whom are undercapitalized and in need of 
financing. Mr. Nice talks to both of them and says he’ll guarantee up 
to $50,000 in loans from their local bank. Harry Unger, a bright, young 
sole proprietor, and Carl Korp, owner of a growing corporation, accept 
his offer with the utmost gratitude.
They both run into tough financial straits, and Mr. Nice is liable for 
$100,000. For his trouble, Mr. Nice is able to take a “business bad 
debt” deduction of $50,000 relating to his dealings with Mr. Unger, 
but he’s having a problem convincing the IRS agent that he should be 
allowed a $3,000 yearly deduction for his “nonbusiness bad debt” with 
Mr. Korp. So much for simplicity (let alone equity) of the Internal 
Revenue Code.
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The foregoing illustrations are simplistic, but they do serve to highlight 
some problems that exist for small business people in the area of loan 
and guarantee losses that, with few exceptions, do not exist for the 
corporate giants. Before we try to figure out why this condition is allowed 
to exist, we should deal with some of the important underlying principles 
and definitions involved.
First of all, the distinction between business and nonbusiness bad 
debts generally does not come into play for corporations. Business bad 
debts are fully deductible against ordinary income, and nonbusiness 
bad debts are treated as short-term capital losses. A nonbusiness bad 
debt is a loss that is not connected with one’s own trade or business.
Deductions, when allowed, must be taken in the year that the loan 
becomes “worthless” (except in the case of certain business bad debts). 
The Tax Court has defined a “worthless” debt as “having no value, 
valueless, useless.” Losses arising from the guarantee of loans are 
normally handled in the same fashion as losses from direct loans. 
However, losses resulting from the guarantee of a loan must be from 
transactions in one’s own trade or business or a “transaction entered 
into for profit.” The definition of this last “transaction” is not precise 
in that it need not necessarily have to be shown that direct monetary 
consideration was received if there were an otherwise “bona fide business 
purpose” behind the transaction. A definition of “bona fide” rests in 
the eyes of the beholder, and, thus, the burden of proof is on the 
guarantor claiming the deduction.
The nebulous statutory and regulatory guidance and lack of clear 
definitions have caused the nonbusiness bad debt area to be one of 
much litigation. Therefore, adequate tax planning can only be achieved 
through the careful, lengthy research of appropriate cases that may 
contain similar facts and circumstances to your own.
Where does this leave the owner of a small business? Frankly, way 
out on a limb because he is the very person who borrows money to 
capitalize his business; he is the one who guarantees his corporation’s 
loan or needs a guarantor to obtain a loan; he is the one who borrows 
money from his relatives; he is the one who can least afford the level 
of tax and legal advice that is required in this area.
Why then is our small business person placed in such jeopardy by 
the Internal Revenue Code? Congress and the Treasury obviously feel 
that loans and guarantees made by family members constitute “gifts” 
and therefore deserve no income tax deduction benefit. They feel that 
to openly allow deduction status to such transactions is to create a 
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climate for abuse. Likewise, the distinction between business and 
nonbusiness treatment exists so as to justly allow losses from transactions 
involving one’s own trade or business and give such situations greater 
range than those transactions that are of a more personal nature. While 
these premises would appear to be valid, the results show that the small 
businessman can be made to suffer dire tax consequences that do not 
exist for his large corporate brothers.
So where do we go from here? There are few specific recommendations 
that can be made because of the complexity of the issue and the interplay 
among several sections of the code. However, one recommendation has 
already been put forth in this area. In April 1980, the Federal Taxation 
Division of the AICPA suggested that “the small business stock concept 
should be expanded to include losses from direct loans to, or guaranty 
losses upon, a small business enterprise ...” (section 1244 treatment). 
The Institute suggested the establishment of an upper limit of $150,000. 
This recommendation should be seriously considered because it would 
create a “safe harbor” in which small business could operate without 
regard to all of the definitional and interpretive problems that have been 
illustrated here.
A piecemeal approach to the problems would entrench the parties in 
the morass of code sections and tax cases on the subject and would 
thus prolong any improvement. The section 1244 safe-harbor approach 
could be done with little damage to the existing sections of the code. 
This issue should be dealt with in the near future, since loan and 
guarantee losses are a daily occurrence.
Excess Investment Interest Expense
Investment interest is “interest paid or accrued on indebtedness incurred 
or continued to purchase or carry property held for investment.” On the 
surface such a definition sounds simple and quite harmless, but you 
can have too much of it, at least as far as the Internal Revenue Code 
is concerned. If you are not a corporation, there are limits beyond which 
you cannot deduct interest on debt that is not incurred in your trade or 
business. The application of the limits applies to partnerships at the 
partner level and subchapter S corporations at the shareholder level. 
Once again—as long as you are a large corporation you don’t have this 
problem.
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Congress decided that individual taxpayers should not be allowed to 
have interest expense deductions substantially in excess of the income 
that the resultant investment earns. Congress found that a “significant 
number” of nontaxable high income returns claimed deductions for 
interest other than home mortgages or business purposes. Thus, late in 
1969 the investment interest limitation was born.
Joe Luck and his two nephews agree to buy Old Corporation for 
$500,000. Joe is to buy 50 percent of the stock and Jeff and Jim will 
buy 25 percent each. They borrow the money at 15 percent payable 
over five years. In the first year, Joe incurs $35,000 in interest expense, 
and Jeff and Jim each incur $17,500. Joe can deduct $25,000, his 
nephews $10,000 each. Why only those amounts? Because that’s what 
the law says.
Now Joe and his nephews can form a new corporation (let’s call it 
Luck Corporation) to buy Old Corporation and have Luck Corporation 
borrow the money from a bank. Luck Corporation can then file a 
consolidated return with Old Corporation and claim the $70,000 interest 
deduction. However, if they have to personally guarantee the loan and 
the venture fails, it will be treated as a contribution to corporate capital.
A major problem encountered in the investment interest area is the 
lack of regulatory guidance from the Treasury. As a result there tends 
to be a general lack of awareness that the problem even exists. Some 
business people are aware of investment interest but are under the 
misconception that it only involves money borrowed for the purchase of 
publicly traded stocks and bonds. In fact, it involves the purchase of 
one’s own company, real estate, and equipment.
Property subject to a “net lease” is not regarded as property used in 
a trade or business. If the lessor’s deductions under section 162 
(management, repairs, supplies, insurance, commissions, and the like) 
are less than 15 percent of rental income, he has a “net lease.” If the 
lessor is guaranteed a specific return or is guaranteed against loss of 
income, he has a “net lease.” Let’s look at the impact on the small 
business community.
Noah Howe has been negotiating for the purchase of a business for 
some time. He has a general knowledge of the legal advantages of using 
a corporate structure to operate his business and of the “tax advantages” 
of owning the real estate from which the business operates. Noah has 
a limited amount of capital, so he needs some help. A local real estate 
broker feels he has a potential buyer (U. N. Aware) for the real estate 
who would lease it to Noah on a net lease basis. Noah can now proceed 
with the purchase of the business.
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Mr. Aware is pleased to be able to purchase the property with a 
built-in tenant. The real estate cost $600,000 ($50,000 land, $550,000 
building), and he is able to mortgage $550,000 of it at 15 percent over 
fifteen years. For 1983, he charges $95,000 in rent and has debt service 
of $92,000, which is not a great cash yield, but let’s look at what Mr. 
Aware thought his tax deductions would be. Under an accelerated cost 
recovery system he can take $55,000 in depreciation and he has interest 
expense of $82,000, so he foresees a tax loss of $42,000, which will 
save him $21,000 in federal income taxes. Or will it?
First of all, the base amount allowable is $10,000. Then we can add 
the amount of net investment income of $40,000 ($95,000 of rent less 
depreciation of $55,000) to get a total allowable interest deduction of 
$50,000 ($10,000 plus $40,000). Mr. Aware actually incurred $82,000 
in interest expense, and therefore $32,000 must be carried over to 
future years when it may be deducted, depending upon the circum­
stances. Thus, U. N. Aware did not receive $16,000 of the $21,000 in 
tax savings that he anticipated. The only way he can increase the 
allowable deduction is to elect straight-line cost recovery. In that way, 
he would only lose approximately $14,000 in interest deductions in 
1983. In any event, had Mr. Aware been aware of the tax consequences 
he probably would not have gone into the deal to begin with, and Noah 
Howe would not have been able to buy his business.
Had Mr. Aware formed a corporation he would not have had the 
deductibility problems we have seen. However, there would be no 
current tax benefit, since subchapter S status is not currently available 
under the circumstances, and in the long run he could have personal 
holding company problems with a “regular” corporation. Why bother?
Could it be that Congress’s attempt to stem potential tax shelter 
abuses actually impedes capital formation in the small business sector? 
We have just seen how the purchase of a business, related real estate, 
and equipment can create tax problems for the small businessman or 
someone doing business with him, unless that someone is a large 
corporation.
One approach to possibly remedy the situation is to provide a safe 
harbor for individuals or entities engaging in transactions with “small 
business enterprises” (SBEs). I would once again refer the reader to 
Tax Recommendations to Aid Small Business published by the AICPA 
in April 1980. An SBE would be an operating company within the 
meaning of the section 1244 regulations and would meet certain size 
and ownership tests, such as assets under $10 million and 50 percent 
72
or more ownership by direct investors and/or people active in the 
business. Thus, anyone doing business with a qualifying SBE would 
escape the investment interest limitations.
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WHAT IS AN SBPD?
by Ronald B. Cohen, CPA, Cohen & Company
The small business participating debenture (SBPD) is a hybrid security 
issued by a qualifying small business that—
• Becomes a general obligation of the company.
• Bears a stated rate of interest not less than a standard imputed 
interest rate specified by the secretary of the Treasury.
• Has a fixed maturity date.
• Grants no voting or conversion rights in the company.
• Provides for the payment to the investor of a share of the company’s 
total earnings.
• Provides an ordinary deduction to the company of both the interest 
and share of earnings.
The stated interest received is taxable to the investor as ordinary 
income. However, amounts paid as a distribution of the share of the 
company’s earnings are taxable to the investor at the preferential long­
term capital gains rate. An individual investor would generally treat 
losses on SBPDs as ordinary losses.
The specified terms of the SBPD, such as the interest rate, maturity 
date, and share of earnings, are negotiated at arm’s length between the 
company and the investor with no government involvement.
An SBPD could only be issued by a domestic trade or business, 
whether or not incorporated, that has a net equity of less than $10 
million. Only companies that do not have securities outstanding that 
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are subject to SEC regulation are eligible to use SBPDs. Additionally, 
no company may have issued and outstanding, at one time, SBPDs with 
a face value in excess of $1 million.
Why It Is Needed
America became great because of the foresight and courage of two very 
different segments of our economy. One was represented by the hard­
working, innovative entrepreneur and the other by his partner, the 
wealthy individual or financial institution that supplied funds for new 
and expanding enterprises. Today we have plenty of small business 
owners who can fill the first role as well as ever, but, unfortunately, 
there are few financial risk-takers willing to support their ventures. The 
following discussion deals with some of the reasons.
The most common source of funds in the past has been commercial 
banks, but with the gradual disappearance of the small, locally owned 
and managed bank, these funds have become less available. Large, 
structured banks are far less likely to finance closely held companies 
than were their owner-managed predecessors.
More and more of the nation’s wealth is being accumulated by 
insurance companies, pension benefit trusts, and other similar institu­
tions. Regulations and traditional investment habits prevent these funds 
from being directed toward risk situations. In fact, even low risk 
situations, if they involve small businesses, are generally not accepted 
in the institutional market place.
The motivation for an individual investor to direct his funds toward 
small business has virtually disappeared. If he wants to become a 
lender, he would have to charge an incredibly high interest rate to 
warrant the additional risk he would be taking compared to money 
market funds or similar investments. Whatever interest rate he earns, 
however, will be subject to ordinary tax rates and, if the investment is 
bad, he will incur a capital loss, having relatively little tax benefit to 
offset the economic loss. On the other hand, should he turn to a purchase 
of equity, there is no way to realize either return of or return on the 
investment without either selling the holdings or being penalized by the 
prohibitive second tax on dividends.
There are a limited number of private venture capitalists. Those that 
do commit capital to emerging businesses traditionally finance only risk 
situations with a potential for extraordinary growth, not traditional 
expansion. In many instances, a substantial amount of equity and 
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control must be given to the venture capitalist in order to secure this 
financing. Many firms find these conditions unacceptable.
Is It Really the Answer?
Knowledgeable small businessmen, their advisers, and sophisticated 
investors believe that the SBPD will finally provide the much needed 
new source of capital for small businesses. It appears to solve many of 
the problems mentioned above. An SBPD offers to the small business 
capital without giving up equity or having to tap existing sources of 
debt financing, which, if available, are often unaffordable. For the 
investor, an SBPD offers a stated rate of return, plus a negotiated share 
of the profits for a limited period of time.
The SBPD should attract new investors because it will offer an 
opportunity to share in the fruits of a potentially flourishing business, 
virtually unlimited profits in addition to a stated interest rate, tax 
treatment of those profits at the capital gains rate and limited downside 
risk (a loss minimized by a tax write-off).
An investor could be anyone who wants to invest in the future of 
America through small business, provided the tax attributes of the 
investment are compatible. For example, individuals who have confi­
dence in a particular entrepreneur would no longer need to be reluctant 
to risk their capital in his venture. Banks and insurance companies 
would be motivated to allocate some of their monies into this exciting 
segment of the economy. Finally, even the small investor could 
participate through investment partnerships that would probably spring 
up. These partnerships, mostly sponsored by stock brokerage firms, 
might sell their units for as low as $5,000. Each partnership would 
then make many investments, thereby reducing investor risk through 
diversification. Naturally, the tax attributes of the investments would 
pass through to the individual partners.
The investor will find that new or expanding businesses will become 
one of the best places for his money, rather than one of the worst. He 
will have the benefit of realizing the appreciation of his investment at 
capital gains rates without having to dispose of it. The potential gain 
on a successful investment would certainly warrant the risk. In summary, 
he will have an investment with the security and yield potential of a 
note, with the upside potential and tax attributes of stock.
For the entrepreneur, SBPDs will make available funds desperately 
needed for product development, market development, or physical 
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expansion. The typical small businessman will not mind generously 
sharing his profit, as long as he knows that he is in control of his 
company and that there is a predetermined method for him to pay off 
his partner when his business can obtain conventional financing.
An additional advantage is the probability that there would be no 
actual cost to the Treasury. The more likely result would be that such 
investment would begin a cycle of activity that would generate capital 
investment and new jobs, thereby creating more federal revenues.
Current Status
Various forms of the SBPD have been proposed from time to time in 
both houses of Congress. The AICPA, in its Tax Recommendations to 
Aid Small Business, and Small Business United, in its Washington 
Presentation, strongly endorsed the SBPD concept. Currently, H.R. 
4015, which follows in Appendix A, seems to be the most promising 
attempt to adopt SBPD legislation.
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APPENDIX A
H.R. 4015
97th Congress, 1st Session. In the House of Representatives, June 25, 1981, Mr. Eckart 
introduced the following bill, which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means.
To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to provide long-term capital gain 
treatment for distribution of earnings with respect to certain small business 
participating debentures.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States 
of America in Congress assembled, That (a) part IV of subchapter P of chapter 
1 (relating to special rules for determining capital gain and loss) is amended 
by adding at the end thereof the following new section:
“SEC. 1256. EARNINGS DISTRIBUTIONS UNDER SMALL 
BUSINESS PARTICIPATING DEBENTURES.
“(a) In General.—For purposes of this subtitle amounts actually paid 
during the taxable year to a taxpayer in respect of a small business participating 
debenture which constitute the distribution of a share of the earnings of the 
issuer, shall be treated as long-term capital gain.
“(b) Special Rules for Payments.—For purposes of this section and 
section 163(e)—
“(1) Time for payment.—Payments under subsection (a) shall be deemed 
to have been made on the last day of a taxable year if the payment is on 
account of such taxable year and is made not later than the time prescribed 
by law for the filing of the return for such taxable year (including extensions 
thereof).
“(2) Order of payments.—Any payment in respect of a small business 
participating debenture shall be treated first as a payment of interest until 
all interest required to be paid under the debenture for such taxable year 
and preceding taxable years is paid and then as a payment of earnings.
“(c) Small Business Participating Debenture Defined.—
“(1) In GENERAL.—The term ‘small business participating debenture’ 
means a written debt instrument issued by a qualified small business which—
“(A) is a general obligation of the qualified small business,
“(B) bears interest at a rate not less than the rate prescribed by the
Secretary under section 483(c)(1)(B),
“(C) has a fixed maturity,
“(D) grants no voting or conversion rights in the qualified small business 
to the purchaser, and
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“(E) provides for the payment of a share of the total earnings of the 
issuer.
“(2) Qualified small business.—
“(A) In GENERAL.—The term ‘qualified small business’ means any 
domestic trade or business (whether or not incorporated)—
“(i) the equity capital of which does not exceed $10,000,000 
immediately before the small business participating debenture is issued,
“(ii) with respect to which, at the time the small business participating 
debenture is issued, the face value of all outstanding small business 
participating debentures issued (including such debenture) does not 
exceed $1,000,000, and
“(iii) which has no securities outstanding which are subject to 
regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission at the time of 
issuance of the small business participating debenture.
“(B) CONTROLLED GROUPS.—For purposes of determining under sub­
paragraph (A) the equity capital and outstanding small business partici­
pating debentures of—
“(i) a member of the same controlled group of corporations (within 
the meaning of section 1563(a), except that ‘more than 50 percent’ 
shall be substituted for ‘at least 80 percent’ each place it appears in 
section 1563(a)(1)), and
“(ii) a member of a group of trades or businesses (whether or not 
incorporated) which are under common control, as determined under 
regulations prescribed by the Secretary which are based on principles 
similar to the principles which apply under clause (i),
the equity capital and outstanding debentures of all members of such 
group shall be taken into account.
“(C) Equity capital.—For purposes of this paragraph—
“(i) Corporation.—In the case of a corporation, the term ‘equity 
capital’ has the same meaning as such term is used in section 44F(c)(6).
“(ii) Noncorporate business.—In the case of a trade or business 
which is not organized as a corporation, equity capital shall be 
determined under regulations prescribed by the Secretary which are 
based on principles similar to the principles which apply under clause 
(i).
“(D) Security subject to regulation by the securities and 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION.—For purposes of this paragraph, a security 
subject to regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission is a 
security—
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“(i) registered on a national securities exchange under section 12(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
“(ii) registered or required to be registered under section 12(g) of 
such Act (or which would be required to be so registered except for 
the exemptions in subparagraphs (B) through (H) of such section); or
“(iii) issued by a company subject to the reporting requirements of 
section 15(d) of such Act.
“(d) Related Parties; Personal Holding Companies.—
“(1) Debentures issued by a related party.—Subsection (a) shall not 
apply to amounts paid in respect of a small business participating debenture 
issued by a small business in which the taxpayer has an interest.
“(2) Debentures issued by person holding taxpayer’s deben­
tures.—If—
“(A) a taxpayer acquires a small business participating debenture from 
a small business, and
“(B) such small business or a person with an interest in such small 
business acquired, before the acquisition described in subparagraph (A), 
any such debenture from the taxpayer or any small business in which the 
taxpayer has an interest,
subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to any payment in respect of a 
debenture or portion of a debenture which is equal to the amount of the 
proceeds of any such debenture acquired from the taxpayer or the small 
business in which the taxpayer has an interest.
“(3) Interested taxpayer.—For purposes of this subsection, a taxpayer 
shall be considered as having an interest in the issuer of a small business 
participating debenture if—
“(A) in the case of a small business participating debenture issued by 
a corporation, the taxpayer is considered, under section 318, to own—
“(i) 10 percent or more in value of the stock, or
“(ii) stock which represents 10 percent or more of the voting rights, 
in the corporation or in a corporation which is a member of the same 
controlled group of corporations (within the meaning of section 1563(a)), 
or
“(B) in the case of a small business participating debenture issued by 
a small business not organized as a corporation, the taxpayer owns, or is 
considered to own (under regulations prescribed by the Secretary similar 
to the regulations prescribed under section 318), more than 10 percent 
of the profits or capital in the business.”.
(b) Interest Deductible as Interest Expense.—Section 163 (relating to 
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interest) is amended by redesignating subsection (e) as (f) and by inserting 
after subsection (d) the following new subsection:
“(e) Interest and Other Amounts Paid on Small Business Partici­
pating Debenture.—For purposes of this section (other than subsection (d)), 
amounts paid as interest, and amounts paid as a share of earnings, on a small 
business participating debenture (as defined in section 1256(b)) shall be treated 
as interest.”
(c) Treatment of Original Issue Discount Interest.—Section 1232 
(relating to bonds and other evidences of indebtedness) is amended by 
redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e) and by adding after subsection
(d) the following new subsection:
“(e) Small Business Participating Debentures.—Any small business 
participating debenture (as defined in section 1256(b)) issued by a trade or 
business other than a corporation shall be treated, for purposes of this section, 
as if it were issued by a corporation.”.
(d) Losses on Small Business Participating Debentures Treated as 
Ordinary Loss.—Section 1244 (relating to losses on small business stock) is 
amended by adding at the end of subsection (d) the following new paragraph:
“(5) Small business participating debentures treated same as 
section 1244 stock.—For purposes of this section, any loss on a small 
business participating debenture (as defined in section 1256(c)) issued to an 
individual shall be treated as if it were a loss on section 1244 stock issued 
to that individual.”.
(e) Clerical Amendment.—The table of sections for such part is amended 
by adding at the end thereof the following new item:
“Sec. 1256. Earnings distributions under small business participating 
debentures.”.
(f) Effective Date.—
(1) In general.—Except as provided in paragraph (2), the amendments 
made by this section shall apply with respect to taxable years beginning 
after December 31, 1980, and to small business participating debentures 
acquired after the date of enactment of this Act.
(2) PROCEEDS used to REPAY loans.—The amendments made by this 
section shall not apply to any small business participating debenture issued 
before or during calendar year 1981 if the proceeds of such debenture are 
used to repay any loan of the issuing small business other than a loan—
(A) with a stated rate of interest in excess of the prevailing rate of 
interest for businesses in the area in which such small business is located, 
and
(B) secured by the inventory or accounts receivable of such small 
business.
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LIMITATION ON 
INVESTMENT OF ERISA 
FUNDS
by Paul H. Jackson, FSA, The Wyatt Company
For many years prior to the passage of the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), pension funds were invested in a largely 
unregulated environment. Most funds were held by banks or insurance 
companies and invested in marketable stocks and bonds. Some were 
invested very conservatively in high-grade bonds with little or no equity 
investment. At the other extreme, a few pension funds invested 
substantial amounts in the common stock of the sponsoring employer 
or in property operated by the employer. In a number of instances, 
company contributions to pension funds were made in the form of notes, 
securities, or real property. As might be expected with a broad range 
of practices, certain abuses occurred. In a few instances, employers 
sold property to pension plans at unreasonably high prices or leased 
back property owned by the plans at unreasonably low rental rates. In 
one widely publicized case, the assets of the plan were transported to 
Liberia in a satchel and invested in real estate on the west coast of 
Africa. After a lengthy review of the practices and the various abuses, 
Congress passed ERISA in 1974.
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The ERISA Solution
If a few bad actors are taking advantage of a situation, Congress can 
either pass a law punishing the bad actors or pass a law prohibiting the 
entire class of actions that encompasses the wrongdoing. This latter 
approach is considered to be more easily administrable by the government 
agencies charged with that task. Anyway, rather than imposing penalties 
on the individuals responsible for the abuses that led to the passage of 
ERISA, Congress elected to take the approach of imposing requirements 
on all who operate tax-qualified programs. The legislation passed by 
the House generally approached the investment problems from the 
standpoint of requiring fair value in the transactions, so that any 
transaction with a pension fund at a value less than fair value might 
result in a penalty or jail term on the part of the person responsible. 
The Senate, however, felt that it would be impossible to tell whether or 
not a price was a fair price and accordingly its bill prohibited certain 
transactions entirely, and the final ERISA legislation followed the Senate 
version.
The three chief investment restrictions contained in ERISA are the 
prudent man rule imposed by section 404, the prohibited transactions 
in section 406, and the limits on employer securities in section 407.
Prudent Man Rule
Section 404(a) of ERISA requires the person responsible for the 
investment of pension funds to discharge his duties “solely in the 
interest of the participants and beneficiaries” and “with the care, skill, 
prudence and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a 
prudent man, acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters, 
would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with 
like aims.” It is indeed surprising that so little of value has resulted 
from the injection of such noble language into our statute books. The 
actual effect of this provision is to put those responsible for the 
investment of pension plans in a position where they are sure to be safe 
if they hand the funds over to a big bank or a big insurance company 
that is known to handle many other similar pension funds. Only then 
can one be certain of acting as other prudent men act. Furthermore, 
this rule has tended to drive the big banks and insurance companies to 
invest in the same set of blue-chip, top-tier securities because any 
unusual investment taken on by a single investor would clearly not meet 
the test of prudence. So far as small and medium-sized businesses are 
concerned, this has resulted in almost a complete drying up of the 
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funds available for equity, real estate purchase, or loans that had 
formerly been available from locally controlled pension funds.
Prohibited Transactions
Section 406 of ERISA prohibits the sale or exchange or leasing of any 
property between the plan and a party in interest or the lending of 
money or furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between the plan 
and the party in interest. The law specifically prohibits the transfer of 
any assets of the plan to a party in interest, and thus it was necessary 
in subsequent Department of Labor regulations to state that a plan was 
not precluded from paying benefits to an employee of the plan sponsor. 
This section of the law has even prevented a labor union from lending 
money on an interest-free basis to a health insurance fund that was 
running out of cash—a loan that was to be repaid following collective 
bargaining of a new contract! Indeed, it prohibits so many transactions 
that the Department of Labor has issued broad-based exemptions, 
generally freeing insurance companies, insurance agents, qualifying 
banks, and security dealers from the requirements of the law and 
regulations. The small businessman who is trying to invest his own 
pension fund assets, however, is still covered by all of these rules.
Limits on Employer Securities
Section 407 of ERISA limits the investment of a pension plan in 
employer securities or real property to the extent of more than 10 
percent of the fund. Qualifying marketable obligations are limited so 
that not more than 25 percent of the aggregate amount can be held by 
the plan and at least 50 percent of the aggregate amount must be held 
by persons independent of the issuer, thus precluding small businesses 
with small obligations from going to their pension funds for this purpose. 
Similarly, qualifying real property requires the existence of “a substantial 
number of parcels dispersed geographically”—again preventing the 
small business with a single location from making use of pension funds 
for this purpose. In the years following enactment of ERISA, the 
Department of Labor has responded to pressure from major organizations 
and has exempted most such large groups from the difficult obligations 
imposed by section 407. However, small businesses have not been 
successful in obtaining a single exemption.
Investments Outside the United States
Section 404(b) of ERISA imposed a direct prohibition of the investment 
of any assets of a pension plan outside the jurisdiction of the United 
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States. The Department of Labor, in issuing regulations, extended an 
automatic exemption to banks with equity capital in excess of $1 million, 
insurance companies having a net worth in excess of $1 million, or 
investment advisors managing in excess of $50 million. Thus, a small 
business with specific knowledge of an investment opportunity in a 
foreign country would be precluded from taking advantage of it by 
reason of this provision. Small banks, small insurance companies, and 
small investment advisers are also precluded from investing abroad. 
Size alone qualifies the investor as being responsible!
Trends Among Lenders
Over the past twenty years, entirely apart from ERISA and its devel­
opments, there have been a number of notable trends taking place in 
the investment community. There has been a strong tendency for banks, 
insurance companies, brokerage houses, and the like to become bigger, 
and merger has proven to be the fastest way to accomplish this. One 
result of such growth is that the lending institutions operating at the 
local level are swallowed up into a larger organization, centrally located, 
with more sophisticated investment research facilities. Those responsible 
for investment decisions are then responsible for very much larger 
amounts, and as a result they tend to move away from small loans 
because of the paper work and other administrative burdens involved. 
One investment house does have an advertising campaign announcing 
that it makes money the old fashioned way (“We earn it”), but the fact 
remains that it is much more exotic to be a 10 percent participant in a 
$1 billion loan to Poland or Brazil than to be involved in 2,000 loans 
averaging $50,000 each. In addition, with as many as 2,000 separate 
loans, some of them must go bad, and the lending officer responsible 
loses his reputation needlessly. In any case, the drive toward bigness 
has tended to move substantial pools of money further and further away 
from the small business borrowers.
The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility 
Act of 1982
The pension and savings plans operated by small businesses were 
handed another setback with the passage of the Tax Equity and Fiscal 
Responsibility Act (TEFRA) in August 1982. The decrease in the 
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overall limits on contributions and benefits will mean that those 
responsible for the establishment of such plans in small businesses will 
have less personal advantage to gain from them, and greater obligations 
imposed in the form of withholding requirements, reporting procedures, 
and loans to participants. Furthermore, the “top heavy rules” will serve 
to impose much stricter limits on small businesses than those that apply 
to large businesses. While the purpose of TEFRA may have been to 
prevent doctors and lawyers from incorporating and taking advantage of 
our tax laws, the congressional solution once again is to impose stiffer 
requirements on small business than those that are imposed on big 
business. Fewer small businesses will be inclined to maintain pension 
plans under these new stiffer requirements. If so, perhaps the restrictions 
that now prevent small businesses from making use of their pension 
funds in real estate purchases, inventory financing, or direct loans will 
apply to so few small employers (those who actually have pension plans) 
that relief will be unnecessary.
Positive Changes
Despite the lofty goals of ERISA in protecting the earned pensions of 
long-service employees, it is accepted as fact today that ERISA is not 
balanced legislation. While many pension funds have been strengthened 
through stronger vesting rules, better investment practices, faster 
funding, and the like, it can be demonstrated statistically that in the 
eight years since the passage of ERISA, more employees have lost 
pension rights by reason of the termination of soundly financed pension 
plans or the failure of their employers to establish pension plans than 
ever lost pension rights in all of the years prior to ERISA. Indeed, an 
estimated 200,000 pension plans are now “missing” statistically, and 
some 4 million employees lack coverage that they would demonstrably 
have had if ERISA had not been passed. Second, it is important to note 
that ERISA guarantees benefits that are expressed in dollar terms at a 
point in time when the dollar has a half life of perhaps six or seven 
years. The guarantees are of short duration; the loss is more likely to 
be long term. Finally, while ERISA imposes massive controls to protect 
the rights of employees to their retirement benefits, it also denies their 
employers the right to borrow from the funds or to terminate the funds 
without liability, and therefore may actually deprive some active 
employees of their jobs. Far greater balance is necessary in the protection 
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of employment-related rights than a single-minded focus on a stream of 
pension payments to be made some years in the future to the exclusion 
of all else.
The substantial repeal of the prohibited transactions section of ERISA 
and of a large number of the reporting requirements as well as a 
substantial portion of the law and regulations relating to the determination 
of service credits under these plans (an area that is almost totally 
ignored in practice) is necessary if we are to have a law that operates 
fairly and reasonably with consideration for the interests of all parties. 
Each of these areas has been found to be unworkable in the original 
ERISA form. Each has been the subject of hundreds of pages of 
regulations, largely incomprehensible to the average businessman, and 
each has been made more “practical” by exempting the most commonly 
occurring transactions. Prohibiting every transaction and then exempting 
most is intellectually dishonest. Fair value may not be precisely 
administrable by the Department of Labor, but the one extreme case of 
abuse could be punished in the courts without imposing unreasonable 
burdens on the 999 cases where there was no real problem anyway.
Some of these changes are being considered currently in Congress. 
Legislation introduced by Congressman Erlenborn and Senator Nickles 
would actually make some minor changes for the better in each of these 
troublesome areas. Unfortunately, mixed in with these salutory relief 
measures in the current drafts are further Draconian provisions that 
would impose greater liability on those who sponsor pension plans as 
opposed to thrift and savings plans. For example, consideration is now 
being given to making the small businessman who sponsors a pension 
plan legally liable for the full value of vested benefits, and this suggests 
the elimination of all investment restrictions, since enlightened self 
interest on the part of the plan sponsor should preclude the unreasonable 
wasting of assets. With federal insurance for the employees through the 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), the only loser in a bad 
investment is the employer whose costs subsequently go up. In addition, 
this new and helpful legislation may even make the small businessman 
“contingently liable” for any loss to the PBGC that arises up to fifteen 
years after he sells his business! And this new “responsibility” could 
even reach past the grave and deprive his widow of her mite! Here 
again, the small businessman can avoid the problem only by not having 
a pension plan at all, and of course this may also mean by not having 
a union either!
There are not very many people in Washington, D.C. looking after
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the interests of the small businessman. Our laws are becoming increas­
ingly complex, and the legislative process now incorporates a major 
input from the government agencies that will be responsible for the 
administration of a statute. Most of the complexity is due to these 
government administrators and their effort to patch up every imaginable 
loophole to prevent abuse. With the legislative balance thus destroyed, 
we are left with mountains of laws, more mountains of regulations, and 
massive noncompliance. It has been observed that every small busi­
nessman must, by the law of large numbers, break at least one federal 
law or regulation every time he makes a business decision. Still, as 
Abe Lincoln might have phrased it, “God must have loved small 
businessmen because he made so many of them.”
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APPENDIX A
THE PRUDENCE RULE AND PENSION PLAN 
INVESTMENTS UNDER ERISA
U.S. Department of Labor 
Labor-Management Services Administration 
Pension and Welfare Benefit Programs
Submitted by Paul Antsen, Office of Fiduciary Standards, 
Pension and Welfare Benefit Programs, U.S. Department of Labor
INTRODUCTION
A final regulation issued by the U.S. Department of Labor on June 26, 1979, 
describes the provisions of the prudence rule under the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and its requirements concerning the 
investment duties of a fiduciary of an employee benefit plan under ERISA.
To assist benefit plan administrators and practitioners in carrying out their 
fiduciary responsibilities, this booklet contains a presentation by the Admin­
istrator of the Pension and Welfare Benefit Programs discussing the prudence 
rule and its relation to the investment of pension plan assets.
In addition, the booklet contains the complete regulation as published in 
the Federal Register.
ERISA’S PRUDENCE RULE AND PENSION PLAN 
INVESTMENTS
Presentation by the Administrator, 
Pension and Welfare Benefit Programs, 
Labor-Management Services Administration, 
U.S. Department of Labor
The private pension system now promises about 40 million active and retired 
workers that they will receive or will continue to receive benefits during their 
retirement. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act does not require 
that such promises be made, but it does assure that they be kept.
ERISA’s assurances are based on four basic concepts—that workers must 
become eligible for benefits after a reasonable length of service, that adequate 
funds be set aside to provide promised benefits, that those managing the plan 
and its funds meet certain standards of conduct, and that sufficient information 
be made available to determine if the law’s requirements are being met.
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The pool of funds set aside to meet pension plan obligations now totals about 
$300 billion and that figure is sure to increase. Recognizing the purposes of 
ERISA and the potential impact on capital markets and on the economy in 
general of regulation of such a large amount of funds, the architects of ERISA 
designed its fiduciary responsibility provisions to protect the interests of plan 
participants and beneficiaries and at the same time to provide appropriate 
flexibility for the management of funds.
Under ERISA section 404(a)(1), plan fiduciaries, including persons to whom 
named fiduciaries delegate certain fiduciary responsibilities, must discharge 
their duties solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and,
(1) for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits and defraying reasonable 
administrative expenses;
(2) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances 
then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with 
such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of like character and 
with like aims (the prudent man rule);
(3) by diversifying plan investments so as to minimize the risk of large 
losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so; and
(4) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan 
insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with the provisions 
of title I of ERISA.
Intention of Congress
It was the intention of Congress in framing these rules that retirement income 
security of plan participants and beneficiaries be maximized. Congress did not 
consider the rules to be unnecessary or unreasonable.
However, the prudent man rule and its relation to the investment of pension 
plan assets has been the subject of debate since the enactment of ERISA, with 
some saying that the rule as stated in the act is an unreasonable standard.
The Labor Department believes, as did Congress, that ERISA’s prudent man 
rule is necessary and reasonable. A final regulation issued by the Labor 
Department June 26, 1979, concerning the investment duties of fiduciaries un­
der the prudent man rule is designed to provide guidance to investment man­
agers in this area without reducing the flexibility now embodied in the law.
The Department makes it clear in the preamble to the regulation that the 
regulation is a “safe harbor” type of rule which describes a manner of satisfying 
the requirements of ERISA’s prudence rule and that the regulation does not 
necessarily constitute the exclusive method for satisfying the requirements of 
the prudence rule. The Department will view fiduciaries who comply with the 
provisions of the regulation as having satisfied the requirements of the prudence 
rule. This means that those who do not comply with the specific provisions of 
the regulation will not necessarily be in violation of ERISA’s prudent man 
rule.
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It also is made clear that the relative riskiness of a specific investment or 
investment course of action does not render such investment either per se 
prudent or per se imprudent.
Some comments on the proposed regulation urged the Department to specify 
the extent to which investment vehicles which traditionally are not viewed as 
trust investments, such as objects of art, are permissible under the prudence 
rule. The Department does not consider it appropriate to provide any list of 
investments or techniques—such as trading in options—that might be permis­
sible because no such list could be complete. However, the preamble does 
state that the universe of investments permissible under the prudence rule is 
not necessarily limited to those permitted at common law.
Appropriate Consideration
The final regulation states that a fiduciary will meet the requirements of 
ERISA’s prudent man rule with regard to an investment or investment course 
of action taken if he has given appropriate consideration to those facts and 
circumstances that, given the scope of his investment duties, he knows or 
should know are relevant to the particular investment or investment course of 
action involved, including the role the investment or investment course of 
action plays in that portion of the plan’s investment portfolio with respect to 
which the fiduciary has investment duties.
This language differs from that of the proposed version in several respects. 
Some interpreted the proposed language that appropriate consideration be given 
to “all” relevant facts and circumstances as an unreasonable and impossible 
standard. That language was changed, recognizing that a fiduciary should be 
required neither to expend unreasonable efforts in discharging his duties nor 
to consider matters outside the scope of those duties.
The new language also takes into consideration multiple manager situations 
so that in considering the role of an investment in a portfolio, the fiduciary is 
required to consider the role it plays only in that portion of the plan’s portfolio 
for which he is responsible.
In addition, the Department makes it clear in the preamble to the regulation 
that in stating that an investment should be judged on the basis of the role it 
plays in the portfolio rather than standing alone, the Department is not 
suggesting either that any relevant or material attributes of a contemplated 
investment may properly be disregarded, or that a particular plan investment 
should be deemed to be prudent solely by reason of the propriety of the 
aggregate risk-return characteristics of the plan’s portfolio.
The section of the regulation listing the factors involved in appropriate 
consideration also was changed. The changes make it clear that the word 
“diversification” is to be given its customary meaning as a mechanism for 
reducing the risk of large losses, that the Department is not suggesting that 
only certain portfolio management techniques are appropriate, and that liquidity 
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needs involve all anticipated cash requirements of a plan and not just those 
involving benefit payments.
Under the final regulation, “appropriate consideration” shall include but not 
necessarily be limited to:
(1) a determination by the fiduciary that the particular investment or 
investment course of action is reasonably designed, as part of the portfolio (or, 
where applicable, that portion of the plan portfolio with respect to which the 
fiduciary has investment duties), to further the purposes of the plan, taking 
into consideration the risk of loss and the opportunity for gain (or other return) 
associated with the investment or investment course of action, and
(2) consideration of the following factors as they relate to such portion of 
the portfolio:
(i) the composition of the portfolio with regard to diversification;
(ii) the liquidity and current return of the portfolio relative to the anticipated 
cash flow requirements of the plan; and
(iii) the projected return of the portfolio relative to the funding objectives 
of the plan.
Investment Decisions
A new section was added to the final regulation in response to comments that, 
in recognition of ERISA’s provisions permitting delegation and allocation of 
investment duties, the Department regulation should specifically permit a 
fiduciary who is responsible for the management of plan assets to rely on 
information supplied by appropriate other plan fiduciaries, and to act in 
accordance with policies and instructions supplied by those persons in making 
investment decisions.
However, the Department does not agree with commentators who state that 
a fiduciary is entitled blindly to rely on instructions or policies established by 
other plan fiduciaries. While the primary responsibility for determining that a 
delegation of authority to an investment manager is appropriate rests with the 
named fiduciary effecting the delegation, the Department considers that the 
prudent man rule includes a duty not to act in accordance with a delegation 
of plan investment duties to the extent that the manager either knows or should 
know that the delegation involves a breach of fiduciary responsibility.
Since information pertaining to a particular plan is, generally, peculiarly 
within the knowledge of the persons responsible for administering that plan, 
the regulation provides that a plan manager may rely on information provided 
to him by appropriate plan fiduciaries if he neither knows nor should know 
that the information is incorrect.
Similarly, the regulation does not state, as requested in one comment, that 
the assets of a pooled investment fund may be invested in accordance with its 
published investment objectives and policies without requiring that consider­
ation be given to the particular needs of any individual plan that has an interest 
in the fund.
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I would like to point out that investment managers, as fiduciaries, are subject 
not just to the prudent man rule but to all requirements of section 404(a)(1) 
which I outlined earlier, including that they discharge their duties solely in 
the interest of plan participants and beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose 
of providing benefits, diversifying investments, and in accordance with plan 
documents and instruments insofar as the documents and instruments are 
consistent with title I of ERISA.
As fiduciaries, they would be liable for a breach by a cofiduciary if they 
know of a breach and do not make reasonable efforts to remedy it or if they 
enable a cofiduciary to commit a breach by failing to comply with the above 
mentioned provisions of section 404(a)(1) of ERISA.
The regulation I have outlined is designed to ensure that both the protections 
of the interests of participants and beneficiaries and the flexibility in the area 
of investment management which were provided by Congress in ERISA are 
maintained and preserved.
RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR FIDUCIARY
RESPONSIBILITY; INVESTMENT OF PLAN ASSETS
UNDER THE “PRUDENCE ” RULE
Agency: Department of Labor.
Action: Final Regulation.
Summary: This document contains a final regulation relating to the investment 
duties of a fiduciary of an employee benefit plan under the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (the Act). The regulation is relevant to the 
investment of assets of employee benefit plans for which fiduciaries have 
investment duties, and, therefore, it affects participants, beneficiaries and 
fiduciaries of all such plans.
Effective Date: July 23, 1979.
For further information contact: Paul R. Antsen, Office of Fiduciary 
Standards, Pension and Welfare Benefit Programs, U.S. Department of Labor, 
Washington, D.C. 20216, (202) 523-6915, or Gregor B. McCurdy, Plan 
Benefits Security Division. Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Department of Labor, 
Washington, D.C. 20216, (202) 523-8634.
Supplementary information: On April 25, 1978, notice was published in 
the Federal Register (43 FR 17480)1 that the Department has under consideration 
a proposal to adopt a regulation. 29 CFR § 2550.404a-1, under section 
404(a)(1)(B) of the Act relating to the investment duties of a fiduciary of an 
employee benefit plan. Section 404(a)(1)(B) of the Act provides, in part, that 
a fiduciary—shall discharge his duties with respect to an employee benefit 
plan with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances 
then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with 
such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and 
with like aims (the “Prudence” rule).2
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Public comments were received, in response to the proposal, that generally 
supported the tentative views of the Department reflected therein, although 
many suggestions for specific revisions were offered. A few comments opposed 
the adoption of the proposed, or of any, regulation concerning these matters. 
Among the reasons given in opposition to the adoption of the proposed regulation 
were: (1) that the courts, rather than the Department, should determine how 
the “prudence” rule is to be interpreted; (2) that the Department’s views 
regarding the requirements of the “prudence” rule, as reflected in the proposed 
regulation are incorrect; (3) that it is impractical to attempt to define “prudence” 
by regulation; and (4) that the proposal did not accomplish its stated objectives. 
The Department has considered the comments opposing adoption of the 
regulation, but has not been persuaded that its interpretation of the requirements 
of “the prudence” rule set forth below is incorrect. It believes, moreover, that 
adoption of a regulation concerning the investment duties of fiduciaries under 
the “prudence” rule is appropriate because such a regulation would provide 
guidance for many plan fiduciaries in an important area of their responsibilities 
under the Act.
Counsel for one group of interested persons, while supporting the proposed 
regulation in principle, asked that they be given an opportunity to express 
their views at a public hearing on the proposed regulation. They also suggested 
that the regulation should, in any event, be republished to give interested 
persons additional opportunity for comment. The Department has considered 
these requests, but has determined that neither a public hearing nor republi­
cation of a proposed regulation is necessary or appropriate.
Accordingly, after consideration of all the written comments received, the 
Department has determined to adopt the proposed regulation as modified and 
set forth below.
Discussion of the Regulation
The legislative history of the Act indicates that the common law of trusts, 
which forms the basis for and is federalized and codified in part 4 of Title I 
of the Act, should, nevertheless, not be mechanically applied to employee 
benefit plans.3 The “prudence” rule in the Act sets forth a standard built upon, 
but that should and does depart from, traditional trust law in certain respects.
The Department is of the opinion that (1) generally, the relative riskiness of 
a specific investment or investment course of action does not render such 
investment or investment course of action either per se prudent or per se 
imprudent, and (2) the prudence of an investment decision should not be 
judged without regard to the role that the proposed investment or investment 
course of action plays within the overall plan portfolio. Thus, although securities 
issued by a small or new company may be a riskier investment than securities 
issued by a “blue chip” company, the investment in the former company may 
be entirely proper under the Act’s “prudence” rule.
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Accordingly, paragraph (b)(1) of the regulation, as adopted, provides generally 
that, with respect to an investment or investment course of action taken 
pursuant to a fiduciary’s investment duties, the requirements of the “prudence” 
rule have been satisfied if the fiduciary has acted in a manner consistent with 
appropriate consideration of the facts and circumstances that the fiduciary 
knows or should know are relevant, including the role that the investment or 
investment course of action plays in that portion of the plan’s investment 
portfolio with respect to which the fiduciary has investment duties. Paragraph 
(b), as adopted, has been modified in response to certain comments received 
on the regulation as originally proposed.
As a general observation, the comments received by the Department indicated 
that many commentators were uncertain of the scope of the proposed regulation. 
In particular, some commentators appear to have viewed the various factors 
and conditions set forth in the proposal as a statement of requirements that 
must necessarily be met in order to satisfy the requirements of the “prudence” 
rule. In this regard, it should be noted that the regulation reflects the views of 
the Department as to a manner of satisfying the requirements of the “prudence” 
rule, and does not purport to impose any additional requirements or constraints 
upon plan fiduciaries. It should also be noted that the Department does not 
view compliance with the provisions of the regulation as necessarily constituting 
the exclusive method for satisfying the requirements of the “prudence” rule. 
Rather, the regulation is in the nature of a “safe harbor” provision; it is the 
opinion of the Department that fiduciaries who comply with the provisions of 
the regulation will have satisfied the requirements of the “prudence” rule, but 
no opinion is expressed in the regulation as to the status of activities undertaken 
or performed that do not so comply.
With regard to more particular matters, a number of comments suggested 
that one condition of the proposal—that a fiduciary give appropriate consid­
eration to “all” relevant facts and circumstances—could be read as establishing 
an impossible standard, especially for fiduciaries of small plans, because (1) 
no fiduciary has unlimited resources to develop all the information that one 
might deem to be relevant to a particular investment decision, and (2) no 
fiduciary can be expected to consider all the relevant facts and circumstances, 
whether or not of material significance.
Because section 404(a)(1)(B) of the Act provides that it is the fiduciary’s 
duties with respect to the plan which must be discharged in accordance with 
the “prudence” rule, it appears to the Department that the scope of those 
duties will determine, in part, the factors which should be considered by a 
plan fiduciary in a given case. The nature of those duties will, of course, 
depend on the facts and circumstances of the case, including the nature of the 
arrangement between the fiduciary and the plan. For that reason, the regulation, 
as adopted, does not distinguish among classes of fiduciaries with respect to 
what particular duties may be involved. The Department recognizes, however, 
that a fiduciary should be required neither to expend unreasonable efforts in 
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discharging his duties, nor to consider matters outside the scope of those 
duties. Accordingly, the regulation has been modified to provide that consid­
eration be given to those facts and circumstances which, taking into account 
the scope of his investment duties, the fiduciary knows or should know are 
relevant to the particular investment decision involved. The scope of the 
fiduciary’s inquiry in this respect, therefore, is limited to those facts and 
circumstances that a prudent person having similar duties and familiar with 
such matters would consider relevant.
Several commentators asserted that the regulation, in recognition of the Act’s 
provisions permitting delegation of investment duties to, and their allocation 
among, several fiduciaries, should permit a fiduciary who is responsible for 
the management of plan assets to rely on information supplied by appropriate 
other plan fiduciaries, and to act in accordance with policies and instructions 
supplied by those persons in making decisions on the investment of plan assets. 
Those comments, generally, addressed the situation where several investment 
managers are involved in managing the assets of a plan, each being responsible 
for a portion of the plan’s investment portfolio.4 Under those circumstances, it 
would not, in the view of the commentators, be appropriate to require a fiduciary 
who is responsible for only a portion of the plan’s portfolio to take into 
consideration facts and circumstances relating to the balance of the portfolio 
in making an investment decision. The Department agrees, in part, with those 
comments. Accordingly, paragraph (b)(1) of the regulation as adopted also 
provides that such a fiduciary need give appropriate consideration to the role 
the proposed investment or investment course of action plays in that portion 
only, of the plan’s investment portfolio, with respect to which the fiduciary has 
investment duties.
However, the Department cannot state that, under the foregoing circum­
stances, a fiduciary is entitled blindly to rely upon instructions or policies 
established by other plan fiduciaries. Similarly, the regulation does not provide, 
as requested by one commentator, that the assets of a pooled investment fund 
may be invested in accordance with its published investment objectives and 
policies without requiring that consideration be given to the particular needs 
of any individual plan that has an interest in the fund. It would appear that, 
where authority to manage part (or all) of the assets of a plan has been delegated 
to one or more investment managers pursuant to section 402(c)(3) of the Act, 
the primary responsibility for determining that the delegation is appropriate 
rests with the named fiduciary or fiduciaries effecting the delegation. Never­
theless, the Department considers that each such manager’s investment duties, 
under section 404(a)(1)(B) of the Act, includes (among other things) a duty not 
to act in accordance with a delegation of plan investment duties to the extent 
that the manager either knows or should know that the delegation involves a 
breach of fiduciary responsibility.5 Once the manager has considered factors 
otherwise necessary to assure himself that the delegation of investment authority 
and related specific instructions are appropriate, he may, in exercising such 
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authority and carrying out such instructions, rely upon information provided 
to him in accordance with the provisions of new paragraph (b)(3) of the 
regulation. That paragraph provides that an investment manager responsible 
for the management of all or part of a plan’s assets pursuant to an appointment 
described in section 402(c)(3) of the Act may, for purposes of complying with 
the provisions of the regulation, rely upon certain information supplied to him 
by or at the direction of the appointing fiduciary, provided that the manager 
neither knows nor should know that the information is incorrect.
Paragraph (b)(1) of the proposed regulation has also been revised in order 
to make clear that the fiduciary’s acts do not satisfy the “prudence” rule solely 
because the fiduciary had previously given consideration to relevant facts and 
circumstances. Some comments questioned whether, under the regulation as 
originally proposed, a fiduciary might be deemed to be “immunized” once he 
had given such consideration, notwithstanding the nature of his subsequent 
acts. The regulation, as adopted, provides that it is the “investment” or 
“investment course of action” in question that will satisfy the requirements of 
the “prudence” rule if the criteria set forth in the regulation are met.
Paragraph (b)(2) of the regulation sets forth factors that are to be included, 
to the extent applicable, in an evaluation of an investment or investment course 
of action if a fiduciary wishes to rely on the provisions of the regulation. They 
are: (1) the composition of the portfolio with regard to diversification; (2) the 
liquidity and current return of the portfolio relative to the anticipated cash flow 
requirements of the plan; and (3) the projected return of the portfolio relative 
to the funding objectives of the plan. These factors are adopted substantially 
as proposed, except that the first factor has been revised, in response to 
questions raised by some of the comments, to make clear that the word 
“diversification” is to be given its customary meaning as a mechanism for 
reducing the risk of large losses; that factor, as originally proposed, referred 
to “diversification of risk.” The second factor has also been modified in order 
to make clear that its principal subject matter is all anticipated cash requirements 
of the plan, and not solely those arising by reason of payment of benefits. A 
fourth factor set forth in the proposal, which related to the “volatility” of the 
portfolio, has been eliminated as a factor specifically to be considered because, 
although paragraph (b)(2) as adopted sets forth factors which must be considered 
in all cases in order to comply with the provisions of the regulation,6 the 
reference to “volatility” may be read, according to some comments, as suggesting 
that only certain portfolio management techniques are appropriate. Moreover, 
as discussed more fully below, the subject of risk and opportunity for gain— 
which subsumes consideration of “volatility” in some respects—is now addressed 
in subparagraph (A) of paragraph (b)(2). A former fifth factor, which read “the 
prevailing and projected economic conditions of the entities in which the plan 
has invested and proposes to invest,” is also dealt with in that subparagraph.
Several commentators suggested that inclusion of that fifth factor in the 
regulation would be contrary to the intent of the proposal because it focuses 
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attention on the individual investment, rather than on the aggregate plan 
portfolio. Others objected to its inclusion on the ground that it is antithetical 
to the theory of operation of certain “passive” investment media (such as 
“index” funds) that acquire portfolios designed to match the performance of 
various investment indices and that, accordingly, have little or no discretion 
in altering the composition of their portfolios.7
The regulation, however, is not intended to suggest either that any relevant 
or material attributes of a contemplated investment may properly be ignored 
or disregarded, or that a particular plan investment should be deemed to be 
prudent solely by reason of the propriety of the aggregate risk/return charac­
teristics of the plan’s portfolio. Rather, it is the Department’s view that an 
investment reasonably designed—as a part of the portfolio—to further the 
purposes of the plan, and that is made upon appropriate consideration of the 
surrounding facts and circumstances, should not be deemed to be imprudent 
merely because the investment, standing alone, would have, for example, a 
relatively high degree of risk. The Department also believes that appropriate 
consideration of an investment to further the purposes of the plan must include 
consideration of the characteristics of the investment itself. Accordingly, 
paragraph (b)(2) of the regulation provides that, for purposes of paragraph 
(b)(1), “appropriate consideration” shall include a determination by the fiduciary 
that the particular investment or investment course of action is reasonably 
designed, as part of the portfolio for which the fiduciary is responsible, to 
further the purposes of the plan, taking into account the risk of loss and the 
opportunity for gain (or other return) associated with the investment or investment 
course of action.8
In the case of “passive” investment funds, referred to above, it would seem 
that, to the extent the fund manager is managing plan assets,9 the investments 
made by the fund, as well as the plan’s investment in the fund, must meet the 
requirements of the “prudence” rule. However, to the extent that an index 
fund, including the screen or filter process described at note 7, is reasonably 
designed to fulfill the fund manager’s fiduciary obligations with respect to a 
plan whose assets are managed therein, such manager, acting in accordance 
with the fund’s objective and its filter or screen process, generally would be 
in compliance with the provisions of the “prudence” rule, as described in the 
regulation, with respect to that plan.
The terms “investment duties” and “investment course of action” are defined 
in paragraphs (c)(1) and (2) of the regulation. No comments were received 
regarding these definitions, and they have been adopted substantially in the 
form proposed. New paragraph (c)(3) has been added, defining the term “plan” 
to mean an employee benefit plan to which Title I of the Act applies.
Discussion of Certain Other Comments
Counsel for one group of commentators characterized the factors set forth in 
paragraph (b)(2) as relating solely to the “investment merit” of a particular 
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investment or investment course of action. Because, in the view of those 
commentators, the prudence of the acquisition or retention of a contract issued 
by an insurance company may involve factors besides “investment merit,” they 
suggested that the regulation should contain a separate provision that would 
set forth two factors to be considered by a fiduciary in evaluating the prudence 
of the acquisition or retention of such a contract: the risks assumed, and the 
services provided, by the insurance company. The Department is unable to 
concur with the commentators’ view that the regulation as proposed dealt only 
with matters of “investment merit” as narrowly perceived in the comment. The 
Department agrees that such factors as the risk to be assumed and the services 
to be provided under a contract are pertinent to any investment decision 
involving such contract. The regulation as adopted specifically provides that, 
in order to come within the scope of the regulation, a fiduciary shall consider 
the facts and circumstances the fiduciary knows or should know are relevant 
to the investment decision, and that the factors set forth in paragraph (b)(2) 
are not intended to be exclusive. Accordingly, the Department believes that it 
is unnecessary to set forth additional factors with respect to insurance contracts 
or other specific types of investment.
Two commentators suggested that the Department clarify that the adoption 
of the regulation would not result in fiduciaries being required to invest in 
expensive systems or analyses to make investment decisions. Under the 
“prudence” rule, the standard to which a fiduciary is held in the proper 
discharge of his investment duties is defined, in part, by what a prudent person 
acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would do. Thus, for 
example, it would not seem necessary for a fiduciary of a plan with assets of 
$50,000 to employ, in all respects, the same investment management techniques 
as would a fiduciary of a plan with assets of $50,000,000.
Numerous comments were received with respect to the factors set forth in 
paragraph (b)(2). Several persons requested that the Department clarify or 
define terms such as “diversification of risk,” “risk,” “volatility” and “liquidity.” 
For example, some persons asked what specific measurements of volatility, 
risk and liquidity should be utilized by fiduciaries in making investment 
decisions for a plan. The Department believes that, in view of the modifications 
(discussed above) made in the regulation as adopted, it is neither necessary 
nor appropriate for the regulation to contain such definitions.
Several commentators asserted that certain specified types of investments, 
such as, for example, investments in small or recently formed companies, or 
non-income-producing investments that are not securities (such as, for example, 
certain precious metals and objects of art) have not been viewed with favor, 
traditionally, as trust investments. Those comments urged that the regulation 
specify the extent to which such investments are permissible under the 
“prudence” rule. Other commentators made reference to the traditional principle 
that trust investments should be income-producing, and suggested that the 
appropriate measure of investment “return” should be defined to mean “total 
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return”—that is, an aggregate return computed without regard to whether a 
contributing factor thereto consists of income or capital items. Although the 
Department considers that defining “return” would be beyond the appropriate 
scope of this regulation, it believes that the “prudence” rule does not require 
that every plan investment produce current income under all circumstances. 
As indicated above and in the preamble to the proposed regulation, the 
Department believes that the universe of investments permissible under the 
“prudence” rule is not necessarily limited to those permitted at common law.
However, the Department does not consider it appropriate to include in the 
regulation any list of investments, classes of investment, or investment 
techniques that might be permissible under the “prudence” rule. No such list 
could be complete; moreover, the Department does not intend to create or 
suggest a “legal list” of investments for plan fiduciaries.
The preamble to the proposed regulation stated (as does this preamble) that 
the risk level of an investment does not alone make the investment per se 
prudent or per se imprudent. Comments were received which asserted that such 
proposition is inappropriate and would promote irresponsibility on the part of 
plan fiduciaries. Other commentators not only agreed with the proposition, but 
also suggested that it should be incorporated in the regulation. The Department 
believes that both of these concerns are addressed by the modifications, 
discussed above, made to paragraph (b)(2) of the regulation as adopted.
The Department has determined that this regulation is not a “significant 
regulation” as defined in the Department’s guidelines (44 FR 5570, January 
26, 1979) implementing Executive Order 12044.
Statutory Authority
The regulation set forth below is adopted pursuant to the authority contained 
in section 505 of the Act. (Pub. L. 93-406, 88 Stat. 894 [29 U.S.C. § 1135].) 
Although the regulation is an “interpretative rule” within the meaning of 5 
U.S.C. § 553(d), the effective date of the regulation is July 23, 1979, consistent 
with the statement of the Department, in connection with the regulation as 
proposed, that such regulation would be effective 30 days after its adoption.
Final Regulation
Accordingly, Part 2550 of Chapter XXV of Title 29 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations is amended by inserting in the appropriate place to read § 
2550.404a—1 as set forth below:
§ 2550.404a—1 Investment Duties
(a) In general. Section 404(a)(1)(E) of the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (the Act) provides, in part, that a fiduciary shall discharge 
his duties with respect to a plan with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence 
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under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like 
capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an 
enterprise of a like character and with like aims.
(b) Investment Duties. (1) With regard to an investment or investment course 
of action taken by a fiduciary of an employee benefit plan pursuant to his 
investment duties, the requirements of section 404(a)(1)(B) of the Act set forth 
in subsection (a) of this section are satisfied if the fiduciary (A) has given 
appropriate consideration to those facts and circumstances that, given the 
scope of such fiduciary’s investment duties, the fiduciary knows or should know 
are relevant to the particular investment or investment course of action involved, 
including the role the investment or investment course of action plays in that 
portion of the plan’s investment portfolio with respect to which the fiduciary 
has investment duties; and (B) has acted accordingly.
(2) For purposes of paragraph (1) of this subsection, “appropriate consid­
eration” shall include, but is not necessarily limited to, (A) a determination 
by the fiduciary that the particular investment or investment course of action 
is reasonably designed, as part of the portfolio (or, where applicable, that 
portion of the plan portfolio with respect to which the fiduciary has investment 
duties), to further the purposes of the plan, taking into consideration the risk 
of loss and the opportunity for gain (or other return) associated with the 
investment or investment course of action, and (B) consideration of the following 
factors as they relate to such portion of the portfolio:
(i) The composition of the portfolio with regard to diversification;
(ii) The liquidity and current return of the portfolio relative to the anticipated 
cash flow requirements of the plan; and
(iii) The projected return of the portfolio relative to the funding objectives 
of the plan.
(3) An investment manager appointed, pursuant to the provisions of section 
402(c)(3) of the Act, to manage all or part of the assets of a plan, may, for 
purposes of compliance with the provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) of this 
subsection, rely on, and act upon the basis of, information pertaining to the 
plan provided by or at the direction of the appointing fiduciary, if—
(A) such information is provided for the stated purpose of assisting the 
manager in the performance of his investment duties, and
(B) the manager does not know and has no reason to know that the information 
is incorrect.
(c) Definitions. For purposes of this section:
(1) The term “investment duties” means any duties imposed upon, or 
assumed or undertaken by, a person in connection with the investment of plan 
assets which make or will make such person a fiduciary of an employee benefit 
plan or which are performed by such person as a fiduciary of an employee 
benefit plan as defined in section 3(21)(A)(i) or (ii) of the Act.
(2) The term “investment course of action” means any series or program of 
investments or actions related to a fiduciary’s performance of his investment 
duties.
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(3) The term “plan” means an employee benefit plan to which Title I of the 
Act applies.
Signed at Washington, D.C., this 20th day of June 1979.
Ian D. Lanoff, Administrator, Pension and Welfare Benefit Programs. Labor- 
Management Services Administration. United States Department of Labor.
NOTES
1. See also 43 FR 27208 (June 23, 1978), in which notice was given of an extension of the 
original comment period.
2. The regulation pertains only to the investment duties of a fiduciary of an employee benefit 
plan. Section 404(a)(1)(B) of the Act, however, requires that a fiduciary discharge all his duties 
in accordance with the “prudence” rule.
It should also be noted that, although the proposed regulation made reference to an additional 
requirement of section 404(a)(1)—that the fiduciary discharge his duties solely in the interest of 
plan participants and beneficiaries—that reference has been deleted from the regulation as adopted. 
This was done to avoid suggesting that satisfaction of the “prudence” rule with respect to an 
investment or investment course of action necessarily implies satisfaction of that additional 
requirement.
3. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 302 (1974).
4. See sections 403(a)(2) and 402(c)(3) of the Act.
5. Further, section 405(a) of the Act provides, in part, that a plan fiduciary shall be liable for a 
breach of fiduciary liability of another fiduciary with respect to the same plan if, among other 
things, he has knowledge of such a breach and does not make reasonable efforts to remedy it, or 
he has enabled such other fiduciary to commit a breach by his failure to comply with the 
requirements of section 404(a)(1) of the Act in the administration of his specific responsibilities 
which give rise to his status as a fiduciary.
6. Paragraph (b)(2) of the regulation, as proposed, stated that the factors which should be 
considered “may” include those listed. In order to reduce uncertainty, reflected in the comments, 
regarding the application of the regulation, and in view of the fact that the regulation is in nature 
of a “safe harbor” provision, paragraph (b)(2) has been restructured so as to indicate the factors 
which should under all circumstances be considered by any fiduciary who wishes to rely on the 
provisions of the rule.
7. It should be noted that index funds typically include a “screen” or “filter” process by which 
portfolio investments for any such fund may be changed to reflect significant, adverse financial 
developments affecting any potential or existing portfolio company, notwithstanding the continued 
inclusion of the company in the index against which the fund is measured.
8. The term “risk” is used here in its ordinary sense, and refers to any and all types of risk 
applicable to a particular investment or investment course of action.
9. See, e.g., section 401(b) of the Act.
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APPENDIX B 
DISCUSSION GUIDE
Prepared by Mark Rollinson, Esq., Rollinson, Nucci & Grabell
I. Technical Framework
A. Types of Plans
There are basically four types of retirement plans, and it is a mistake 
to treat them all the same. They are listed below in roughly descending 
order of importance, measured by assets under management.
1. Defined Benefit Plans
Under defined benefit plans the employer is more of an insurer 
than anything else, and the largest single asset of most plans 
is, in effect, an “account receivable” from the employer—the 
unfunded liability. (Is this “prudent”?)
A strong argument can be made that these plans should be 
regulated as if they were in fact insurance companies. Following 
the Wisconsin model now used in many states, allowance would 
be made for size, experience, and maturity, with decreasing 
gradations of regulation of investment practices.
Like insurance company shareholders, the sole beneficiary of 
superlative investment performance, and the first victim of 
adverse performance, is the employer. Actuarial ability to keep 
promises is the sole legitimate social/regulatory concern.
2. Defined Contribution Annuities
Each time a contribution is made to these plans an annuity is 
purchased for each beneficiary from an insurance company.
ERISA regulation of these plans is ritualistic, formalistic, and 
unnecessary.
3. Defined Contribution Plans, Group
These plans are in the nature of closed-end mutual funds. Yet 
the shareholders are not allowed to vote and there is no stated 
investment policy.
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These plans, arguably, should most benefit from the new 
definition of “prudence”—mandating a diversified risk policy.
4. Defined Contribution Plans, Individual Record
These plans are like small trust accounts or IRAs with a common 
trustee and no beneficiary control. These usually end up becoming 
defined contribution annuities because corpus is never large 
enough to develop a diversified investment strategy.
B. Reasons for Investment Phenomena
Before trying to induce pension managers to invest in small enter­
prises, it is mandatory to identify the perceived present restraints.
While most seem to point to the “prudent man rule,” this may not 
be (and probably is not) the real reason. After all, roughly 40 percent 
of all large pension funds now have at least one significant investment 
in venture capital partnerships. It is unlikely that there are this many 
professional pension managers who misread the prudent man rule.
The principal reason probably is lack of skill! If so, a 5 percent 
safe-harbor basket would do more damage than good. If so, a tight 
“plan asset” rule would be counterproductive.
II. Social Policy Issues
A. Allocation of Resources Function
In a capitalist society, an extremely important function, arguably, is 
allocation of capital resources.
Pension and profit-sharing managers are far removed from the “front 
line” and essentially have abdicated their responsibility. “Index 
investing” is the most flagrant example of abdication. (The subtleties 
of “plan asset” arguments are ludicrous in a regulatory framework 
where “index investing” is possible.)
B. Allocation of Resources Application
Small enterprises are significant contributors to the corpus of pension 
resources. Yet the large competitors of small enterprises are the 
principal beneficiaries of the allocation of these resources.
C. Free Market
Experience seems to teach that tampering with free market forces is 
counterproductive in all instances except some natural monopolies 
and except for a moral framework, for example, the fraud of promising 
a defined benefit without being able to deliver.
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III. Possible Change
A. Wrenching Change
1. Taxation
If it is deemed desirable that more pension and profit-sharing 
plan resources be allocated to smaller enterprise, the simplest, 
easiest, and most effective way to achieve the objective is through 
taxation of corpus. For example, one might levy a 2 percent tax 
on corpus of all plans and allow a credit of 10 percent of corpus 
invested in small business and 10 percent of corpus invested in 
medium-sized business.
2. Free Choice
It may make sense to allow beneficiaries of defined contribution 
plans to vote upon whether they want a more conservative or 
more liberal investment policy.
3. State Regulation Model
It may make sense for defined benefit plans to be regulated 
along the model of state regulation of insurance companies.
B. Modest Change
1. Plan Assets
The single most needed change, arguably, is a plan asset policy 
that permits third-party management of small enterprise invest­
ment without disruption to proven effective activities in that 
business, for example, leverage and incentives.
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Fringe and 
Retirement Benefits 
Equity

RETIREMENT BENEFITS 
EQUITY
by John S. Nolan, Esq., Miller & Chevalier, Chartered
Tax Treatment of Retirement Plans for 
the Self-Employed
Prior to 1962, self-employed persons were not eligible to participate in 
qualified retirement plans. Although deductible contributions by self- 
employed persons were permitted after the enactment of H.R. 10, they 
were conditioned upon a host of special restrictions. In 1974, the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) liberalized the 
original H.R. 10 rules somewhat by increasing the limits on deductible 
contributions and authorizing the establishment of defined benefit plans 
for self-employed persons, but the special restrictions applicable only 
to H.R. 10 plans remained intact.
While the changes made by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 
(ERTA) fell short of achieving full equality of treatment for self-employed 
persons, they went a considerable way in closing the gap between the 
self-employed and their corporate counterparts. Most of the amendments 
apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1981.1
Three changes of particular significance are discussed herein.
1. Self-employed persons were permitted to make deductible vol­
untary contributions to H.R. 10 plans and Individual Retirement 
Accounts (IRAs).
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2. The dollar limitations applicable to an employer’s H.R. 10 
contributions were increased.
3. The prohibition on plan loans was extended to all self-employed 
persons (not merely owner-employees).
The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) 
dramatically altered the tax treatment of retirement plans for self- 
employed persons by (1) repealing some of the special restrictions 
imposed on H.R. 10 plans, (2) extending other H.R. 10 rules to all 
qualified plans, including corporate plans, and (3) applying many of 
the remaining restrictions only to plans that primarily benefit key 
employees (whether employed by corporate or noncorporate employers). 
Most of the provisions relating to parity between corporate and noncor­
porate plans apply to years beginning after December 31, 1983.
When the provisions of TEFRA take effect, the tax benefits of a 
retirement plan will no longer turn on the form of business organization 
maintaining the plan; rather, the crucial factor will be whether the plan 
is a top-heavy plan, which primarily benefits “key employees.” A 
defined benefit plan is top-heavy if, as of the last day of the preceding 
plan year, the present value of the cumulative accrued benefits for key 
employees exceeds 60 percent of the analogous sum for all employees.2 
A defined contribution plan is top-heavy if, as of the last day of the 
preceding plan year, the aggregate of the accounts of key employees 
exceeds 60 percent of the analogous sum for all employees.3
If several plans of the same employer must be aggregated, each of 
the plans will constitute a top-heavy plan if the “aggregation group” is 
a “top-heavy group.”4 On the other hand, if the aggregation group is 
not a top-heavy group, no plan in the group will be treated as a top- 
heavy plan.
A “key employee” is any plan participant (including a self-employed 
individual) who, at any time during the plan year or any of the four 
preceding plan years, was one or more of the following:5
• An officer of the employer, as determined by reference to duties 
rather than title, but in no event will more than fifty employees 
(or, if lesser, the greater of three employees or 10 percent of the 
employees) be treated as officers6
One of the ten employees actually or constructively owning the 
largest interests owned by employees in the employer
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• A 5 percent owner of the employer (including constructive own­
ership)
• A 1 percent owner of the employer having an annual compensation 
(or earned income, in the case of a self-employed individual) of 
more than $150,000.
Voluntary Contributions to H.R. 10 Plans 
and IRAs
One of ERTA’s most important provisions has not been significantly 
affected by the enactment of TEFRA; deductible contributions may now 
be made to an IRA even though the individual is an “active participant” 
in a qualified H.R. 10 plan or corporate plan.7 Alternatively, an 
individual may make voluntary deductible contributions directly to a 
qualified plan, if the plan so permits.8 A self-employed person may 
make these deductible contributions without making additional contri­
butions on behalf of common-law employees.
A self-employed person may make a voluntary deductible contribution 
of up to $2,000 per year to an H.R. 10 plan or an IRA.9 The deductible 
amount may be as much as $2,250 if contributions are also made to an 
IRA for the self-employed person’s spouse.10 If the spouse also has 
earned income, the spouse may contribute up to $2,000 per year to a 
separate IRA (or to his or her employer’s qualified plan).
As under prior law, distributions from an IRA must commence no 
later than age 701/2 and must be made within a prescribed time after 
the individual’s death.11 Similar rules will apply to deductible voluntary 
employee contributions (as well as employer contributions) in plan years 
beginning after December 31, 1983.12 Other IRA rules have also been 
extended to deductible voluntary employee contributions, such as—
• Distributions made prior to age 591/2 will be subject to a 10 
percent excise tax penalty, except in the case of death or 
disability.13
• If an employee borrows from the contributed funds, or pledges 
them as security for a loan, the transaction may be treated as a 
taxable distribution.14
• Similarly, if such contributions are applied toward the purchase 
of life insurance, the amount so applied will be treated as a 
taxable distribution.15
111
• Deductible voluntary contributions and the earnings thereon will 
not qualify for ten-year forward averaging or capital gains treat­
ment, although they will qualify for the estate tax exclusion.16
Employer Contributions to H.R. 10 Plans
Advantages Obtained Under ERTA
Congress reduced the extent of discrimination against self-employed 
persons in 1981 by liberalizing the special rules governing employer 
contributions to H.R. 10 plans. The changes described below affect all 
taxable years beginning after December 31, 1981, and before January 
1, 1984.
ERTA increased the deduction limit for employer contributions to 
defined contribution H.R. 10 plans from $7,500 to $15,000 per year, 
but, as under prior law, the deductible amount was limited in any case 
to 15 percent of earned income.17 The level of benefits permitted under 
a defined benefit plan that includes self-employed persons was also 
increased.18
ERTA increased the limit on the amount of a self-employed person’s 
compensation that may be taken into account under an H.R. 10 plan, 
but imposed corresponding restrictions on the rate at which contributions 
must be made for common-law employees. In general, the rate at which 
contributions are made for self-employed persons in relation to their 
compensation has not been permitted to exceed the rate of contribution 
for common-law employees (except to the extent integration with social 
security is permitted).19 Under ERTA, a self-employed person may take 
his actual earnings into account up to $200,000—an increase of 
$100,000 over the old limit.20
However, to insure that plans would not reduce contributions that 
would otherwise have been required for common-law employees, ERTA 
prescribed minimum contribution levels; if compensation exceeding the 
old limit of $100,000 was actually taken into account for a particular 
plan year, contributions on behalf of a common-law employee would 
have to be made at a rate not less than 7.5 percent of compensation 
(the rate required, under old law, to obtain the maximum deduction of 
$7,500).21 At present, section 401(j) of the Internal Revenue Code 
imposes a comparable limitation on the benefit that may accrue on 
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behalf of a self-employed person under a defined benefit H.R. 10 plan 
in a single year.
An employer’s social security contributions may be considered in 
determining whether integrated H.R. 10 plans satisfy these minimum 
contribution or benefit requirements. Similarly, if “comparable” plans 
are maintained for self-employed persons and common-law employees, 
the contributions and benefits under the plan for common-law employees 
may be taken into account.
Equal Treatment Under TEFRA
Effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 1983, Congress 
abandoned most of the special restrictions governing employer contri­
butions to H.R. 10 plans. The $15,000 deduction limit for contributions 
to an H.R. 10 plan on behalf of a self-employed individual was re­
pealed.22 The special limitation on benefit accruals under defined benefit 
H.R. 10 plans was also repealed.23 In addition, TEFRA repealed the 
special restrictions on the amount of a self-employed person’s compen­
sation that may be taken into account under H.R. 10 plans.24 As a 
result of these changes, employer contributions to H.R. 10 plans will 
be subject to virtually the same limitations as corporate plans.
A new set of special restrictions on employer contributions will apply 
to top-heavy plans, beginning in 1984.
For any plan year in which a plan is a top-heavy plan, only the first 
$200,000 of an employee’s compensation (or earned income) may be 
taken into account in determining contributions or benefits under the 
plan. Beginning in 1986, this $200,000 limit will be adjusted for cost- 
of-living changes.25
A top-heavy plan must provide to each participant who is a non-key- 
employee a minimum contribution or minimum benefit based on the 
participant’s compensation.26 These minimum amounts are to be provided 
without regard to any social security contributions or benefits.27 But if 
a non-key-employee participates in both defined benefit and defined 
contribution plans of the employer, the employer is not required to 
provide the employee with both the minimum benefit and the minimum 
contribution.28
A top-heavy plan must vest an employee in his accrued benefit 
attributable to employer contributions in accordance with either a three- 
year full vesting schedule or a six-year graded vesting schedule.29 With 
certain exceptions, if a key employee participates in a defined benefit 
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plan and a defined contribution plan, both of which are included in a 
top-heavy group, the aggregate section 415 limit on benefits and 
contributions is reduced to 1.0, rather than 1.25.30
Loans to Plan Participants
Added Restrictions Under ERTA
ERTA extended the prohibition on plan loans to all self-employed 
persons (not merely owner-employees, as under prior law).31 Thus, prior 
to TEFRA, any loan from an H.R. 10 plan or a pledge of an interest 
in the plan as security for a loan, was treated as a currently taxable 
distribution, regardless of the bona fides of the transaction. In contrast, 
prior to the enactment of TEFRA, the law did not preclude a participant 
in a corporate plan from borrowing from the plan.32 Nevertheless, loans 
from a corporate plan of amounts transferred from an H.R. 10 plan to 
the corporate plan after January 1, 1982, presumably would be treated 
as a taxable distribution under ERTA.33
Equal Treatment Under TEFRA
TEFRA established a new general rule: A loan from any “qualified 
employer plan,” or a pledge of an interest in the plan, will be treated 
as a taxable distribution to the recipient.34 The new provisions apply to 
any loan, pledge, or assignment made after August 13, 1982, as well 
as any loan that is renegotiated, renewed, or extended after that date.35 
However, a transition rule mitigates the harsh impact of this effective 
date.36 The restrictions imposed by ERTA on loans from H.R. 10 plans 
have been repealed, effective after August 13, 1982, and the new rules 
described herein are applicable to such loans.37
New section 72(p) of the code contains an exception to the general 
rule, which provides that a loan meeting the following requirements will 
not be treated as a taxable distribution:
• The loan cannot exceed the lesser of $50,000 or 50 percent of 
the present value of the employee’s nonforfeitable accrued benefit 
under the plan (but not less than $10,000). The dollar limitation 
is applied cumulatively; thus, all prior outstanding loans, including 
those made on or before August 13, 1982, must be taken into 
account.
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• The loan must, by its terms, be repayable within five years, unless 
it is used to acquire, construct, or rehabilitate any dwelling unit 
that is to be used as the principal residence of the participant 
within a “reasonable time.”
If the loan exceeds the limits described above, the excess will be treated 
as a taxable distribution under taxable section 72. However, to the 
extent that the participant has made nondeductible employee contri­
butions to the plan, the loan may be treated as a nontaxable return of 
the participant’s basis.
For purposes of the income tax rules governing distributions, repay­
ments of amounts previously taxed as distributions will be treated as 
nondeductible employee contributions. Thus, the repaid amounts may 
subsequently be distributed tax-free. However, the repaid amounts will 
not be deemed employee contributions for purposes of those rules 
limiting nondeductible employee contributions and annual additions on 
behalf of an employee or those rules allowing the employee to make 
deductible voluntary contributions to a qualified plan.38
If a loan from a top-heavy plan to a key employee is treated as a 
distribution, it may be subject to the 10 percent excise tax imposed on 
premature distributions.39 A loan that is treated as a distribution will 
be subject to the new withholding provisions.40
The conference report (but not the statute) states that “plan investments 
(including investments in residential mortgages) which are made in the 
ordinary course of an investment program will not be considered as 
loans if the amount of the mortgage loan does not exceed the fair market 
value of the property purchased with the loan proceeds.”41 A loan made 
at the direction of a participant will not be considered a loan made as 
part of an investment program. Moreover, no loan that benefits an 
officer, director, or owner will be treated as an investment.
Incorporation: The Relative Advantages
Prior to the enactment of TEFRA, numerous tax benefits were available 
to professionals who chose to practice in corporate form. Many of the 
advantages of incorporation will continue to exist for another year or 
more, and these are discussed below. Nevertheless, it must be noted 
at the outset that TEFRA has drastically reduced the number of 
advantages to be gained from incorporation.
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Limit on Employer Contributions. Before TEFRA, valuable tax 
deferral advantages arose from the fact that larger contributions could 
be made to a qualified corporate retirement plan than to an H.R. 10 
plan. In 1982, employer contributions to a defined contribution plan on 
behalf of any corporate employee were limited to the lesser of 25 percent 
of compensation or $45,475.42 This far exceeded the $15,000 ceiling 
established by ERTA for H.R. 10 plans. Furthermore, the disparity was 
expected to grow with inflation, since only the limit on corporate plan 
contributions had been indexed to cost-of-living changes.43 The larger 
contributions permissible under corporate plans also increased the 
benefit of the estate tax exclusion.44
Under TEFRA, employer contributions to H.R. 10 plans will even­
tually be subject to the same indexed limits as employer contributions 
to corporate plans. The dollar limit for contributions to profit-sharing 
plans and other defined contribution plans maintained by corporations 
has been reduced to $30,000, effective for all years beginning after 
December 31, 1982.45 The dollar limit applicable to H.R. 10 plans will 
be increased to the same level after December 31, 1983.46
The cost-of-living adjustments to the dollar limits have been suspended 
until 1986, at which time the limits will be adjusted for post-1984 cost- 
of-living increases (as measured by the social security benefit index).47
Section 245 of TEFRA imposes a $100,000 cap on the estate tax 
exclusion otherwise applicable to amounts payable under qualified 
retirement plans. The new limit applies to estates of decedents dying 
after December 31, 1982.
Limit on Annual Benefits. Before TEFRA’s enactment, the max­
imum benefit permitted under a defined benefit pension plan was also 
greater for corporate employees than for their self-employed counterparts. 
In 1982, a corporate employer was allowed to fund an annual pension 
benefit of as much as $136,425, a figure that has been adjusted annually 
for cost-of-living changes.48 Benefits available to self-employed persons 
were substantially smaller, due to special restrictions based upon the 
participant’s age when first covered by the plan. Special limitations on 
annual benefit accruals under H.R. 10 plans have prevented older self- 
employed persons from taking advantage of short-term funding arrange­
ments permitted under corporate plans.49
Under TEFRA, defined benefit plans that cover self-employed indi­
viduals will, by 1984, be subject to the same rules applicable to other 
defined benefit plans. The dollar limit for annual benefits has been 
reduced to $90,000, effective for all years beginning after December 
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31, 1982, and the cost-of-living adjustments have been suspended until 
1986.50 The special limitations in section 401(j) of the code have been 
repealed, effective after December 31, 1983.51
The 1.4 Rule. Before TEFRA, corporate employees could partic­
ipate in both a defined contribution plan and a defined benefit plan, 
provided that the combined benefits of both plans did not exceed 140 
percent of the otherwise applicable separate dollar or percentage limits. 
This advantage, commonly known as the 1.4 rule, was not, as a practical 
matter, available to self-employed individuals.52
With respect to plan years beginning after December 31, 1982, 
TEFRA reduced the aggregate limit from 1.4 to the lesser of 1.25 (as 
applied only to the dollar limits) or 1.4 (as applied to the percentage 
limits).53 The new limits will affect self-employed persons to the same 
extent as corporate employees, but participants in top-heavy plans will 
be subject to special rules.54
Plan Loans. Until August 14, 1982, employees of professional 
corporations were permitted to borrow from a corporate plan or pledge 
the plan interest as security for a loan.55 As discussed earlier, however, 
TEFRA imposed restrictions on loans from all “qualified employer 
plans,” including corporate plans and H.R. 10 plans.
Special Restrictions on Certain Employees. H.R. 10 plans that 
cover an “owner-employee” (self-employed person holding a greater 
than 10 percent interest in the capital or profits of the business) have 
been subject to additional restrictions that are not applicable to corporate 
plans. These include the following:
• All common-law employees participating in the plan must be fully 
vested at all times.56
• No payments may be made, without penalty, to an owner-employee 
prior to his attaining age 591/2, but payments to an owner-employee 
must begin by age 70 1/2.57
• Integration with social security is not permitted in most cases.58
• Plan assets must be held by a bank.59
Most of the special restrictions on plans covering owner-employees have 
been repealed, effective for plan years beginning after December 31, 
1983.60 They have been replaced with special restrictions on top-heavy 
plans covering key employees. For example, no payments may be made, 
without penalty, to a key employee in a top-heavy plan prior to his 
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attaining age 591/2.61 In addition, payments to a key employee in a top- 
heavy plan must commence by age 701/2, regardless of whether he has 
separated from service by that time.62 Nevertheless, several rules of 
special applicability to owner-employees have not been changed.63
Corporate Surtax Exemption. Professional corporations have 
benefitted from the corporate surtax exemption; ERTA substantially 
reduced the composite rate of tax on the first $100,000 of corporate 
income.64 This advantage may be short-lived, due to the enactment of 
section 269A of the code.65
Fringe Benefits. Self-employed lawyers and accountants have 
never been able to obtain certain tax-free fringe benefits available to 
employees of professional corporations, such as group-term life insur­
ance, disability income insurance, health insurance, and benefits under 
qualified medical expense reimbursement plans.66 TEFRA made no 
significant changes in this regard;67 thus, by 1984, the availability of 
fringe benefits will be one of the few remaining advantages to be gained 
from incorporation.
Social Security Taxes. The social security taxes paid by incor­
porated professionals are somewhat higher due to the fact that professional 
corporations bear the burden of both the employer and employee FICA 
taxes. Inasmuch as the employer portion is tax-deductible, however, 
the net burden is only slightly heavier than the wholly nondeductible 
self-employment FICA tax paid by unincorporated lawyers and account­
ants.68
Limited Malpractice Liability. The primary nontax advantage of 
incorporation is the reduced exposure to malpractice liability. In many 
jurisdictions, a professional’s liability for the negligence of others is 
limited to the assets of the professional corporation (although the 
professional still has unlimited liability for his own negligence).69
Administrative Costs. The administrative costs of incorporation 
tend to be minor: filing fees, state registration fees or taxes, cost of 
preparing charter, bylaws, employment agreements, shareholder agree­
ments, and so on.
Multistate Practice. Since many states require shareholders of a 
professional corporation to be licensed to practice in the state of 
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incorporation, some multistate firms may find it necessary to practice 
as a partnership of corporations separately established in each state. 
Alternatively, the firms may decide to permit individual partners to 
incorporate. Some professionals believe that the increased autonomy 
that accompanies a partnership of professional corporations may cause 
the partnership to disintegrate.70
Single-Shareholder Professional 
Corporations: Special Tax and Nontax 
Considerations
Flexibility in Plan Design
The principal advantage of permitting individual partners to incorporate 
has been that each lawyer or accountant may adopt the type of plan 
that best suits his or her needs. For instance, older partners may choose 
to defer a greater portion of their current earnings than younger partners 
facing cash flow problems, but all common-law employees must receive 
benefits on a nondiscriminatory basis by reference to the richest plan 
in the group.71 If the partners individually incorporate, each can be 
made to bear the full burden of his or her own retirement plan costs. 
If the firm is incorporated as a whole, this result can only be approximated 
by treating the pension costs as an overhead item, then making 
appropriate adjustments in salaries and bonuses.
Multiple Corporate Surtax Exemptions
The low rates of tax on the first $100,000 of corporate income have 
worked to the advantage of individually incorporated lawyers. Incor­
porated attorneys and accountants have been able to retain their capital 
accounts upon incorporating and have then built up those accounts 
through earnings not withdrawn as compensation or dividends. Such 
amounts have been taxed to their corporations at rates as low as 15 
percent.
To a limited extent, some professional corporations have accumulated 
additional earnings—representing amounts not needed for current 
consumption—but such amounts will be taxed again at the shareholder­
level upon distribution.72 Capital gains rates may apply if these amounts 
are distributed in complete liquidation of the corporation.73
If an individual lawyer or accountant owns most of the stock of 
another corporation, the additional corporate surtax exemption may be
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denied.74 In light of the enactment of section 269A of the code, it is 
questionable whether the surtax advantage remains viable.
Limited Liability
In many jurisdictions, a partner who incorporates individually is liable 
for partnership liabilities (not arising from his own negligence) only to 
the extent of his corporation’s assets; unincorporated partners would 
remain personally liable for partnership liabilities. Although indemni­
fication agreements may be used to achieve more equitable results, such 
agreements may undercut the business purpose for incorporating and 
increase the likelihood of attack by the IRS.75 To the extent that firms 
carry substantial insurance coverage, the issue may be largely academic.
Administrative Costs
The creation and maintenance of a single corporation or partnership 
and single set of plans is obviously more cost-efficient, from an 
administrative standpoint, than the establishment of separate corpora­
tions with separate plans.
The failure of one incorporated partner to conform to the requisite 
corporate formalities could have an adverse impact on other incorporated 
partners as well. Accordingly, firms that permit their partners to 
incorporate will have to bear the administrative burden of ensuring that 
each partner observes all corporate formalities.
Thus, the incorporation of individual partners can be justified 
economically only if the partners anticipate very significant tax deferrals. 
The unique tax risks associated with individual partner incorporation 
require careful consideration.
Tax Risks Associated With Single-Shareholder
Professional Corporations
Section 250 of TEFRA added new section 269A to the code in response 
to several recent Tax Court opinions that recognized the validity of one- 
man professional corporations despite the IRS’s multifaceted attacks. A 
summary of those cases is provided below, as a necessary preface to 
the discussion of section 269A.
There have been only limited attempts to attack professional corpo­
rations under the “sham corporation” theory, except where corporate 
formalities have not been observed.76 In arguing that a professional 
corporation is a sham or alter ego of its shareholders, the IRS has had 
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to reckon with the Supreme Court’s ruling that a corporation is a 
separate, viable entity if it was organized for a legitimate business 
purpose or if it is engaged in substantial business activity.77 It is worth 
noting, however, that the dissenters in Keller suggested that a one-man 
corporation must have a business activity of its own; in the case of a 
law partnership of professional corporations, the dissenters would argue 
that the law practice is the partnership’s business, rather than the 
business of an incorporated partner.
Where the primary motivation for organizing a professional corporation 
was to obtain the tax benefits of retirement plans, the IRS has sought 
to disallow the deductions under section 269 of the code on grounds 
that the corporate acquisition was made for the purpose of avoiding 
taxes.78 To date, the courts have firmly rejected the IRS’s attacks under 
section 269 in this context: “Once a corporation is formed and all 
organizational and operational requirements are met, it should be 
recognized for tax purposes regardless of the fact that it was formed to 
take advantage of the richer corporate retirement plans. ”79
In cases involving individually incorporated partners, the IRS has 
mounted attacks based on section 482 of the code and the assignment- 
of-income doctrine.
Where corporate formalities have not been observed, a professional 
corporation’s income may be reallocated to its shareholder under section 
482 or under the general authority of section 61.80 Assignment of income 
principles may be applied if the corporation lacks the power to control 
the earning of the income. In IRS Letter Ruling 8031028, the IRS 
listed seven factors it considered in determining whether the shareholder 
was the true earner of income under section 61:
1. A written partnership agreement naming the corporation as a 
partner
2. Assignment of the partnership interest to the corporation
3. An employment contract between the corporation and the share­
holder
4. Modification of insurance policies to provide coverage for the 
corporation
5. Employment by the corporation of individuals other than the sole 
shareholder
6. Indebtedness incurred by the corporation (other than retirement 
plan costs)
7. Failure of the corporation to distribute all of the earnings as salary 
or dividends
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If the formalities have been observed, the courts have held that 
section 482, rather than the assignment of income doctrine, is the 
appropriate mechanism for reallocating income.81 Under section 482, 
the IRS may reallocate income and deductions among commonly 
controlled businesses if such adjustments are necessary to clearly reflect 
the income of such businesses. Several recent cases have suggested 
that a one-man professional corporation may be vulnerable to reallocation 
under section 482 to the extent that it retains income that the shareholder­
employee would have received absent incorporation.
In Keller, a partnership of physicians included a one-man professional 
corporation. The Tax Court recognized the professional corporation as 
a separate, viable corporate entity. With regard to the section 482 issue, 
the question was whether the physician and the professional corporation 
would have entered into the same transactions had they been dealing 
at arm’s length; specifically, the court asked whether the total compen­
sation, including qualified plan contributions, paid to or on behalf of 
the incorporated physician was essentially equivalent to the amount he 
would have received absent incorporation. Since the question was 
answered in the affirmative, the majority concluded that the reallocation 
of income was improper (except with respect to income received by the 
corporation from a laboratory after incorporation but before the corpo­
ration was legally substituted for the individual in the contract with the 
laboratory). The dissent in Keller argued that assignment of income 
principles should have been applied to the professional corporation, 
since the corporation existed as an empty shell with none of the attributes 
of an ongoing business (assets, debts, employees other than the sole 
shareholder). In the dissenters’ view, the partnership conducted the 
business.
In Pacella, the IRS conceded that an incorporated psychiatric practice 
was a viable entity, but attempted to invoke section 482 to reallocate 
income from the corporation to its sole shareholder and a hospital owned 
by the sole shareholder. Following Keller, the Tax Court ruled that the 
IRS’s allocation was arbitrary and capricious; the psychiatrist’s com­
pensation from the corporation, including the pension plan contributions, 
closely reflected the amount of compensation he would have sought for 
his services from an unrelated entity.
In Foglesong, the taxpayer split the income derived from the services 
he performed as a sales representative between himself and his personal 
service corporation. By manipulating corporate dividends, he attempted 
to shift income to members of his family who owned preferred shares. 
The corporation did not adopt any retirement plans. The Tax Court 
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originally applied assignment of income principles to tax virtually all 
of the income to the taxpayer personally. The seventh circuit reversed, 
holding that the assignment of income doctrine could not be used to 
defeat a personal service corporation where corporate formalities had 
been observed. On remand, the Tax Court reallocated most of the 
income to the taxpayer under section 482. Citing Keller, the court ruled 
that the taxpayer would have received nearly all of the income personally 
had he not incorporated; had he dealt with the corporation at arm’s 
length, he would not have accepted less.
The Tax Court stated expressly in Foglesong that it did not intend to 
discourage the use of the corporate form for personal service businesses 
where one of the purposes of incorporation is to take advantage of 
certain tax laws relating to employee benefit plans.
The purpose of new section 269A of the code is “to overturn the 
results reached in cases like Keller, where the corporation served no 
meaningful purpose other than to secure tax benefits that would not 
otherwise be available.”82 Section 269A is essentially a synthesis of 
sections 269 and 482. The new provision authorizes the IRS to allocate 
all income and other tax benefits—deductions, credits, exclusions, and 
the like—between a “personal service corporation” and its “employee­
owners” (any employee who actually or constructively owns more than 
10 percent of the outstanding stock) if the following conditions are 
satisfied:
• Substantially all of the corporation’s services must be performed 
for or on behalf of one other organization, including another 
corporation or a partnership.
• The principal purpose for forming or availing of the corporation 
must be to avoid or evade taxes by reducing the income of, or 
securing the benefit of any allowance for, any employee-owner 
that would not otherwise be available.
• The reallocation of income or allowances must be necessary to 
prevent avoidance or evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the 
income of the corporation or any of its employee-owners.
Section 269A is applicable to all taxable years beginning after December 
31, 1982; it takes effect one year before the parity rules for retirement 
plans do.
Senator Dole has stated that “a personal service corporation will not 
be considered to be formed or availed of for the purpose of evading or 
123
avoiding Federal income tax solely because, for 1983, the qualified 
plan rules will permit higher contributions and other advantages for 
corporate employees. Thus, in applying section 269A, the Secretary of 
the Treasury will not take a corporation’s retirement plan into account.”83 
Nevertheless, section 269A may prove to be a potent weapon against 
certain professional corporations formed primarily for the purpose of 
taking advantage of the corporate surtax exemption.
Other Tax Issues Pertaining to 
Professional Corporations
Reasonable Compensation
Where lawyers practice in partnership form, all of the distributable net 
income of the partnership is automatically taxable to the partners.84 In 
the context of the 50 percent maximum tax on earned income, the IRS 
took the position that all partnership income attributable to legal fees 
was personal service income.85
In contrast, a professional corporation is taxable on its gross income 
less allowable deductions.86 Compensation paid to shareholder-employ­
ees will not be deductible if the payments are more than a “reasonable 
allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services 
actually rendered” or are “disguised dividends.”87 In determining 
whether compensation is reasonable, all compensation, including fringe 
and deferred benefits, is considered.
The disappearance of the maximum tax on earned income under 
ERTA eliminated one of the primary motivations for inflating the 
compensation figure. Nevertheless, disallowance of the compensation 
deduction will still increase the corporate-level tax and reduce the plan 
contributions made on the shareholder-employee’s behalf.
Yet, the IRS has rarely challenged the reasonableness of law firm 
compensation.88
• Although capital investment is an increasingly important element 
in law practice, most income is still attributable primarily to the 
personal services of the lawyer-principals.89
• Whether a law firm has goodwill is very questionable; in general, 
the practice of law is still characterized by highly personal 
relationships.90
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• The income attributable to legal fees should be treated consistently, 
regardless of whether the firm practices in partnership or corporate 
form.
Distribution of a regular, even though modest, dividend (representing 
at least a minimum return on the lawyer’s capital account plus a share 
of the corporation’s investment earnings) may ultimately prove to be the 
most persuasive evidence that any amounts paid as “compensation” 
were indeed reasonable.
Personal Holding Company Status
If a professional corporation undertakes to accumulate income in the 
corporation, the accumulated earnings may be subject to a stiff personal 
holding company penalty tax unless they are distributed as dividends.91 
A small, closely held corporation may be regarded as a personal holding 
company if a significant portion of its income is derived from personal 
service contracts that provide that some person other than the corporation 
has the right to designate the particular individual who is to render 
services on the corporation’s behalf.92 The IRS has ruled that a mere 
solicitation or expectation that a particular person will perform the 
services is insufficient in the absence of evidence that the services are 
so unique as to preclude substitution.93
In the case of an incorporated firm, personal holding company status 
can be avoided by specifying in the instruments that no particular 
shareholder-employee is obligated to perform or supervise professional 
services on the corporation’s behalf.
The personal holding company tax may be of more serious concern 
to partnerships of professional corporations. If the partnership agreement 
itself is regarded as a personal service contract and the agreement 
either explicitly or implicitly designates the shareholder-employee of a 
corporate partner as the person to perform services for the partnership, 
then the corporate partner could be characterized as a personal holding 
company. Nevertheless, the IRS’s position has been that the client, 
rather than the partnership, is the person for whom services are 
performed; thus, the partnership agreement is not a personal service 
contract. Therefore, a corporate partner is not likely to be considered 
a personal holding company so long as the governing instruments provide 
that the corporation has the authority and duty to replace the services 
of its shareholder-employee with those of other lawyers as needed.94
To the extent that the application of sections 482 or 269A of the 
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code precludes one-man professional corporations from accumulating 
significant amounts of income, the question of whether such corporations 
risk personal holding company tax liability is rendered moot.
Accumulated Earnings Tax
In general, professional corporations may accumulate up to $150,000 
without risk of imposition of the penalty tax on income that is accumulated 
beyond the reasonable needs of the business.95 (Note: The increase in 
the minimum accumulated earnings credit under section 232(a) of ERTA 
did not apply to professional service corporations.) If an incorporated 
attorney or accountant also owns a substantial interest in another 
corporation, a single accumulated earnings credit must be divided 
between the two corporations.96
As a practical matter, demands for cash compensation by the principals 
will render this issue moot in most cases. Furthermore, the application 
of sections 482 and 269A of the code may effectively preclude 
professional corporations from accumulating substantial amounts of 
income.
Liquidation of Personal Service Corporations
Congress recognized that a number of personal service corporations may 
wish to liquidate when the parity provisions of TEFRA take effect, and 
accordingly provided some temporary tax relief. Section 247 of TEFRA 
provides that a personal service corporation may, during 1983 or 1984, 
undertake a complete liquidation under section 333 of the code without 
exposing itself to the risk that the corporation will incur tax on its 
unrealized receivables.97 Nevertheless, the distributee shareholder will 
recognize ordinary income upon subsequent collection or other dispo­
sition of the receivables.
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FRINGE BENEFITS
EQUITY
by Thomas P. Brock, CPA, Brock, Cordle and Associates
Our federal tax laws contain inequities in the treatment of small 
businesses. This is true even though continuing efforts have been made 
to make the laws as fair as possible. Perhaps the most pervasive and 
financially significant of these discriminations against small businesses 
exists in the area of fringe benefits, including health and accident plans, 
group life insurance plans, and employee death benefits. Retirement 
plans, such as pension, profit-sharing, and annuity plans, are not within 
the scope of this paper.
The discrimination against small businesses in the fringe benefit area 
is directly connected to the distinction made between incorporated and 
unincorporated businesses. Incorporated businesses obviously include 
almost all of the largest businesses in this country, and unincorporated 
businesses include almost all of the smallest businesses.
In a nut shell, corporations can deduct the cost of health and accident 
plans, group life insurance, employee death benefits, and similar fringe 
benefits paid to all of their employees including stockholder-employees. 
Unincorporated businesses can generally deduct these same costs only 
to the extent that they relate to their employees; they cannot deduct 
these costs if they relate to the owners of the businesses (sole proprietors 
and partners). Certain other types of fringe benefits may be deducted 
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for both owners and employees but are subject to special limitations 
imposed on owners that are not imposed on other classes of employees.
As a result, there is a flagrant inequity in the tax treatment of owners 
of businesses, especially unincorporated businesses, as opposed to the 
treatment of employees. Owners are treated differently from all types of 
employees, including employees of businesses, governments, and non­
profit entities. There seems to be no rational justification for this 
difference. It is so inconsistent with the general thrust of our tax laws 
that it seems almost inadvertent.
According to income tax return information compiled by the Internal 
Revenue Service for the year 1977, there were about 3,700,000 
proprietorships and partnerships in the United States with receipts of 
$25,000 or more. Of this total, about 800,000 were in the agriculture, 
forestry, and fishing industries and 2,900,000 were in nonagricultural 
industries. Information released by the Small Business Administration 
(SBA) indicates that business receipts totaled $488 billion for all 
proprietorships in 1979 and $208 billion for all partnerships in 1978. 
The size of these numbers makes the importance of these unincorporated 
businesses to our total economy evident. A further indication of the 
importance of small business is found in other SBA figures, which show 
that 66 percent of the total new jobs generated between 1969 and 1976 
were in firms with twenty or fewer employees.
Fringe Benefits That Discriminate 
Against Unincorporated Businesses
The main fringe benefits that are required to be treated differently by 
unincorporated businesses are discussed below.
Accident and Health Plans. Section 105 of the Internal Revenue 
Code provides that most payments by employers for the costs of medical 
care are not taxable to the employees receiving the payments. Neither 
are payments to compensate for permanent injury or disfigurement and 
certain payments to the permanently and totally disabled. Under section 
162, these payments are deductible by the businesses making the 
payments. For these purposes, self-employed individuals are not con­
sidered to be employees, so unincorporated businesses cannot deduct 
these kinds of payments to the self-employed. (Certain nondiscrimination 
rules apply to self-insured medical reimbursement plans.)
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Group-Term Life Insurance Section 79 of the code provides that 
the cost of up to $50,000 of group-term life insurance may be paid for 
and deducted by employers without creating income taxable to the 
employees receiving the coverage. Proprietors and partners are not 
considered to be employees for this purpose; thus, payments made on 
their behalf for group life insurance are not deductible. The Tax Equity 
and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, which was recently passed, 
applies new nondiscrimination rules in this area beginning in 1984.
Qualified Transportation. Section 124 allows employers to deduct 
transportation costs of employees between their residences and places 
of employment in commuter highway vehicles without generating taxable 
income reportable by the employees. Once again, because self-employed 
individuals are not considered employees, owners of unincorporated 
businesses do not qualify for this fringe benefit.
Meals and Lodging Furnished for the Convenience of the 
Employer. Section 119 allows certain employees to exclude from 
gross income the value of meals or lodging furnished for the convenience 
of their employers. While there is some conflict in related court decisions 
(see G. A. Papineau, 16 T.C. 130 (1951)), the IRS and several circuit 
courts hold that self-employed individuals may not exclude these items 
from their gross incomes.
Employees’ Death Benefits. Section 101(b) of the code provides 
for the exclusion from employees’ incomes of employees’ death benefits 
of up to $5,000 paid and deducted by employers. Self-employed 
individuals are not considered to be employees for this purpose; therefore, 
death benefit payments to them by unincorporated businesses are not 
deductible. However, Congress, in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 
1982, has changed this provision to allow up to $5,000 of tax-free death 
benefit payments to self-employed individuals after 1983 if made from 
retirement plans or annuity contracts, thereby eliminating a part of the 
discrimination against unincorporated businesses.
Other Fringe Benefits
The change in the death benefit provision is evidence of a growing 
recognition by Congress of the inherent unfairness of the fringe benefit 
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rules described above. Perhaps because of this change in thinking, 
most recently adopted fringe benefit programs have provided that self- 
employed individuals should be treated the same as employees. But, a 
new type of discrimination against smaller businesses involving restric­
tions on payments for the benefit of business owners has been introduced. 
Recently adopted fringe benefits are described below.
Group Legal Service Plans. Section 120 of the code provides for 
employer-funded group legal service plans effective for years beginning 
after 1976. Employees are not taxable on deductible employer contri­
butions. Self-employed individuals are treated as employees. Discrim­
ination in favor of employees who are officers, shareholders, self- 
employed or highly compensated individuals is forbidden. However, 
payments for the benefit of all the more-than-5-percent shareholders 
and owners are limited to not more than 25 percent of the total amount 
contributed to the plan.
Educational Assistance Programs. Section 127 permits em­
ployer-funded, tax-deductible educational assistance programs, which 
pay for such things as tuition, fees, and books for employees for years 
beginning after 1978. Employees are not taxed on these payments. Self­
employed individuals are treated as employees. Discrimination in favor 
of owners and others is forbidden. Payments for the benefit of all the 
more-than-5-percent shareholders and owners are limited to not more 
than 5 percent of the total amount paid to all participants under a 
program.
Dependent Care Assistance Programs. Section 129 provides for 
dependent care assistance programs for years beginning after 1981. 
Employees do not have to pay tax on certain limited tax-deductible 
amounts paid by employers for the care of dependents. Employees 
include self-employed individuals. Discrimination in favor of owners 
and others is prohibited. However, not more than 25 percent of the 
total amount paid by an employer can benefit all the more-than-5-percent 
shareholders and owners.
The thrust of these three provisions is obviously different from that 
of the other fringe benefits previously described. Both incorporated and 
unincorporated businesses are treated in generally the same way. All 
three of these new types of fringe benefits contain rules preventing 
discrimination in favor of officers, owners, and highly compensated 
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employees and their dependents. This kind of rule is not philosophically 
objectionable because it applies equally to all businesses regardless of 
size. However, in all three of the programs, a new type of discrimination 
against small businesses is introduced by further limiting the total 
dollars that can be spent on behalf of more-than-5-percent shareholders 
and owners to a specified percentage of total expenditures. This type of 
discrimination seems to be totally unwarranted.
One other rather strange example of fringe benefit discrimination 
against small business owners appears in section 217. Both employees 
and self-employed persons are allowed to deduct certain expenses of 
moving to a new principal place of work. However, employees must 
work full-time for at least thirty-nine weeks in the twelve months 
following their moves, and self-employed individuals must work full- 
time for seventy-eight weeks in the twenty-four months following their 
moves.
The key question that all of these provisions raise is whether there 
is any real justification for the various types of discrimination that our 
tax laws have created. Suppose an individual who has worked for a 
large corporation starts his own unincorporated business doing a similar 
kind of work (and perhaps creating new jobs for others) and makes a 
similar amount of money. Is there any compelling reason why fringe 
benefits are tax-free and unlimited in one case and taxable or limited 
in the other? Should the fact that he worked for a large business in one 
case and owned a small business in the other have any bearing on the 
outcome of this question? If the corner grocer operates as a proprietorship, 
is there any reason why he should be denied the deduction for medical 
insurance premiums that he could unquestionably obtain if he incor­
porated? Is there any broadly acceptable reason why partners and 
proprietors in particular and business owners in general deserve to be 
treated differently from their employees or from the employees of 
governments and nonprofit organizations? The answer seems to be that 
there simply is no fundamental justification for these differences.
A Proposal for Fringe Benefit Equity
None of the fringe benefit programs previously described are completely 
free of bias against small business. All either do not allow deductions 
by proprietors and partners or limit payments or deductions for the 
benefit of self-employed individuals and other key persons. This is true 
even though the payments do not discriminate in their favor. Obviously, 
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a limited deduction is fairer than no deduction at all, but the only really 
fair result would be to treat owners and employees exactly the same.
Generally speaking, it seems clear that a start towards a reasonable 
course in the fringe benefit area has been provided by the drafters of 
the newer fringe benefit provisions. For example, section 120(d), which 
relates to qualified group legal service plans provides that “the term 
‘self-employed individual’ means, and the term ‘employee’ includes, for 
any year, an individual who is an employee within the meaning of 
section 401(c)(1) (relating to self-employed individuals).” If this concept 
were uniformly applied throughout the fringe benefit area, much of the 
long-standing discrimination in the treatment of unincorporated business 
would be eliminated.
As noted, certain fringe benefit sections contain language precluding 
discrimination in favor of officers, shareholders, and highly compensated 
employees. Where this type of limitation is felt to be necessary, it could 
appropriately be extended to self-employed individuals. However, 
percentage limitations on payments for the benefit of such persons as 
those applicable to group legal service plans, educational assistance 
programs, and dependent care assistance programs are simply not 
appropriate because they generally affect only small businesses.
One problem that needs to be addressed involves the smallest of 
unincorporated businesses. IRS figures indicate that there were nearly 
9 million proprietorships and partnerships that filed income tax returns 
in 1977 and reported gross receipts of less than $25,000. To limit fringe 
benefits only to legitimate operating businesses, consideration might be 
given to extending the fringe benefit rules described earlier only to 
those unincorporated businesses having at least one full-time employee 
or to unincorporated businesses where the owner works full-time in the 
business.
The revenue effect of such a proposal is difficult to estimate. However, 
the tax savings for a single self-employed person could easily be in the 
$500 to $1,500 yearly range. Since as many as 4 million proprietors 
and partners might be involved, the annual revenue effect could 
conceivably be from one to several billion dollars. These numbers would 
no doubt be increased further as a result of the extension of fringe 
benefits to employees of unincorporated businesses and other small 
businesses who are not now receiving these fringe benefits.
However, regardless of the exact cost, it is exceptionally important 
to note that the provision of fringe benefit equity also provides a very 
specific and targeted reduction in income taxes for the owners of truly 
134
small businesses. It does not seem likely that any other proposed change 
in our tax laws would so specifically and significantly help the small 
business sector of our economy.
Social Effects of a Change in the Status 
of Fringe Benefits
While it is risky to predict the social effects of changes in our tax laws, 
certain observations can be made that probably are reasonably relevant. 
One of these is that our present tax laws partially subsidize the cost of 
fringe benefits. Presumably, fringe benefits are subsidized by the tax 
laws because they meet a social need. Through our tax laws, for example, 
we encourage the purchase of medical and life insurance. However, the 
effect of our present tax laws is to provide more encouragement to 
incorporated businesses than to unincorporated businesses. This is so 
because officers and employed owners of incorporated businesses can 
benefit from the fringe benefits, while the owners of unincorporated 
businesses cannot. Thus, there is less incentive for owners of unincor­
porated businesses to provide fringe benefit coverages for their employees 
than for the owners of similar incorporated businesses.
A second observation is that it is likely that unincorporated businesses 
employ a disproportionately large share of those in the lower economic 
levels of our work force. Small businesses generally pay lower wage 
rates than large businesses and thus hire more marginal workers. Since, 
among other things, there is less tax incentive for the owners of 
unincorporated businesses to provide fringe benefits for these workers, 
the level of benefits provided is probably significantly lower than the 
level provided by corporate employers. Yet, because of lower compen­
sation levels, the employees of unincorporated businesses probably are 
more in need of fringe benefits such as medical and life insurance than 
are corporate employees.
Finally, if these assumptions are generally true, it appears that 
encouraging the owners of small and unincorporated businesses to take 
advantage of various fringe benefit options and to provide the same 
fringe benefits for their employees on a nondiscriminatory basis would 
tend to meet a real need in our society. It can be speculated that the 
resulting additional coverage by medical and life insurance plans alone 
might significantly reduce the need for and the cost of various “safety 
net” programs provided for both the owners and the employees of small 
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businesses. The relationship of these cost savings to added costs 
resulting from increased tax deductions for fringe benefits might be 
surprising.
The effect of the inequities in our present tax law has been generally 
to encourage incorporated businesses to provide fringe benefits to their 
employees and to discourage unincorporated businesses from doing the 
same. It seems likely that eliminating this inequity would have the 
effect of extending medical, life, and other types of protection to many 
of the people in our small business community and in our total work 
force who need them the most. The cost to our government might be 
less than expected.
The allowance of fringe benefits is probably the greatest single 
inequity in the tax treatment of small businesses. This inequity is not 
philosophically justifiable, and serious consideration needs to be given 
to rectifying the situation. Providing tax equity in this area would 
probably be more meaningful for the really small businesses in this 
country and their employees than any other change that could be made 
in our tax laws.
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